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Abstract 
This thesis offers a philosophical defence of military humanitarian intervention 
(MHI). To do so, it develops the ‘other-defensive conception’ of MHI. The other-
defensive conception of MHI draws an analogy between so-called rescue killings in 
domestic society and MHI. In a domestic rescue killing, a rescuer defends a victim 
against an unjust aggressor. In fact, the thesis argues that the rescuer has a right to 
intervene on behalf of the victim. This right is correlated to a negative duty falling 
upon the attacker not to resist the intervention. By analogy, a state that is guilty of 
committing Atrocity Crimes against those under its rule forfeits its equal sovereign 
standing in international society. As a result, an intervening state does not violate 
negative duties not to aggress the ‘target’ state. Further, like a rescuer in a domestic 
rescue killing, the intervening state is holder of a (moral) right to intervene. The latter 
obliges the target state not to resist the intervention. The thesis supports this claim 
through two additional arguments. First, it argues that because Atrocity Crimes 
constitute grave moral evils, a military response to them is proportionate. Second, 
states that commit Atrocity Crimes do not perform their sovereign function of 
preserving the peace amongst those under their rule. Accordingly, the purpose of 
MHI is not merely to halt Atrocity Crimes, but also to reconstruct stable political 
institutions in the target state. On this basis the thesis explores the following four 
issues: 1) the relationship between the declaration of war and its conduct, 2) the 
problem of non-combatant immunity, 3) the foundation of a duty to intervene, and 
4) the ethics of humanitarian occupation. In doings so, it offers a comprehensive 
discussion of central problems in contemporary just war theory and the ethics of 
killing and saving.             
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Chapter I 
A normative theory of military humanitarian intervention  
 
‘Humanity itself is a dignity; for a man cannot be used merely as a means by any 
man ... but must always be used at the same time as an end. It is just in this that his 
dignity (personality) consists... so neither can he act contrary to the equally necessary 
self-esteem of others... he is under obligation to acknowledge, in a practical way, the 
dignity of humanity in every other man’.   
(Immanuel Kant)1 
‘To see others suffer does one good, to make others suffer even more: this is a hard 
saying but an ancient, mighty, human, all-too-human principle to which even the apes 
subscribe; for it has been said that in devising bizarre cruelties they anticipate man 
and are, as it were, his ‘prelude’. Without cruelty, there is no festival’. 
(Friedrich Nietzsche).2  
 
It is injustice, not justice, that brings us into normative politics --- despotism, not 
freedom. Moral political theory should start with negative politics, the politics that 
informs us on how to tackle evil before telling us how to pursue the good. 
(Avishai Margalit)3 
                                                           
1 Immanuel Kant quoted in: J. Glover, Humanity: A moral history of the twentieth century (London: Pimlico, 
2001), p. 23.  
2 Friedrich Nietzsche quoted in: (ibid.), p. 16-17.   
3 A. Margalit, On Compromise and Rotten Compromises (Princeton/N.J: Princeton University Press, 2010), 
p. 176.  
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I 
Atrocities and the tasks of political philosophy  
Considering Ancient Sparta’s agrarian and expansionist ideology as a template for 
later genocides and related forms of atrocious mass killing, Ben Kiernan shows that, 
throughout history, human beings have tried to ‘eliminate’ or ‘enslave’ fellow humans 
and their societies.4 The 20th century turned out to be particularly bloody in this 
respect. Although the Holocaust perpetrated by Nazi Germany prompted the 
rediscovery of the language of pre-political ‘natural’ rights, genocidal and non-
genocidal mass slaughter continued post-World War II. Millions lost their lives 
during Mao’s Cultural Revolution, the civil war in East Bengal, Idi Amin’s rule over 
Uganda, the Khmer Rouge’s attempt to turn Cambodia into an agrarian utopia, the 
gassing of members of the Kurdish minority in Northern Iraq, the return of ethnic 
nationalism in ex-Yugoslavia, the Russian war against secessionist rebels in 
Chechnya, the Rwandan genocide, and the pillaging and looting of pro-Indonesian 
militias in East Timor. This rather bleak picture is complemented by the large-scale 
displacement of individuals and groups during these conflicts.  
There are reasons to be sceptical whether the 21st century is going to be more 
peaceful. First, in 2003 the Arab Janjaweed militia, with backing from the Sudanese 
government, began to systematically empty the Northern Sudanese region of Darfur 
of non-Arab tribes, extending its operations into neighbouring Chad in 2005. At the 
time of writing the conflict remains unresolved. Between 1993 and 2003, according 
to the United Nations (UN), the Rwandan and Ugandan Army committed acts that 
‘may be genocide’ against Hutus who had fled to Zaire/DR Congo in the aftermath 
of the Rwandan genocide. Second, the experience of state failure in some areas of 
sub-Saharan Africa has resulted in war crimes. Mass rape, for example, has become 
common in the ongoing civil war in East Congo. Finally, the removal of Saddam 
Hussein and his Baath Party regime led to bloody confrontations between Sunni and 
Shiite Muslims in Iraq. It remains to be seen whether it is possible to secure long 
term peace between the two groups.5   
                                                           
4 B. Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Dafur (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).   
5 For a treatment of the situation in Dafur and some thoughts on the actions of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, see 
B. Kiernan, Blood and Soil, pp. 594-604. On the situation in Congo, see Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, DRC: Mapping Human Rights Violations 1993-2003, 
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Considering the prevalence of mass atrocities in human history, Claudia Card, who, 
amongst contemporary philosophers, has gone furthest in disambiguating the notion 
of atrocity, seems to be correct in concluding that it is unrealistic to suppose that 
there will be no more large-scale atrocities, such as genocide, mass murder and ethnic 
cleansing, within our future as a species.6 Given the likely occurrence of atrocities in 
the future, political philosophers must turn their attention to this bloody 
phenomenon.  
Unfortunately, though, there is a tendency amongst political philosophers, especially 
those working in the ‘analytic tradition’, to operate within the realm of ‘ideal theory’. 
The best contemporary example of ideal theorising is John Rawls’ famous theory of 
justice as fairness. It assumes a) the existence of autarkic national basic structures, b) 
full employment in the labour market, c) favourable economic conditions, and d) full 
compliance with principles of justice. Yet, as Rawls recognises in a later work, The 
Law of Peoples, the problem of mass atrocities falls into the realm of ‘non-ideal 
theory’.7 The occurrence of atrocities signals a) large scale non-compliance with basic 
negative duties against harming and b) that affected societies have not reached a level 
of development conducive to peaceful relations amongst their members.  
This is not to suggest that ideal theorising has no implications for the study of 
atrocities. To counterbalance Card’s pessimism somewhat, ideal theorising remains 
useful because it provides us with the vision of a just society. Interestingly, Rawls 
argues that some of the great social evils, such as genocide, mass killing, and religious 
persecution, result from political injustices. By delineating what he calls a ‘realistic 
utopia’, we can engineer more stable political institutions that avoid the mistakes and 
injustices of current ones.8 That said, if they take the value of justice seriously, 
philosophers must devote more attention to non-ideal theory. The relationship 
between ideal and non-ideal theory is dialectical. Without peace and stability the 
realisation of justice is impossible. Conversely, without the creation of just social 
relations, societies are unlikely to remain stable and peaceful.   
                                                                                                                                                               
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/AfricaRegion/Pages/ProjectMapping.aspx: both accessed 
01/10/2010. The ambiguous formulation ‘it may have been genocide’ is due to the interventions of 
DR Congo, Rwanda and Uganda before the publication of the report.  
6 C. Card, The Atrocity Paradigm: A theory of evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 8.   
7 See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edition (Cambridge/Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
For Rawls’ observations on non-ideal theory in international affairs, see J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples 
(Cambridge/Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
8 (ibid), pp. 6-7.   
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This thesis is an exercise in non-ideal theory. It assumes that, when confronted with 
the non-ideal phenomenon of atrocities, political philosophers face three main tasks.   
1. They must identify what is morally distinctive about mass atrocities as 
opposed to other types of wrongdoing.  
2. They must develop governing principles for our immediate response to 
atrocities. 
3. They must specify our moral obligations towards those currently threatened 
by atrocious violence.  
In order to approach these and related questions, the thesis focuses on one particular 
response to atrocities, namely, the phenomenon of military humanitarian 
intervention (abbreviated as MHI hereinafter). Roughly, the term MHI describes 
situations where a state (henceforth the ‘intervening state’) intervenes militarily in the 
internal affairs of another state (henceforth the ‘target state’) in order to alleviate a 
humanitarian crisis.9 In recent history, famous instances of MHI include India’s 
intervention in the East Bengal crisis in 1971, Vietnam’s intervention in Democratic 
Kampuchea in 1979, Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda in 1979, the US-led UN 
intervention in Somalia in 1992, NATO’s interventions in the Balkan civil wars in 
1995 (Bosnia) and 1999 (Kosovo), respectively, and the Australian-led UN 
intervention in East Timor in 1999/2000. Rwanda, by contrast, serves as an example 
of a lamentable failure to intervene. A historical judgement of the failure to intervene 
in Darfur is still outstanding.10  
                                                           
9 For the sake of convenience, the thesis uses the term intervening state in the singular to also cover 
instances of multilateral MHI.    
10 Addendum 13/05/2011: In the time span between the submission of the thesis on 22 December 
2010 and its oral examination on 29 March 2011, the practice of MHI experienced an unexpected 
revival in international politics, when the UN Security Council, via Resolution 1973, authorised the 
international community to protect Libyan civilians, by military means if need be, from attack by 
(Libyan) government forces. This resulted in a large-scale bombing campaign against Libyan military 
installations and troops. As I prepare the corrected thesis for resubmission in early May 2011, 
operations in Libya are ongoing, though it remains unclear what direction the campaign is going to 
take. In fact, there are some worries about the effectiveness of the operation, now led by NATO, and 
it is fair to say that the intervention has caused a deep rift amongst NATO members. The case of 
Libya is fascinating, not least because it came at a time when, partly due to the abuse of interventionist 
language in the so-called War on Terror and an increasingly inward-looking US administration under 
President Obama, future interventions seemed unlikely. Needless to say, the Libya intervention raises 
many issues, especially with regard to the aims of the intervention, the use of bombing, the use of 
ground troops, and the possibility of occupation. It would have been interesting to see how the Libyan 
case develops further, but, unfortunately, an analysis is not possible here. Nevertheless, this case 
demonstrates that the issue of MHI is still an important topic, warranting theoretical scrutiny.        
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To be clear, being a philosophical work, it is not the purpose of this thesis to provide 
a detailed examination of historical case studies of MHI. Instead, it critically 
approaches MHI via the framework of contemporary just war theory (abbreviated 
just war theory).11 In the history of (western) political thought, just war theory is the 
most significant attempt to place normative restrictions on the use of force.12 
Rejecting realism and pacifism, just war theory assumes that the use of force is 
morally justifiable and can be subjected to various moral constraints. Given that any 
military response to atrocities must not in itself be ‘inhumane’, just war theory is a 
natural and normatively defensible starting point for a theoretical inquiry into MHI. 
This is does not mean, though, that one should uncritically accept its central 
assumptions. In fact, since the relationship between MHI and just war theory is not 
unproblematic, the discussion of the former provides a good opportunity to probe 
the tenets of the latter. 
One reason for the tension between MHI and just war theory is that the latter, 
exemplified by Walzer’s seminal approach in Just and Unjust Wars, considers self-
defence against (unjust) aggression as the paradigmatic case of a just war. 
Consequently, many just war theorists construct, for better or worse, the normative 
framework for the regulation of military force around the ethics of (domestic) self-
defence. Certainly, the rationale of MHI can sometimes include considerations of 
self-defence. India’s intervention in East Bengal, for instance, was partly motivated 
by a worry that the influx of (Bengali) refugees into Indian state territory was going 
to have a destabilising effect on India’s domestic social relations. For the purpose of 
this thesis, however, it is more interesting to discuss interventions where self-defence 
either plays no role or only a subordinate one.  
To illustrate the point, while strategic rivalries with Russia may have contributed to 
NATO’s decision to intervene in ex-Yugoslavia, the national security of its member 
states was not acutely threatened by the Balkan civil wars, though eventually the crisis 
may have spread. Similarly, if Western states had intervened to halt the Rwandan 
genocide, it is unlikely that they could have done so on grounds of self-defence. 
                                                           
11 The problem of MHI, of course, is not new. It has been discussed by some of the classic early just 
war theorists. Augustine, whose views became influential for the theoretical development of MHI, 
already thought that force in defence of the innocent is justified. For a historical overview of just war 
theory, see A.J. Bellamy, Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq (Polity: Cambridge, 2006).    
12 For an overview of non-western approaches to the ethics of war, see R. Sorabji & D. Rodin (eds.), 
The Ethics of War: Shared Problems in Different Traditions (Aldersholt: Ashgate Publishing, 2006).    
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While the constant stream of refugees had destabilising effects on what was then 
known as Zaire (DR Congo today), Rwanda was not of strategic importance to most 
Western states. We must assess, then, how the (potential) absence of a self-defence-
based justification for military action impacts on the normative framework of just 
war theory.  
More generally, any just war-based treatment of MHI must tackle the following six 
issues. First, proponents of MHI deny that states are sovereign if they exercise 
absolute power over their territory. This denial of sovereignty reflects the rediscovery 
of the language of pre-political moral rights after World War II. Contrary to Thomas 
Hobbes’ argument that in order to establish a sovereign body individuals need to lay 
down their rights, theories of MHI are usually closer to John Locke’s views on 
legitimate political authority. To wit, they assume that individuals hold certain (pre-
political) rights against the state, and if the latter fails to respect these, MHI, in 
principle, becomes permissible. Rawls even eschews the language of sovereign states 
altogether, replacing it with the more ambiguous concept of ‘peoples’, whose internal 
power over their citizens is limited by human rights.13 This indicates that any theory 
of MHI must deal with fundamental questions about the nature of sovereignty and 
the function of the state. One important task for philosophers, therefore, is to spell 
out the normative background assumptions that go into the construction of theories 
of MHI.  
Second, due to the paradigmatic status of self-defensive war, contemporary just war 
theory, taking cues from international law, has developed sophisticated accounts of 
the crime of state aggression.14 But there is no suitable analogue for theories of MHI. 
In fact, the literature on the subject, quite uncharacteristically for analytical 
philosophy, is marred by a lack of precision. Some theorists view MHI as a response 
to ‘tyranny’ or ‘crimes that shock the conscience of mankind’, whereas others 
contend that its aim consists in the halting of ‘crimes against humanity’ or the 
removal of ‘injustice’. This leads to three interrelated questions. First and foremost, 
we must disambiguate these concepts. That is, we must clarify what constitutes, say, a 
‘crime against humanity’ and what is morally distinctive about it. Second, because the 
relationship between these concepts is obscure, we must determine whether they 
                                                           
13 Rawls, Law of Peoples, pp. 25-27.  
14 See, Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 4th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2004), chapter 4; Y. Dinstein, 
War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 4th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) & L. May, 
Aggression and Crimes against the Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).     
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describe similar or different states of affairs. Finally, we must find out how they 
relate to the atrocities just mentioned. Do they cover all or only some types of 
atrocities? More challengingly, are some concepts perhaps broader than the category 
of atrocities suggests? Depending on the answer, we may end up with fairly similar or 
radically different theories of MHI.   
Third, once a sound analogue to the crime of aggression has been established, it must 
be shown that it is permissible for a foreign state to declare a non-self-defensive war. 
This is a complicated undertaking. Since it is assumed here that the potential 
intervening state does not face an existential threat by the target state, the declaration 
of MHI must count as an act of aggression. In this way, theorists of MHI defend 
what contemporary just war theory views as the paradigm of an unjust war, namely, 
state aggression.15 It needs to be clarified, therefore, whether state aggression, even in 
aid of a good cause, can ever be morally permissible. But even if the answer is 
affirmative, it warrants further consideration whether the target state is morally 
permitted to defend itself against the aggressor, i.e. the intervening state. After all, it is 
the victim of an unprovoked attack.   
Fourth, the permissibility of state aggression is not sufficient to establish the overall 
moral permissibility of MHI. This point can be attributed to the fact that MHI, like 
any other military campaign, has a dual normative structure.16 This is because a 
military campaign involves relations between corporate entities, i.e. states, as well as 
individuals. Thus, even if it can be shown that the intervening state is allowed to 
declare a non-self-defensive war against the target state, it is not automatically the 
case that its combatants gain a moral permission to use force against individuals 
located in the target state. Indeed, finding a solution to this problem is one of the key 
tasks of this thesis.  
Fifth, as a response to the interventions (or, in the case of Rwanda, lack thereof) of 
the 1990s, the Canadian-led International Commission on Intervention and State 
                                                           
15 From a legal perspective, the UN Charter rules that it is permissible to declare war if a) it is an 
individual response to an act of aggression, b) it constitutes a collective response to an act of state 
aggression (collective self-defence) or c) it has been authorised by the UN Security Council in order to 
prevent threats to international peace and security. International lawyers, though, disagree about how 
to interpret the UN Charter’s prohibition of the use of force. Being interested in the ethics of MHI 
rather than its legality, the thesis will not enter into the legal debate. For a philosophical assessment of 
the significance of MHI for the reform of international law, see A. Buchanan, ‘From Nuremberg to 
Kosovo: The Morality of Illegal International Legal Reform’, Ethics, Vol. 111/No. 4 (2001), pp. 673-
705. 
16 D. Rodin, War and Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 163-165.    
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Sovereignty (ICISS) developed the so-called Responsibility to Protect (abbreviated as 
R2P hereinafter) in 2000/2001.17 According to R2P, the international community, 
represented by the UN Security Council, has a (moral) responsibility to prevent and 
halt atrocities. Clearly, although it is currently not recognised as a legal norm in 
international law, R2P has interesting implications for the legal permissibility of MHI. 
Yet, due to the contested relationship between the practice of MHI and the legal 
prohibition of the use of force in international law, the ICISS was more interested in 
establishing the permissibility of MHI than specifying the actual (moral) foundations of 
the duty to intervene. Here philosophical analysis can make an original contribution 
to the field by closing the normative gap between permission and obligation in the 
debate about R2P.  
Sixth, the role of interveners has rarely been limited to the halting of atrocities. In 
order to rebuild the institutions of what the thesis calls post-atrocity societies, 
intervening states have usually exercised considerable amounts of power over the 
territory of the target state. In recent years, in fact, efforts to socially engineer post-
atrocity societies have resulted in the legal phenomenon of ‘humanitarian 
occupations’ or ‘internationalised territories’. Here the international community takes 
over the role of local government to ensure the transition from conflict to peace. 
This development is duly reflected by R2P, which also asserts a responsibility to 
rebuild. But just as MHI challenges the prohibition of aggression in international 
affairs, the practice of humanitarian occupation appears to threaten our notions of 
collective self-determination. The question is whether MHI constitutes a reversal of 
the process of decolonialisation heralded by the UN in the aftermath of World War 
II, leading to the establishment of a new empire, albeit, as Michael Ignatieff puts it, a 
‘humanitarian’ one.18 
In order to lay the groundwork for the discussion of these and related issues, the 
remainder of this chapter examines some general definitional and methodological 
questions. Part II identifies the problems faced by attempts to define MHI. Part III 
then introduces, at a normative and methodological level, the broader moral project 
into which just war theory must be embedded. In doing so, Part III also introduces 
the core argument of the thesis, namely the claim that MHI is normatively analogous 
                                                           
17 For excellent treatments of R2P, see A.J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Polity, 2008); 
T.G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: Polity, 2007); G. Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: 
Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes once and for all (Washington/D.C: Brookings Institution, 2009).    
18 M. Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (London: Vintage, 2003).   
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to a domestic rescue killing. Finally, Part IV gives an overview of the individual 
chapters.    
II   
What is a military humanitarian intervention?  
Before we can develop a normative theory of MHI, we must first attend to some 
definitional issues. Although it states the obvious, the concept of MHI is made up of 
two basic concepts, namely ‘military intervention’ and ‘humanitarianism’. Taken 
together, these two concepts suggest the following:  
1. There is a particular category of acts that can be classified as interventions.  
2. The relevant interventionist acts involve the use of military force.  
3. The relevant acts of military intervention are carried out for humanitarian 
reasons. 
4. The relevant acts of military intervention have humanitarian features.   
Depending on whether one rejects the compatibility of humanitarianism with the use 
of military force, a military humanitarian intervention could turn out to be an 
oxymoron. This indicates that it is difficult to define MHI without impinging on 
normative territory. Perhaps MHI is an ‘essentially contested concept’ because it is 
impossible to avoid normative evaluation.19  
In order to shed light on the nature of MHI, let us begin by considering the concept 
of an intervention. The verb ‘to intervene’ is derived from the Latin verb intervinire, 
which means ‘come between’. Consequently, for the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), 
‘to intervene’ means ‘to come between so as to prevent or alter the result or course 
of events’. Interveners come between individuals, groups, or corporate entities in 
order to prevent the occurrence of a specific result. The act of ‘coming between’, in 
the present context, has three features. First, it should be understood as the 
interference in the internal affairs of another state. Second, it involves the use of 
military force. Third, it is almost always coercive. This is because the intervener 
                                                           
19  W.B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 56 (1956), pp. 
167-198. 
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deliberately interferes in the area in which the target state would have otherwise 
acted.20  
While this constitutes an important part of the conceptual core shared by all theories 
of MHI, the concept of an intervention itself is ‘essentially contested’. In the current 
discourse on MHI, there are two ways in which the ‘act of coming between’ can be 
interpreted. First, according to the dominant interpretation of the Cold War era, 
intervention can be seen as a form of ‘self-help’. Put differently, interventionism 
represents the unilateral recourse to force in the absence of world government.21 
Second, in the context of a post-Cold War world, R2P transcends the self-help 
model by maintaining that intervention is not an act of self-help, but represents the 
discharge of the responsibility to protect. But since R2P vaguely assigns the duty to 
intervene to the international community, it appears that states still play a key role in 
its discharge. At least in this regard, the self-help model, which is statist in 
orientation, and R2P seem to agree. We shall return to the role and status of states 
and non-state actors in theories of MHI in a short moment.     
As we saw above, defenders of MHI also argue that relevant acts of military 
intervention are carried out for humanitarian reasons. According to the OED, a 
humanitarian is concerned with the promotion of human welfare. As Richard 
Shapcott notes, in its most basic version, humanitarianism can be defined as a 
commitment to respond to the suffering of others.22 But humanitarianism does not 
amount to a coherent philosophy. This is because it is thoroughly rooted in the 
practical concerns of humanitarian organisations. Not surprisingly, many 
humanitarian organisations eschew a closer philosophical engagement with the 
concept of humanitarianism, whereas theorists of MHI retain the label ‘humanitarian’ 
for convenience rather than philosophical accuracy. 
However, there are ways to disambiguate the concept of humanitarianism. The term, 
as Shapcott points out, connotes that human beings share morally significant 
                                                           
20 The thesis follows Isaiah Berlin’s definition of coercion. According to Berlin, ‘coercion implies the 
deliberate interference of other human beings in the area in which I would otherwise act’. See, Isaiah 
Berlin, ‘Two concepts of liberty’, in: I. Berlin, Liberty, edited by T. Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), p. 169.   
21 For the legal self-help argument, see O. Ramsbotham & T. Woodhouse, Humanitarian intervention in 
contemporary conflict (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), chapter II.   
22 R.  Shapcott, International Ethics: A critical introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), p. 150.  
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attributes as a species that are due to recognition as such.23 One of these attributes is 
our susceptibility to pain and our general vulnerability. As Peter Singer succinctly 
puts it, the suffering resulting from a lack of certain goods, e.g. food, medical aid, 
and shelter, is bad.24 As a result, human suffering is morally relevant, regardless of 
membership in a specific association. Humanitarianism, writes Shapcott, entails 
solidarity with distant strangers.25  
But human suffering in itself is not a useful guide for theories of MHI. It should be 
seen in the context of a theory of basic needs. The latter underwrite what Henry 
Shue refers to as a list of ‘basic rights’.26 In particular, as we shall see, one group of 
basic rights, which Shue calls security rights, is central to the theory of MHI 
developed in this thesis. It is noteworthy, though, that the concept of 
humanitarianism, even if it is conceived in terms of Shue’s basic rights, neither offers 
a comprehensive list of human rights nor a fully-developed theory of justice.  
In regard to human rights, Shue’s basic rights are conceptually classifiable as human 
rights because they are shared by all human beings. But not all human rights are 
‘basic’ in the sense outlined by Shue. For example, although the rights to be allowed 
to marry or to periodic holidays are included in the UN Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, they are not essential to securing immediate survival. Shue’s account 
of basic (human) rights, then, is less demanding than many other human rights. 
Nevertheless, some of the more demanding rights can be instrumentally valuable 
because they guarantee the fulfilment of basic ones. In this way, basic and 
‘demanding’ rights are closely related.      
In regard to justice, while humanitarians and many contemporary theorists of justice 
agree on the importance of prioritising the needs of the ‘worst off’, they pursue 
different projects. Theories of justice aim to determine a distribution of goods that 
enables individuals to pursue a conception of the good life. Humanitarians, by 
contrast, seek to mitigate some of the worst excesses of human suffering. To 
illustrate the difference between the two approaches, although a person in a refugee 
camp has her basic rights fulfilled, she may not be able to pursue a conception of the 
                                                           
23 (ibid), p. 124.  
24 P. Singer, ‘Famine, affluence and morality’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1 (1972), pp. 229-243.  
25 Shapcott, International Ethics, p. 150.   
26 H. Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy, 2nd (Princeton/N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 1996).  
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good. In this sense, humanitarianism is less demanding than, say, Harry Frankfurt’s 
theory of sufficiency. For Frankfurt, individuals have sufficient resources if they lack 
an active interest in more.27 But it is conceivable that the person in the refugee camp 
has legitimate interests in additional resources, e.g. decent housing.  
While the above indicates that the goal of a humanitarian intervention consists in 
ensuring compliance with basic rights, the concept of humanitarianism is also 
relevant for the conduct of the interveners. For, as was observed above, the concept 
of MHI suggests that interventionist acts should have humanitarian features. 
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), humanitarian 
acts are characterised by a) universality, b) neutrality, c) impartiality and d) consent’.28 
It is easy to see how these criteria lead to the charge that the concept of MHI is an 
oxymoron. There may be military interventions where the intervening party, with the 
consent of the target state’s government, uses its military to, say, deliver food to 
alleviate a humanitarian crisis, and it is fair to say that these types of intervention can 
be conducted within the ICRC framework.  
However, as soon as the interveners ‘come between’ victims and perpetrators in 
order to put an end to violations of basic rights, it becomes difficult to meet the ICRC 
criteria. For instance, perpetrator groups with the most to lose are unlikely to consent 
to MHI. In fact, this accounts for the coercive feature of MHI. Further, the practice 
of MHI raises questions about the scope of humanitarian concern. According to a 
‘broad’ interpretation of humanitarian scope, any distribution of basic humanitarian 
goods must ignore the distinction between perpetrator and victim or aggressor and 
defender.29 This, it is argued, is required by the values of impartiality, universality and 
neutrality. Needless to say, this claim is deeply problematic. Even for practical 
reasons, the delivery of aid to perpetrators or would-be perpetrators may be akin to 
pouring oil into the fire, prolonging human suffering rather than shortening it.30 
From a moral perspective, the broad interpretation is also counterintuitive. It is odd 
to argue that someone who is about to participate in a massacre is entitled to the 
same humanitarian assistance as his victims. 
                                                           
27 H. Frankfurt, ‘Equality as a Moral Ideal’, Ethics, Vol. 98/No. 1(1987), pp. 21-43.  
28 Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention, pp 14-18.  
29 Shapcott, International Ethics, p. 128.   
30 See, D. Rieff, A bed for the night: humanitarianism in crisis (London: Vintage, 2002). 
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However, according to a narrower interpretation of the scope of humanitarianism, 
individuals must be treated ‘equally’ or impartially if (and only if) they have assumed 
the status of non-combatants.31 This interpretation is reinforced by R2P, which 
requires interveners to protect victims of atrocities. As later chapters will show, the 
concept of a non-combatant raises difficult theoretical questions, but these can be 
ignored here. In any case, since the narrow interpretation does not explicitly rule out 
the unequal or partial treatment of combatants, the military halting of a humanitarian 
crisis does not contradict the spirit of humanitarianism. Of course, just war theory 
must provide a more detailed argument for why combatants, unlike non-combatants, 
need not be treated equally. But assuming this can be done, a military humanitarian 
intervention is not an oxymoron.  
In fact, the humanitarian emphasis on the values of neutrality and impartiality, if it is 
construed along the lines of the narrow interpretation, serves as an important 
reminder not to resort to Manichean thinking. Given what we know about mass 
atrocities, the purpose of MHI cannot consist in assisting a ‘good’ group of victims 
against a ‘bad’ group of rights violators.  
First, as Card points out, since the categories of ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ are 
abstractions, it is likely that individuals and groups occupy both roles.32 To illustrate 
the point, consider the aforementioned UN report on war crimes and atrocities 
committed against Hutus who had fled to Zaire/DR Congo in the aftermath of the 
Rwandan genocide. During the Rwandan genocide the dominant Hutus turned 
against the elite Tutsis. But the Rwandan Army, whose actions the UN report singles 
out, was led by Tutsis. Here the roles of victim and perpetrator are reversed. 
Alternatively, consider Primo Levi’s well-known account of the Sonderkommandos in 
Auschwitz. The Sonderkommandos were groups of Jewish prisoners who were ordered 
to kill fellow Jews in the gas chamber and crematoriums of the concentration camp. 
Building on Levi’s work, Card argues that conflicts can give rise to ‘grey zones’ where 
victims become complicit in atrocities by assisting the principal perpetrators.33 As the 
two examples show, victims may become perpetrators because they want to exact 
revenge or out of fear for their own survival. Conversely, perpetrators can also 
become victims.  
                                                           
31 Shapcott, International Ethics, p. 128.  
32 C. Card, Confronting Evils: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
pp. 15-16.  
33 Card, Atrocity Paradigm, pp. 211-234.      
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Second, contemporary (domestic) conflicts often amount to complex emergencies, 
which are characterised by a plurality of actors with different agendas.34 It is thus 
increasingly difficult to determine who deserves support.  
Third, although atrocities are collectively perpetrated, ‘perpetrator groups’ are rarely 
homogenous entities. In fact, they often exert violence against their own members. 
During the Bosnian civil war, for instance, Bosnian Serb forces threatened to kill 
fellow Serbs if they refused to participate in the massacring of Bosnian Muslims.35 
Victims, as one can see, can even exist within perpetrator groups.  
In sum, the three points show that MHI must be conducted in the interest of all of 
those who suffer from the effects of a conflict. Humanitarian values remind us that 
there are no first or second class victims.  
Having argued that a commitment to humanitarianism is compatible with military 
intervention, let us now try to formulate a working definition of MHI:      
The term military humanitarian intervention describes uses of military force that a) constitute a 
deliberate interference in the internal affairs of another state, i.e. the target state, b) constitute a 
coercive act, c) are carried out in the name of non-citizens via an appeal to their basic rights and d) 
are conducted in such a way as to serve the interests of all victims of a humanitarian crisis equally.   
Admittedly, the definition can be challenged, but it is attractive because it can be 
developed further. For instance, it can easily accommodate R2P by adding a special 
reference: e) [MHI] represents the discharge of the responsibility to protect. Moreover, note 
that this basic definition does not include any reference to the nature of the 
intervening party. Although we have used a rather statist language so far, it is 
worthwhile pointing out that one of the central debates in contemporary just war 
theory is concerned with the status of the so-called ‘right authority criterion’, which 
forms an important part of the normative (and legal) justification of a just war. 
Taking a cue from international law, some contemporary just war theorists, most 
notably Walzer, assume that (only) (nation) states have the right authority to declare 
war. Recently, however, the state-centric version of the right authority criterion has 
                                                           
34 D. Keen, Complex Emergencies (Cambridge: Polity, 2007).  
35 See, D. Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (London: Simon & Schuster, 1996).  
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been challenged.36 Without going into more detail, while the above definition is 
clearly compatible with a statist or self-help-based approach to MHI, it does not 
foreclose the possibility of formulating a non-statist ethic of MHI, including a more 
radical version of R2P.  
As should be apparent, though, any theory of MHI must be embedded in a broader 
theoretical project. First, our definition of MHI only provides a starting point for 
thinking about MHI. Second, the concept of humanitarianism in itself does not help 
us tackle some of the deeper points in the MHI debate mentioned in Part I. Part III 
outlines the ‘broader theoretical project’ in which the following reflections on MHI 
are couched. 
III 
Killing and constraint: Liberalism, non-consequentialism and war 
A. Liberalism: cosmopolitan, nationalist, or legalistic?   
The broader theoretical project underpinning our analysis of MHI is contemporary 
liberal political theory. The core of the ‘Rawlsian’ brand of liberalism defended here 
assumes that individual human persons are primary objects of moral concern because 
they are capable of autonomously choosing a conception of the good.37 As a result, 
they must be considered as free and equal, sharing a universal moral personality. One 
major debate in liberal political theory concerns the implications of this view for the 
moral status of (state) borders. Some theorists claim that the idea of a universal 
moral personality is compatible with special obligations (of distributive justice) owed 
to those with whom one shares the coercive (legal) institutions of a state (let us call 
this view liberal legalism), whereas others argue that liberal considerations allow the 
partial treatment of fellow members of democratic national communities (liberal 
nationalism). Against these two perspectives, cosmopolitan liberals argue that if one 
                                                           
36 See, C. Fabre, ‘Cosmopolitanism, Legitimate Authority, and the Just War’, International Affairs, 84 
(2008), pp. 963-976 & U. Steinhoff, On the Ethics of War and Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford Unviersity 
Press, 2007), especially chapter I.    
37 In this sense, what follows is closer to Rawls’ A Theory of Justice than the revised version of his theory 
espoused in Political Liberalism, paperback edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). As 
Richard Taylor shows, without a commitment to autonomy the Rawlsian conception of justice as 
fairness collapses. R.S. Taylor, ‘Rawls’s Defense of the Priority of Liberty: A Kantian Reconstruction’, 
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accepts the existence of a universal moral personality, boundaries have secondary 
moral importance.38  
The following discussion of MHI is couched within the framework of liberal 
legalism.  Generally, as we shall see over the course of the thesis, when compared to 
the remaining liberal theories, liberal legalism has three main advantages. First, unlike 
liberal nationalism, it is compatible with the fact that many ‘nation states’ are, in 
reality, ‘multi-nation states’. Since liberal legalists focus on the coercive functions of 
the law, they do not need to argue that a shared ‘national identity’ accounts for 
special relationships. Second, contrary to cosmopolitanism, liberal legalism expresses 
the intuition that membership in a political association gives rise to special 
relationships. Third, the rationale behind liberal legalism hints at a possible definition 
of the state. Following David Copp, the thesis understands the state as an ‘animated 
legal system’.39 States are legal systems and enforce, via their various organs, the law 
against those under their rule. They are ‘animated’ in the sense that we cannot 
separate their operation from those who currently occupy offices within their 
apparatus. As will become apparent later, this definition of the state is particularly 
conducive to the discussion of the ethics of war.  
Now, with regard to the more specific treatment of MHI, liberal legalism is helpful 
for three reasons. First, it is compatible with a normative commitment to 
humanitarianism. While liberal legalists do not extend egalitarian principles across the 
globe, they are nevertheless committed to confronting some of the worst excesses of 
human suffering.  
Second, Part I pointed out that any theory of MHI must engage with fundamental 
questions about the value of sovereignty and the function of the state. Liberal 
                                                           
38 Representatives of liberal legalism include: M. Blake, ‘Distributive Justice, State Coercion and 
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26 
 
legalism is in a good position to provide the necessary theoretical background. 
Thomas Nagel, for instance, stresses that sovereignty is an ‘enabling condition’ that 
makes the pursuit of other values possible, especially distributive justice. Nagel’s 
point reinforces an important strand of argumentation in this thesis. It will later be 
argued that the occurrence of large-scale atrocities signals the failure of (formally) 
sovereign institutions to carry out their ‘enabling’ function. This has important 
implications for the aims of MHI.  
Third, Part I argued that political philosophers must determine the obligations of 
outsiders to those threatened by atrocities. Without going into detail, rescue 
obligations always have individual and collective dimensions. In regard to the latter, 
David Miller argues that rescue obligations should be assigned nations and their 
states. But given the diversity of actually existing ‘nation’ states, this claim is deeply 
problematic. On the other hand, by stressing that the operation of the law establishes 
special relationships between citizens, liberal legalism enables us to develop a model 
of political community to whom collective duties, including the duty to intervene, 
can be assigned, even in the face of internal diversity.  
While these points indicate some of the strengths of the liberal legalist position, its 
overall relation with the ethics of war remains vague. This is so because, unlike 
cosmopolitan theorists, non-cosmopolitan liberals, with the exception of Michael 
Walzer and John Rawls, have not addressed the issue of war in greater detail. 
Conversely, many just war theorists have not clarified their relationship with 
contemporary liberal political theory. To make progress on this issue, the 
endorsement of autonomy necessitates the development of a non-consequentialist 
perspective on MHI.40 In order to get a better grasp of non-consequentialism, 
Section B gives a general overview of its main normative assumptions. Section C 
then outlines five normative challenges a non-consequentialist approach to just war 
theory must solve. Section D looks at the methodological dimension of non-
consequentialist thought and examines its relevance for just war theory.   
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B. Ends and means  
As its names suggest, non-consequentialism is critical of consequentialist approaches 
to ethics.41 The latter assume that the rightness or wrongness of an act has to be 
assessed in terms of its consequences. Utilitarianism is the most prominent form of 
consequentialism. Though it exists in various guises, it essentially rests on the claim 
that acts are deemed good if (and only if) their consequences maximise the welfare 
for the greatest possible number (of individuals).  
To pre-empt potential misunderstandings, non-consequentialists agree with their 
consequentialist counterparts on the importance of consequences in our ethical 
reasoning. For individual agents, failure to take consequences into account is 
unreasonable at best and negligent at worst. Yet, in order to avoid any 
counterintuitive or even morally perverse results, non-consequentialists place so-
called deontological constraints on the extent to which consequences can legitimately 
enter into our ethical reasoning. In the absence of such restrictions, for example, a 
doctor may be permitted to kill a healthy patient in order to save five others, 
provided doing so leads to preferable overall consequences. Similarly, bombing a 
kindergarten during war becomes permissible if doing so frightens the enemy into 
submission, thereby shortening the overall bloodshed of war.  
According to (some) non-consequentialists, these examples show that 
consequentialism, especially in its utilitarian form, fails to respect what Rawls calls 
‘the separateness of persons’. Immanuel Kant’s second formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative, i.e. that one should never merely treat individuals as means 
but always also as ends-in-themselves, is often cited as the main inspiration for this 
criticism.42 As the above invocation of autonomy suggests, what is distinctive about 
human persons is their ability to deliberate and make autonomous choices about 
what to do. According to Kantian critics of consequentialism, then, the problem is 
that although, at the input level, consequentialists initially take the status of each 
individual seriously, their interest in consequences entails that some individuals are 
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treated, at the outcome level, as mere means rather than autonomous ends-in-
themselves. 
Of course, consequentialists can reply that even non-consequentialists cannot avoid 
treating individuals as means. But while Amy treats the bus driver as a means in order 
to travel to college, she must not fail to also treat him as an end-in-himself. Just as the 
killing of an innocent person to harvest his organs is not compatible with the ends-
not-means thesis, beating up the bus driver because he does not have the right 
change for Amy’s fare money is certainly a violation of his status as an end-in-
himself.43 The fact that social life is impossible without treating individuals as means 
supports, rather than challenges, the non-consequentialist attempt to protect our 
separate moral standing. 
In fairness to consequentialism, however, few of its adherents want to deter people 
from visiting their doctor or put schoolchildren in the firing line of bombing squads. 
So-called rule utilitarians have tried to respond to the above criticisms by stressing 
that welfare should be maximised indirectly through the introduction of rules. The 
latter form an ‘ideal code’, whose consequences are preferable, in terms of long-term 
utility maximisation, to any comparable set of rules. To illustrate the point, the rules 
of ‘due process’ governing our legal system are more conducive to the long-term 
maximisation of welfare than, say, a policy allowing the police to lock up innocent 
individuals in order to pacify public opinion. Similarly, in order to prevent war from 
deteriorating into massacre, there should be rules that grant civilians immunity from 
(intentional) attack.44  
Although it is impossible to survey the burgeoning literature in the field here, it is 
doubtful that the move from direct to indirect welfare maximisation can vindicate 
utilitarianism and other forms of consequentialism. First, rule utilitarians owe us an 
account of how we can choose between different sets of codes, otherwise their 
approach remains too vague to be practically useful.45 Second, the security rule-
utilitarianism offers is only surface deep because it is likely to collapse back into act-
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29 
 
utilitarianism with its direct concern for consequences.46 On the one hand, the ‘ideal 
code’ could simply consist of the rule that everyone is obliged to directly bring about 
the best possible short-term consequences. On the other hand, in order to avoid the 
charge of ‘rule worship’, rule utilitarians could concede that is permissible to break 
rules, perhaps on a case by case basis, in order to bring about desirable consequences 
in the short run. As a result, rule utilitarianism abandons us in exactly those 
circumstances where we are the most vulnerable. This point is especially pertinent in 
the context of war. 
These brief observations show that there are good reasons to reject consequentialism 
in its direct and indirect forms. We can now turn to three key deontological 
constraints that non-consequentialists place on consequentialist reasoning.  
Rights: Moral rights, Robert Nozick argues, function as normative side constraints on 
consequentialist reasoning, while Ronald Dworkin contends that rights trump 
consequences.47 ‘Individuals’, writes Nozick, ‘have rights, and there are things no 
person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)’. Having already 
encountered the idea of a basic right, we must now clarify a) how rights can be 
defined conceptually and b) on what basis it is possible to hold rights. 
In regard to the conceptual question, the thesis understands rights as Hohfeldian 
claim-rights.48 These are correlated to negative and positive duties, giving rise to a 
triadic relationship between a subject (right holder), object (duty bearer), and content 
(what the right entails).49 In a rights-based relationship, then, the right holder holds a 
claim against the duty bearer to perform/not perform a certain act. Three points are 
noteworthy about the Hohfeldian concept of claim-rights.  
First, Hohfeld’s analysis was originally intended to disambiguate the nature of legal 
rights. The correlation between duties and claim-rights appears natural because (legal) 
rights are usually enforceable via the legal system. The thesis, however, is interested 
in moral rights, which are, by definition, pre-legal and pre-political. But leaving the 
                                                           
46 (ibid), p. 122.  
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issue of legal enforceability aside, Hohfeld’s distinction between claim-rights and 
liberties is still useful because it enables us to render moral relationships precise.  
Second, it is fallacious to draw a rigid distinction between negative and positive 
duties. Basic rights, according to Shue’s analysis, are correlated to both. For Shue, 
basic rights entail negative duties not to deprive the right holder of a certain good as 
well as positive duties to protect rights holders and assist them in case their rights 
have been violated.50  
Third, according to the Hohfeldian scheme, the opposite of claim-rights are liberty-
rights, which are characterised by the absence of a duty [no duty not to]. Beyond this 
basic distinction, though, the relationship between liberty-rights and claim-rights is a 
complex one. Sometimes, for instance, a liberty-right may be embedded within the 
periphery of a claim-right. As we shall see in Chapter II, the so-called right to rule, 
held by legitimate states, consists of a liberty-right which allows states to enforce the 
law against those within their jurisdiction. The right to rule, however, also consists of 
a claim-right correlated to duties falling upon other states not to interfere with the 
rule of a legitimate state. Generally and for brevity’s sake, whenever the thesis uses 
the term ‘right’ it has in mind the Hohfeldian concept of a claim-right. It simply 
refers to Hohfeldian liberty-rights as a ‘liberty’ or ‘liberties’.  
In regard to the justification of rights, the thesis takes a twofold approach. First, it 
uses Rawls’ idea of natural duties of justice (abbreviated as natural duties hereinafter) 
as a possible justification of rights.51 Natural duties reinforce the humanitarian 
account of basic rights offered in Part II. For Rawls, natural duties are owed between 
human persons, regardless of institutional relationships. They obtain, as Rawls puts 
it, between all of us as equal moral persons. Natural duties oblige us not to be cruel. 
In particular, the duty not to kill, which is correlated to the basic security right not to 
be attacked, is an important natural duty that applies irrespective of consent. 
Second, the thesis appeals to the interest theory as formulated by Joseph Raz. The 
central idea for Raz is that one has rights insofar as one can benefit from the 
performance of the correlative duty.   
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‘X, has a right, if and only if X can have rights, and other things being equal, an aspect of X’s well 
being (is a sufficient reason) for holding some other person under a duty’.52 
The interest theory is useful for two reasons. First, in conjunction with natural duties, 
it can back up our account of basic rights. Second, just war theory has to make 
judgements about the moral standing of groups. Because groups can have interests, 
the interest theory is able to provide us with a sound normative perspective on group 
rights. In this respect, the asset of the interest theory is that it does not force us to 
abandon moral individualism. For Raz, as will be explained in Chapters II and III, 
groups can have rights in virtue of the interests of their individual members.      
Doctrine of Double Effect (abbreviated as DDE hereinafter): The Doctrine of Double 
Effect denies the claim, popular amongst utilitarians, that all the consequences of our 
actions should be given (roughly) equal weight. Non-consequentialists reply that we 
must be careful to distinguish between intended and foreseen consequences. For 
DDE, it is permissible to carry out an act if (and only if) its positive consequences 
are intended and its negative ones merely foreseen (subject to proportionality). For 
instance, it is permissible for a doctor to relieve a terminally ill cancer patient’s pain 
(intended effect) by administering a high dose of morphine, which, eventually, will 
kill the patient (foreseen side-effect). As will be explained in a later chapter, the 
distinction between intended and foreseen side-effects is said to be crucial for the 
protection of our status as ends-in-ourselves.  
Doctrine of Doing and Allowing: Utilitarian versions of consequentialism usually operate 
with a notion of negative responsibility. To wit, they hold agents responsible for 
negative consequences they failed to prevent. The doctrine rejects negative 
responsibility by distinguishing between consequences that result from our actions 
and those that we allow to happen through inaction. In this respect, it is possible to 
distinguish between killing and letting die. According to the doctrine, the former is 
worse than the latter. Suppose that one has a choice between two options: either one 
sends poisoned food to the victims of a famine or one does not send any food at all. 
For the doctrine, the first option is worse than the second. By sending the poisoned 
food we would kill the victims of the famine, whereas by not sending any food we let 
them die.        
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It is noteworthy that none of these deontological constraints is unproblematic. 
Interestingly, the ethics of war contains some of the strongest challenges to the status 
and role of deontological constraints in our moral reasoning. Let us draw attention to 
five central problems that a non-consequentialist theory of the just war must tackle. 
Somewhat dauntingly, these are particularly pressing in the context of MHI.  
C. Key questions for a non-consequentialist theory of war 
The problem of proportionality: We just saw that non-consequentialists and 
consequentialist are in agreement about the moral importance of consequences in 
our moral reasoning. Consequences also play a crucial role in just war theory, not 
least due to the proportionality criterion, which pertains to the declaration and 
conduct of war (see below). The criterion demands, quite reasonably, that the harms 
resulting from a certain course of action must not outweigh the benefits. Although 
the proportionality criterion remains obscure, it rests on two-interrelated claims.  
First, according to what one may term the ‘qualitative claim’, an action, even if it 
leads to roughly the same benefits as an alternative action, is impermissible if the 
harms it causes are morally intolerable. The use of, say, the anthrax virus, rather than 
a conventional weapon, on enemy combatants is therefore impermissible. Second, 
according to what one may term the ‘quantitative claim’, numbers (of victims) count 
morally. For instance, if Green’s air force can chose between bombing Yellow’s 
munitions factory during the day or during the night when most of its workers have 
gone home, Green’s generals are obliged to pursue the second option.53 It matters, 
then, how people are killed and how many of them are killed.  
For a non-consequentialist theory of the just war, the problem of proportionality 
arises at an epistemological and normative level. In regard to the former, unlike in a 
philosophical thought experiment, we only have limited knowledge of the possible 
consequences any action, in the real world, might have. Due to an increase in 
demand for shell supply, for example, Yellow’s munitions workers, unbeknownst to 
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Green’s generals, may have returned for an additional shift during the night. The 
solution, it seems, consists in the introduction of an appropriate decision procedure 
through which one can assess the likelihood of different options. Even if an act does 
not result in the ‘reasonably’ expected outcome, the fact that it was reached through 
a sound procedure renders it at least excusable. But for reasons of space, we shall not 
pursue the epistemological component of the problem of proportionality here.  
At a normative, rather epistemic, level it must be clarified how numbers are to be 
balanced against each other. It must be answered whether different weight may be 
attached to similar numbers, depending, say, on the relationship in which those 
affected stand to each other. Consequences matter, but the challenge is to find out 
how they matter. This is a task to which we return later. 
The problem of combatant liability: As we just saw, for Nozick, individual rights, including 
the right not to be attacked, are important ‘side-constraints’ on political action. The 
problem of combatant liability consists in establishing why (if at all) combatants lose 
their basic security right not to be attacked during war.54 In what follows, the term 
liability indicates the loss of the right not to be attacked. War entails, by definition, 
the large-scale and intentional killing of combatants. If it cannot be shown that 
combatants are liable to attack, war is nothing but a violation of natural duties and 
basic rights. 
It is possible to respond that combatants are not individuals in their own right but 
representatives of sovereigns. But this does not explain how individuals assume this 
role and why doing so leads to the loss of some of their rights. Perhaps war is 
analogous to a boxing match where participants consent to harm each other in the 
name of their respective sovereigns (subject to certain rules). Yet, as Jeff McMahan 
convincingly argues, combatants rarely, if ever, ‘consent’ to being attacked.55 But 
even if consent was rendered, it is questionable whether it is possible to consent to 
the infliction of deadly harms at the hands of another party. 
The problem of combatant liability is amplified in the context of MHI. As was 
observed above, the intervening state has to engage in an act of aggression. As a 
result, intervening combatants need to attack the soldiers of the target state, although 
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the latter do not pose a threat to them. It is possible to argue that, through their 
participation in atrocities, the target state’s soldiers incur liabilities to attack. But it is 
not necessarily true that all of the target state’s soldiers are involved in the 
perpetration of atrocities. Intervening soldiers, therefore, are likely to encounter 
combatants who are merely ordered to defend the target state. Theories of MHI need 
to prove that the latter incur liabilities to attack, despite the fact that they are victims 
of aggression.  
The problem of mandatory killing: The problem of mandatory killing is simply the other 
side of the same coin. Just as it needs to be shown that combatants are liable to be 
killed, it must also be shown that individuals are morally obliged to a) surrender their 
autonomy to the military apparatus of the state and b) kill in the name of a broader 
political project. As is to be expected, consent plays, again, a central role here. 
Historically-speaking, however, just as many individuals never consented to being 
targeted in battle, few had a choice over whether to kill or not. Because, due to the 
recent rise of R2P, we are interested in whether MHI can ever be morally obligatory, 
the thesis discusses the problem of mandatory killing as it pertains to the citizens of 
potential intervening states. It tries to find out whether it can ever be obligatory to 
kill on behalf of non-members of one’s own political community.  
The problem of non-combatant immunity: In addition to the large-scale killing of 
combatants, the use of military force inevitably impacts on those who do not 
participate in hostilities. The problem of non-combatant immunity gives rise to two 
central issues. First, from a conceptual perspective, one of the major challenges for 
just war theory is to specify how one can draw a line between combatants and non-
combatants. This is a particularly difficult undertaking for theories of MHI. As was 
pointed out in Part II, just as the boundaries between victims and perpetrators may 
be fluid in atrocities, the distinction between perpetrators and bystanders is less than 
clear cut.  
Second, from a normative perspective, it needs to be demonstrated that non-
combatants can be permissibly harmed. To solve this problem, DDE has been 
conscripted, for better or worse, into just war theory. Accordingly, Green’s air force 
is permitted to destroy Yellow’s weapons factory even though non-combatants in a 
nearby settlement will be harmed as a side-effect. But it is impermissible to 
intentionally bomb the civilian settlement in order to scare the enemy into submission. 
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Yet, in addition to the issue of whether it is conceptually possible to distinguish 
between what we foresee and what we intend, the question is whether so-called 
‘strategic bombing’ is normatively defensible. For it must be proven that although 
they are exposed to lethal harm, those non-combatants in the settlement are still 
treated as ends-in-themselves. 
The problem of non-consequentialist anti-interventionism: The Doctrine of Doing and 
Allowing does not merely challenge just war theory. Rather, it seems to undermine 
the idea of MHI as such. In fact, it could amount to what one may term a form of 
non-consequentialist anti-interventionism. Non-consequentialist critics of MHI can 
argue that if a state fails to intervene in order to halt atrocities, it lets innocent people 
die. By contrast, if it intervenes it will kill innocent people. Since killing is worse than 
letting die, MHI should not take place.  
We must investigate how far a non-consequentialist approach to MHI can resolve 
these problems. To do so, we must first gain a better understanding of the 
methodology underlying non-consequentialist theorising.               
D. From intuitions to equilibrium 
From a methodological perspective, non-consequentialism can be considered as an 
intellectual heir to the Enlightenment project. Unlike fashionable poststructuralist 
approaches, its adherents do not rule out the attainability of objective moral 
knowledge. Assuming a sound methodology is available, non-consequentialists are 
optimistic about the prospect of finding out what is the right or wrong thing to do. 
An influential strand of non-consequentialism assumes that intuitions play a key role 
in our moral theorising.56 In order to defend the central status of intuitions in moral 
theorising, this section argues that Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium represents 
the best methodology available to contemporary non-consequentialists. It argues that 
reflective equilibrium is particularly suited for a critical discussion of the ethics of 
war.   
To begin, it is noteworthy that our intuitions may contradict each other or collide 
with some of our other beliefs. To deal with this possibility, Rawls proposes a 
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method called ‘reflective equilibrium’.57 In a nutshell, reflective equilibrium is a 
critical and inductive approach to moral theorising, which, by moving back and forth 
between our intuitions, seeks to render them coherent. To achieve coherence, agents 
must a) test principles against each other, b) look for ways in which beliefs support 
each other, c) look for coherence amongst the widest possible sets of beliefs, and d) 
revise them if they do not fit. Coherence is finally achieved when there are no 
inclinations to revise principles further. This process does not only assist us in 
adjudicating clashes between our intuitions. It also delivers, Rawls claims, objective 
moral knowledge. As Rawls puts it, moral objectivity obtains when we reason about 
what is distinct from any given individual’s point of view and arrive at determinate 
answers in at least as many cases that all reasonable people have good reasons to 
regard as authoritative.58  
However, Rawls, it needs to be stressed, eschews the term intuitions, appealing to 
what he calls considered judgements instead. These judgements are more complex 
than mere intuitions. They have four features:  
1. Considered judgements are held in a confident manner.     
2. Considered judgements are, at least initially, held intuitively without recourse 
to further principles. 
3. Considered judgements are held in knowledge of the relevant facts and when 
we are cool, calm and collected.  
4. Considered judgements occur at different levels of generality, ranging from 
the particular (Amy should not steal from Ben) to the most abstract (human 
persons should be treated as ends-in-themselves).   
Furthermore, we must distinguish between considered judgements that have been 
rendered coherent in narrow and wide reflective equilibrium.59 In the former, we 
merely render our considered judgements coherent. This leads to what Thomas 
Scanlon calls a ‘weak justification’, that is, a person who has rendered her views 
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coherent is justified in holding them.60 By contrast, in a wide reflective equilibrium, 
we render our considered judgements coherent by testing them against different 
moral theories. We also contrast and test these theories against each other. If carried 
out correctly, we achieve what Scanlon calls a strong level of justification, that is, 
there are in themselves good and sufficient reasons to support a principle.  
Having outlined the method of reflective equilibrium, we must examine three 
criticisms that are commonly levelled against it. First, although the rules of astrology 
can, in principle, be rendered coherent,61 this does not mean that they gain any 
epistemological validity. By analogy, rendering considered judgements coherent does 
not necessarily lead to objective moral knowledge. Advocates of reflective 
equilibrium can respond that the analogy between the rules of astrology and our 
considered judgements held in reflective equilibrium is mistaken. This is because the 
former depend on independent empirical or factual judgements that are fallacious. But 
reflective equilibrium does not depend on any independently existing moral 
properties. The latter may indeed be ‘queer’ if they existed.62 The attraction of 
reflective equilibrium as a moral philosophical method partly lies in the idea that, 
without ruling out the attainability of moral knowledge, it manages to bypass 
complex meta-ethical issues. Reflective equilibrium is concerned with finding sound 
philosophical justifications for moral principles rather than solving meta-ethical 
puzzles.    
Secondly, reflective equilibrium is sometimes criticised for being inherently 
conservative. Especially utilitarian thinkers hold that because our considered 
judgements are shaped by contingent historical processes, they result in unduly 
conservative moral principles.63 But this charge overlooks that reflective equilibrium 
is a critical moral methodology. On the one hand, considered judgements, although 
held intuitively, entail a process of reflection. On the other hand, as Scanlon 
emphasises, reflective equilibrium is Socratic in orientation because it relies on a 
critical examination of our views.64 The very process of working back and forth 
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between our considered judgements is designed to help us realise the conservative 
nature of some of our assumptions. We can even modify our considered judgements 
or abandon them in case they become untenable. Furthermore, we may, upon 
receiving further information, introduce new considered judgments into the process. 
The method of reflective equilibrium can even lead to a ‘moral surprise’ because, 
upon closer inspection of one’s considered judgements, one may arrive at a moral 
position that one has previously rejected.65        
The third challenge is the charge of relativism. In brief, since different people may 
have different considered judgements about similar cases, we are faced with the 
possibility of different reflective equilibriums. Yet, as was pointed out above, since 
we may readjust or abandon our considered judgements during our search for 
reflective equilibrium, it is theoretically possible to arrive at a widely shared 
equilibrium, notwithstanding different starting points. Moreover, disagreement does 
not necessarily signal that the method of reflective equilibrium has failed. Agents may 
have made mistakes in their moral reasoning by, say, overlooking or misinterpreting a 
certain point. In such cases, we must enter the process of reflective equilibrium again 
in order to re-evaluate some of our considered judgements. Finally, the distinction 
between ‘narrow’ and ‘wide’ versions of reflective equilibrium assists us in 
overcoming the relativism objection. As we saw above, in the wide version of 
reflective equilibrium agents test their principles against different moral theories. By 
adding an even more demanding layer of complexity to our moral reasoning, wide-
reflective reflective equilibrium narrows the scope for disagreement.    
If the above is correct, reflective equilibrium is a sound methodology for moral 
philosophical inquiry. Let us now consider why it is a particularly useful method for 
the normative analysis of MHI. First, reflective equilibrium is a critical methodology. 
As such, it can assist us in probing some of the tenets of just war theory. To make 
sense of the phenomenon of MHI, we must test our considered judgements about, 
say, the value of community, the value of human life, the moral standing of states, or 
the meaning of innocence. In order to render them coherent, we will have to 
reconsider some of our values or even abandon them entirely. One considered 
judgement that will figure prominently in this thesis is that targets of aggression are 
allowed to defend themselves against aggressors. But as will be argued later, when 
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balanced against considered judgements about the function of the state and the value 
of individual life, it has to be abandoned.  
Second, the inductive nature of reflective equilibrium enables us to critically contrast 
our considered judgements about war with related cases of killing and saving in 
domestic society. To discuss the ethics of war, we need to start somewhere, and the 
best way of doing so entails turning to our considered judgements about killing and 
saving in domestic circumstances. There is an influential tradition within just war 
theorising that draws an analogy, henceforth the Domestic Analogy, between the 
ethics of self-defence in a domestic context and the ethics of war in an international 
one. The thesis uses reflective equilibrium to revive the Domestic Analogy and 
broaden its scope by applying it to the problem of MHI. The process of reflective 
equilibrium, then, should enable us to render some of our key considered judgements 
about killing and saving coherent across domestic and international contexts. It is, 
strikingly, one of the staunchest (utilitarian) critics of reflective equilibrium, Peter 
Singer, whose thoughts on MHI illustrate how this process might work.  
‘But in the end, we need to do something that will make potential perpetrators of 
genocide fear the consequences of their actions. Just as, at the domestic level, the last 
line of defence against individual crimes of murder, rape, and assault is law 
enforcement, so too the last line of defence against genocide and similar crimes must 
be law enforcement, at global level, and where other methods of achieving that fail, 
the method of last resort will be military intervention’.66  
Let us leave aside the normative substance of Singer’s argument, i.e. the appeal to the 
concept of law enforcement. From a methodological perspective, the quote illustrates 
that one starts by examining one’s considered judgements about domestic responses 
towards certain types of crimes and then works one’s way up towards the 
international sphere by moving back and forth between considered judgements in 
both realms. Applied to the topic of MHI, the result of this approach is the other-
defensive conception of MHI.   
E. The other-defensive conception of military humanitarian intervention 
The above outlined the normative and methodological dimensions of liberal and 
non-consequentialist political and moral theorising. On this basis, the thesis develops 
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the other-defensive conception of MHI. Utilising the Domestic Analogy, the other-
defensive conception of MHI draws an analogy between domestic rescue killings and 
MHI. A rescue killing obtains when a rescuer defends a victim against an attacker. By 
analogy, the intervening state defends victims of atrocities against perpetrators. The 
endorsement of the Domestic Analogy is the outcome of two considerations. First, it 
provides a mechanism through which we can link the ethics of killing and saving 
with theories of MHI. Second and from a methodological perspective, it enables us 
to reconcile our considered judgements about the ethics of killing and saving with 
the ethics of war. As Chapter II shows, theorists of MHI do not engage with the 
ethics of killing and saving. This is a serious shortcoming that the other-defensive 
conception of MHI seeks to address.  
The other-defensive conception of MHI articulates a liberal and non-consequentialist 
understanding of the ethics of war. The liberal element results from the 
aforementioned endorsement of the value of autonomy. The latter has two 
important implications for the theory of MHI defended here.   
First, the other-defensive conception of MHI stresses that individual agency is 
central to the solution of the problem of combatant liability. Combatants are liable to 
attack precisely because they are morally responsible agents. Liberalism considers 
individuals as agents who are capable of regulating their conduct according to basic 
moral principles. Failure to do so establishes liability to attack in certain 
circumstances. In other words, an agent loses his right not to be attacked because he 
is morally responsible for an unjust threat. The agency-based solution to the problem 
of combatant liability is particularly suitable for the specific circumstances posed by 
atrocities and has far reaching implications for the relationship between intervening 
combatants and the target state’s combatants.        
Second, the other-defensive conception of MHI contends that certain public goods 
are necessary for the realisation of autonomy. In this way, the other-defensive 
conception of MHI connects the ethics of MHI with a key theme from liberal 
political thought in general and the liberal legalist position in particular, namely the 
rule of law. In order to be able to act autonomously, we must be subject to a legal 
system that is capable of preserving the peace amongst us. As a result of this view, 
the other-defensive conception of MHI broadens the objective of interventionist 
action. The goal of MHI does not merely consist in halting a humanitarian crisis. 
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Interveners are also obliged to assist members of post-atrocity societies with the 
construction of decent, secure and law governed social relations. Controversially 
perhaps, the other-defensive conception of MHI maintains that the liberal 
democratic model of government is well suited for the pacification of post-atrocity 
societies. The emphasis on the importance of public goods is congruent with R2P. 
Advocates of the latter also defend ‘a duty to rebuild’.  
Note, however, that the invocation of the value of autonomy gives rise to a central 
tension at the heart of the other-defensive conception of MHI. On the one hand, the 
other-defensive conception of MHI focuses on individuals. At the same time, 
though, it follows liberal legalism by making a positive case for state sovereignty. Can 
liberals have it both ways? Can they attach moral weight to individuals and states? 
Although it is not possible to give a detailed answer here, we return to these 
questions when we consider the relationship between intervening combatants and 
their adversaries in Chapter IV. For now let us outline four points in defence of the 
other-defensive conception of MHI.  
First, as was already indicated in Part I, any just war theory, liberal or not, is subject 
to the same tension between individuals and states because war encompasses both 
units of analysis. Of course, statists can respond that individuals, especially 
combatants, should not be considered in virtue of their standing as free and equal 
human persons. Instead, they are agents of the state. But even an entirely statist 
theory would still have to provide a mechanism that convincingly accounts for how 
individuals become part of the sovereign. Considering McMahan’s criticisms of 
consent, it is doubtful that pure statism would succeed in this regard.  
Second, the intentional (and non-consensual) killing of an individual is normally 
considered as a grave moral wrong. Because war entails the large-scale and 
intentional killing of combatants, even those committed to statism must pay 
attention to the standing of individuals as such. As we shall see in Chapter IV, while 
Walzer, by far the most influential contemporary advocate of a statist version of just 
war theory, argues that war is a legal condition between states, he acknowledges that 
it is also a moral condition which obtains between armies and individual soldiers.67 
Accordingly, for Walzer, the mere fact that states have entered into the legal relation 
of war is not sufficient for combatants to be liable to attack. Hence he provides a 
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number of justifications [for intentional killing] that focus on the individual. 
Regardless of whether this claim is normatively sound, it illustrates that statism and 
individualism are not morally exclusive in just war theory.   
Third, MHI is a special case for just war theory because it is, for the other-defensive 
version at least, aimed at the halting of large-scale atrocities. There will be large 
numbers of individuals in the target state who violate basic rights by participating in 
atrocities. Those who do not abide by the laws of war cannot claim the (legal) 
protection of their state. Historically speaking, the Nuremberg Trials emphasised the 
importance of individual responsibility for our normative and legal assessment of 
atrocities. As Walzer, quoting a famous scene from Shakespeare’s Henry V, makes 
clear, while obedience to the king wipes the crime of war out of soldiers, superior 
orders are no defence for committing atrocities.68 The very subject matter of MHI, 
then, forces us to supplement a statist perspective with an individualist one.   
Fourth, the statism of the other-defensive conception of MHI is heavily qualified. As 
Chapter II explains, for liberals, the state has no intrinsic value. States matter because 
individuals matter. The other-defensive conception of MHI is statist and liberal 
because its commitment to autonomy informs its endorsement of sovereignty and 
the rule of law. If we are interested in protecting individuals, we must pay attention 
to states. In this sense, qualified statism and individualism mutually reinforce each 
other.     
If these points are correct, one should not set up a false dichotomy between 
individuals and states. A liberal version of just war theory can and should incorporate 
both. Having clarified and defended the liberal element of the other-defensive 
conception of MHI, we can now turn to the non-consequentialist element.            
The relationship between non-consequentialism and the other-defensive conception 
of MHI is complex. On the one hand, the other-defensive conception of MHI 
affirms the importance of restricting the way in which consequences enter into our 
moral reasoning. To do so, it affirms the relevance of the distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants for just war thinking. It also defends the 
incorporation of DDE into just war theory. Moreover, the other-defensive 
conception of MHI stresses the importance of rights as side-constraints. It tries to 
                                                           
68 (ibid.), p. 39.  
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show that negative duties not to harm are much more stringent than some dominant 
strands of contemporary just war theory assume. For instance, it contends that 
individuals who do not possess agency, so-called non-responsible attackers, are not 
liable to attack. It further argues that those who pose a just threat are not liable to 
attack either.    
On the other hand, the other-defensive conception of MHI is critical of some 
aspects, or possible interpretations, of non-consequentialism. First, it criticises those 
non-consequentialists, who utilise the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, in order to 
defend an anti-interventionist position. Of course, this does not necessarily mean 
that the distinction between killing and letting die is unsound. Rather, its normative 
appeal is limited in the context of atrocities. The other-defensive conception of MHI 
questions whether watching genocide unfold without intervening is worse than 
bringing about the deaths of a certain number of individuals in order to halt it.    
Second, although rights act as important side-constraints on actions, the other-
defensive conception of MHI opposes the ‘strict deontological’ claim that rights, 
especially the right not to be attacked, are absolute. If this was the case, it would 
never be morally permissible to endanger the lives of those who are not liable to 
attack. To avoid this conclusion, the other-defensive conception of MHI maintains 
that rights can sometimes be permissibly infringed. That is to say, in certain 
circumstances it is permissible to override, i.e. not observe, the correlative duty of the 
right in question, especially the right not to be attacked. For the other-defensive 
conception of MHI, rights infringements are morally defensible due to the general 
claim that a concern for numbers is compatible with non-consequentialism. But 
more interestingly, the permissibility of rights infringements also arises from the 
morally distinctive context of MHI. As we shall see, it matters morally that MHI aims 
to a) prevent ‘intolerable’ harms and b) provide certain public goods for those in the 
target state.     
With these remarks about the background assumptions of the other-defensive 
conception of MHI out of the way, let us outline a definition of MHI. 
Being analogous to the domestic use of force by a rescuer in defence of a victim of unjust aggression, 
MHI entails the halting of Atrocity Crimes via military force by an ‘intervening party’. The use of 
military force a) constitutes a deliberate interference in the internal affairs of another state, i.e. the 
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target state, b) constitutes a coercive act (because it is undertaken without the target state’s consent), 
c) is carried out in the name of non-citizens via an appeal to their basic rights, d) is conducted in 
such a way as to serve the interests of all victims of a humanitarian crisis equally, particularly 
through the provision of certain public goods necessary for the establishment of a reasonably secure 
basic structure, and e) represents the discharge of the Responsibility to Protect.     
Six main benefits follow from this conceptualisation of MHI. First, as will be shown 
over the course of the next few chapters, the other-defensive conception of MHI is 
in a good position to solve the problems of proportionality, combatant liability, and 
non-combatant immunity. It also sheds some light on the problem of mandatory 
killing. Second, it draws attention to some of the neglected issues in the MHI debate, 
most notably the conduct of MHI. Third, it provides a philosophical foundation for 
R2P. Fourth, it is sufficiently broad to appeal to liberals who do not subscribe to the 
liberal legalist position. Fifth, the idea of a war in defence of others coheres with some of 
the classic Augustinian and modern natural law-based views on MHI in just war 
theory. Thus, although the thesis approaches MHI through the framework of 
contemporary liberalism, it fits into the broader tradition of just war thinking. As will 
become apparent in Chapter IV, it tries to revive some of the older assumptions of 
just war theory that have been neglected in modern times. 
Sixth, it was observed in Part II that the status of the right authority criterion is 
disputed in contemporary just war theory. The other-defensive conception of MHI, 
as our definition shows, does not take sides in this dispute. It refers vaguely to an 
‘intervening party’, which can be a state or a non-state actor. As such, it is compatible 
with statist and post-statist versions of MHI and can be amended accordingly. In 
what follows, however, it is assumed that states are likely to act as intervening parties. 
On the one hand, the thesis does so for the sake of convenience. As Chapter II 
explains, the framework for and language of contemporary theories of MHI is pre-
dominantly statist, and it is, in my view, easier to discuss the ethics of MHI by using a 
language we already know.  
More importantly, due to the liberal legalist emphasis on the importance of public 
goods, the other-defensive conception of MHI is fairly demanding and, at the 
moment at least, it seems that states have the necessary resources at their disposal to 
carry out a military campaign. For this and related reasons, the thesis sticks with the 
formulation introduced in Part I of this chapter and refers to the intervening party as 
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the ‘intervening state’. While, as the endorsement of liberal legalism shows, the other-
defensive conception of MHI is certainly not unsympathetic towards a (liberalised) 
form of statism, it is not categorically committed to it, at least insofar as the identity 
of the intervening party is concerned.    
Generally, the issue of ‘right authority’ reveals a tension at the heart of the other-
defensive conception of MHI, which is, I think, characteristic of many theories of 
MHI. On the one hand, the other-defensive conception of MHI is concerned with 
efficient interventionism. Far too often potential interveners have stood by while 
tragedies unfolded. In this sense, those who ‘can’ intervene ‘should’ intervene, 
subject to further criteria set out in the following chapters. If states cannot be 
persuaded to intervene, non-state actors should take over this task. On the other 
hand, given that, as was indicated above, the other-defensive conception of MHI is 
fairly demanding, potential interveners need to have considerable resources at their 
disposal in order to stabilise societies ravaged by Atrocity Crimes. As one can see, 
then, there is a tension between ‘efficiency’ and ‘capacity’, which is difficult, if not 
impossible, to resolve. Since capacity plays an important role in the formulation of 
the central contours of the other-defensive conception of MHI, especially in 
Chapters VI and VII, the argument will, initially at least, be entirely expressed in 
statist terms.  
Before we outline the arguments of this thesis in detail, the idea of an other-
defensive war, it should be stressed, is one (liberal) conception of MHI amongst 
others. To wit, it is a (particular) conception of the (general) concept of MHI. The 
distinction between concept and conception goes back to Rawls’ work.69 As Chapter 
II explains, contemporary liberal theorists are pro-interventionists. As a result, their 
views share certain similarities. For instance, all are committed to the quasi-Lockean 
view of political authority mentioned Part I, all are concerned with rights, and none 
of them attaches intrinsic moral importance to the state. But, as Chapter II shows, 
liberal theorists differ on how central aspects of the concept of MHI should be 
interpreted. In this sense, liberal theorists develop different conceptions of MHI. The 
other-defensive conception of MHI, then, should not be taken to be the ‘last’ or 
‘only’ word on MHI. Instead, the following theoretical reflections are intended as a 
starting point for what will hopefully be a wider discussion of MHI. Indeed, as Rawls 
                                                           
69 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 5.  
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admits, moral theorising via reflective equilibrium should not be understood as a 
closed process but an open-ended one.  
IV 
Just war theory operates with three central categories that underlie the chapter 
structure of this thesis. First, the jus ad bellum (abbreviated as JAB hereinafter), which 
contains the just cause, proportionality, right intention, last resort, right authority and 
reasonable likelihood of success criteria, judges the permissibility of the declaration 
of war. Second, the jus in bello (abbreviated as JIB hereinafter), which contains the 
discrimination and proportionality of means criteria, governs the conduct of war. 
Third, the jus ex bello and jus post bellum (abbreviated as JEB and JPB hereinafter) 
govern the termination of hostilities and the establishment of a just post-war order, 
respectively. Chapters II and III mostly deal with JAB. Chapter IV is interested in the 
relationship between JAB and JIB, whereas Chapter V narrows the focus to JIB. 
While chapters II-V have established the permissibility of MHI, Chapter VI asks 
whether the latter should also be made obligatory. Chapter VII rounds off the 
inquiry by turning to JEB and JPB. More precisely, the six main chapters of the thesis 
explore the following issues.     
Chapter II 
Chapter II surveys the treatment of MHI by contemporary liberal political theorists. 
It is the most exegetical chapter of this thesis. It begins by critically discussing 
Michael Walzer’s and Fernando Teson’s influential approaches. Due to their 
pioneering role, it is impossible to grasp the debate about MHI without an 
understanding of their work. Walzer’s and Teson’s theories also indicate some of the 
wider challenges in the normative debate about MHI. The chapter then examines the 
status of MHI in Rawls’ Law of Peoples. It finally turns to the work of contemporary 
cosmopolitan writers who link the ethics of MHI with theories of global distributive 
justice. By offering a detailed overview of the central issues a liberal theory of MHI 
must address, Chapter II provides crucial groundwork for the conceptualisation of 
MHI as an other-defensive war.  
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Chapter III 
Chapter III attends to JAB by asking under what circumstances potential intervening 
states are permitted to declare an other-defensive war. To do so, the chapter outlines 
the analogy between MHI and domestic rescue killings. It argues that MHI is 
permitted to halt Atrocity Crimes, including genocide, mass murder, and ethnic 
cleansing. There are two reasons for why the halting of these crimes is analogous to a 
domestic rescue killing. First, just as those domestic attackers who engage in unjust 
aggression against their victims forfeit their negative right not to be attacked, states 
guilty of committing or tolerating Atrocity Crimes forfeit their right not to be 
subjected to aggression in international society. Second, just as domestic rescuers 
hold a right against the unjust aggressor not to be subjected to a counterattack, the 
intervening state is holder of a right to intervene, holding the target state under a 
negative duty not to defend itself. But the right to intervene is qualified in two ways. 
First, it is not held by any potential intervening state. Rather, potential interveners 
need to satisfy certain preconditions in order to be recognised as right holders. 
Second, the right to intervene is a prima facie right. Its existence depends on the ‘tacit 
consent’ of the victims of Atrocity Crimes.         
Chapter IV 
As we saw above, since war is a relation between corporate entities as well as 
individuals, the existence of a state-held right to intervene is not sufficient to show 
that any individual located within the territory of the target state is liable to attack. 
Turning to the problem of combatant liability, Chapter IV examines the relationship 
between JAB and JIB. It resists attempts to assert the normative independence of the 
two. It argues that the justness of the cause of war determines the permissibility of 
the use of force during its conduct. In order to analyse the repercussions of this 
claim for the other-defensive conception of MHI, the chapter proceeds in two steps. 
First, it argues that combatants who engage in Atrocity Crimes are neither permitted 
nor excused for resisting intervening combatants. Second, appealing to the concept 
of complicity in criminal law, the chapter contends that the prohibition to use force 
against intervening combatants also applies to those combatants who are merely 
ordered to defend the target state against the interveners. As a result, intervening 
combatants, provided they abide by the rules of war, hold a right to use force against 
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the combatants of the target state. The state-held right to intervene, in other words, 
is ‘mirrored’ at the individual level.    
Chapter V 
Chapter V turns to the problem of non-combatant immunity by asking three 
interrelated questions. First, it critically discusses the conceptual distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants. Second, it scrutinises the conscription of DDE 
into just war theory, arguing that its application to an other-defensive war is 
problematic. It tries to rescue DDE for theories of MHI by developing the Public 
Goods Argument. The latter allows intervening combatants to infringe the rights of 
non-combatants, subject to certain conditions. Third, the chapter approaches the 
problem of proportionality. In particular, it argues that JIB’s proportionality criterion 
is more stringent than previously assumed. Because interveners merely infringe the 
rights of non-combatants, they must make adequate provisions to remedy some of 
the negative side-effects of their campaign. In this regard, the chapter considers the 
controversial case of bombing targets that have dual military and civilian functions. 
Though it defends the destruction of those targets as morally permissible, it stresses 
that interveners are obliged to render some humanitarian aid to civilian populations.    
Chapter VI 
Since the other-defensive conception of MHI seeks to reinforce R2P, Chapter VI 
uses the Domestic Analogy to determine whether MHI is morally obligatory. 
Arguing that there can be mandatory rescue killings in domestic circumstances, the 
chapter contends that the declaration of an other-defensive war is sometimes 
obligatory. Victims of Atrocity Crimes, in fact, hold a right to be rescued against 
potential intervening states, subject to certain conditions. To defend this claim, the 
chapter pursues a twofold strategy. First, it defends the right to be rescued via an 
appeal to egalitarianism. Second, it dispels the myth that the causes of mass killing 
are exclusively found within the domestic political arrangements of the target state. 
Rather, the influence of external factors on the domestic dynamics of mass killing 
strengthens the case for a moral right to be rescued. However, these considerations 
do not show that individual citizens of potential intervening states are under a duty 
to participate in MHI. Potential intervening states, the chapter concludes, may not be 
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able to fulfil the correlative duty of the right to be rescued if they lack suitable 
volunteers for an other-defensive war.   
Chapter VII 
Taking the contemporary legal debate about humanitarian occupations as a starting 
point, Chapter VII discusses some of the issues arising in the reconstruction of post-
atrocity societies. It begins by exploring the relationship between the other-defensive 
conception of MHI and notions of negative and positive peace, arguing that 
interveners should bring about both types of peace. It then provides a critical 
examination of the value of peace treaties, contending that the intervening state is 
permitted to non-consensually and unilaterally occupy the target state’s territory and 
remove its government from power. That said, drawing on the legal concept of 
internationalised territories, the chapter argues that the reconstruction of the target 
state should be undertaken multilaterally. Finally, it offers a qualified defence of the 
construction of (liberal) democratic institutions in the target state. The costs of 
democratic reconstruction, though, must not be disproportionate to the benefits. 
Democracy can provide a normatively desirable framework for post-atrocity 
societies, but it may not always be realisable.       
 
Chapter VIII/Conclusion  
Chapter VIII summarises the main arguments of the thesis. In doing so, it responds 
to those non-consequentialists who utilise the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing to 
advance an anti-interventionist position. It also gives an outlook on future fields of 
research for theorists of MHI.    
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Chapter II 
Military Humanitarian Intervention and Contemporary Liberal 
Political Theory: A critical survey  
 
‘Justice is the first virtue of institutions’. 
(John Rawls, A Theory of Justice) 
 
But the evil is, that if they have not sufficient love of liberty to be able to wrest it from 
the hands of domestic oppressors, the liberty bestowed on them by other hands of their 
own, will have nothing real, nothing permanent. 
(John Stuart Mill, A Few Words on Non-Intervention) 
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I 
Liberalism, the right to rule and the value of the state 
It is the task of this chapter to critically survey how contemporary liberal political 
theorists have approached the problem of MHI. Liberalism, as it is understood here, 
covers the tradition of analytical political theorising following the publication of John 
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice in 1971. Since numerous methodological as well as 
normative disagreements exist between contemporary liberal thinkers, we shall not 
attempt the impossible by offering an authoritative definition of liberalism here. 
Instead, the chapter draws attention to the liberal elements of each theory discussed 
below. But despite their disagreements, it is characteristic for liberal theorists to reject 
what Fernando Teson calls ‘absolute non-interventionism’. The latter usually stems 
from a restrictive (legal) interpretation of what the thesis calls the Principle of 
Sovereign Equality in international law:70 
1. States qua states are holders of rights and bearers of correlative duties in 
international society. Most importantly, states are at liberty to adopt a 
political system of their own choosing for their internal constitution. 
Furthermore, they are protected, via a negative right, from (coercive) 
interference by other states in their internal domain.  
2. States have equal standing as right-holders in international society if they 
meet the following three conditions: a) they rule over a population that b) 
resides within their territory via c) an effective government.  
3. It is necessary to differentiate between domestic and international society. 
In the former, justice is a legitimate, and important, political goal. In a world 
of sovereign states, by contrast, the primary purpose of international law is 
to ensure order. Therefore: 
4. Non-consensual intervention in the internal affairs of states is prohibited.     
 
While the Principle of Sovereign Equality has come under pressure through the 
introduction of R2P, liberal political theorists deny the claim that states qua states can 
have rights. This is so because they are not intrinsically valuable. For liberals, states are 
instrumentally valuable in virtue of the functions they perform for those under their 
                                                           
70 The exposition of the Principle of Sovereign Equality draws on Fernando Teson’s work. See, F. 
Teson, A Philosophy of International Law (Boulder/Col: Westview Press, 1998), p. 39-40.    
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rule. In particular, states must further the interests of those under their rule by 
exercising morally legitimate authority over them. Not surprisingly, then, all of the 
liberal theorists discussed below operate with a conception of state legitimacy. The 
implications of the liberal commitment to state legitimacy are twofold. First, theories 
of state legitimacy restrict the state’s liberty to choose a particular political system for 
its internal constitution. Second, moral legitimacy entails immunity from outside 
interference. A morally legitimate state is usually considered as the holder of a ‘right 
to rule’. The latter, amongst other things, takes the shape of a negative right 
correlated to a duty of non-aggression/interference. This right is held in rem, to wit, it 
is held against all other states in international society.71  
Needless to say, contemporary liberal theorists disagree about the nature of state 
legitimacy. As a result, they also disagree over the scope and moral permissiveness of 
liberal interventionism. Those theorists committed to ‘limited interventionism’ 
maintain that MHI is justified in cases of what Chapter I referred to as atrocities, i.e. 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, and possibly cases of state failure and mass starvation.72 
Those who defend ‘broad interventionism’ allow armed intervention in 
circumstances that fall short of atrocious mass killing. Since the differences between 
‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ interventionists result from intricate philosophical debates over 
the nature of rights, the role of justice, and the conditions of state legitimacy, the 
chapter will explore these disputes in detail.  
Before we can do so, however, let us note a neglected point in the liberal debate 
about MHI. Rather curiously, none of the liberal thinkers discussed here engages 
with the concept of humanitarianism. The debate about MHI, in liberal political 
philosophy at least, is normative, not conceptual. This may be taken as an indicator 
of the ‘essentially contested’ nature of the concept of MHI mentioned in Chapter I. 
Nevertheless, the liberal lack of engagement with the concept of humanitarianism is 
                                                           
71 The right to rule has generated considerable controversy. Traditionally, it has been viewed as a ‘right 
to be obeyed’, that is, it was thought to constitute a claim-right held by the state against its subjects to 
obey the law. A. John Simmons in particular has argued against the view that states could be holders 
of such a right. This chapter operates with a slightly weaker notion of the right to rule, which is 
defended by Allen Buchanan and David Copp. In what follows, the right to rule merely entails a 
liberty to enforce the law in a given territory. For reflections on the weaker version of the right to rule, 
see, D. Copp, ‘The Idea of a Legitimate State’, especially p. 18; pp. 26-27 &  A. Buchanan, 
‘Recognitional Legitimacy and the State system’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 28/No.1 (1999), pp. 
46-78, esp. p 49. For Simmons’ critique of the classic notion of the right to rule, see A.J. Simmons, 
Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton/N.J: Princeton University Press, 1979).   
72 F.R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2nd ed. (Irvington-on-
Hudson/N.Y: Transnational Publishers, 1997), pp. 23-24.   
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lamentable for two reasons. First, as Chapter I showed, the concept of 
humanitarianism has important implications for the aims and conduct of MHI. 
Second, it is questionable whether some liberal theories of intervention are 
classifiable as theories of humanitarian intervention. As we shall see below, some 
theorists pursue extremely demanding normative aims that exceed the humanitarian 
goal of reducing human suffering. Conceptually speaking, it could be argued that 
some theorists defend pro-democratic interventions rather than humanitarian ones. In 
any case, these conceptual worries illustrate the necessity of a critical approach to 
contemporary liberal interventionism.      
Since most contemporary theories of MHI are incomprehensible without reference 
to Michael Walzer’s seminal contribution to the subject, Part II begins with an 
analysis of his views. Part III discusses Fernando Teson’s equally influential 
Kantian/Rawlsian theory of MHI, which, in many ways, is a response to Walzer. 
Parts IV and V then looks at two sets of approaches that emerged over the past 
decade or so. Part IV engages with Rawls’ The Law of Peoples, while Part V analyses 
recent cosmopolitan contributions to the subject. 
II 
The society of states, the rights of communities, and the politics of rescue 
A. A liberal theory? 
Just as Rawls’ A Theory of Justice revived normative political theorising about social 
justice in the Anglo-American tradition, Michael Walzer’s book Just and Unjust Wars: 
A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations reinvigorated the debate about the just 
war amongst contemporary political philosophers.73 But because his work is often 
associated with the so-called communitarian critique of liberalism, the classification 
of Walzer as a liberal political theorist may raise some eyebrows.74 Indeed, in their 
critique of Walzer’s just war theory, liberal critics have accused him of being 
thoroughly illiberal. But while it is true that there are illiberal elements in Walzer’s 
thought, it is also possible to find liberal ones. The following discussion aims to 
                                                           
73 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. For the sake of convenience, all references to Just and Unjust Wars are 
placed directly in the main text. The work is abbreviated as JUJW hereinafter.    
74 Walzer is uncomfortable with the label of communitarianism. He prefers to view his political theory 
as a corrective of, rather than an alternative to, liberalism. See, M. Walzer, ‘The Communitarian 
Critique of Liberalism’, Political Theory, Vol. 8/No. (1990), pp. 6-23.    
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readjust the perception of Walzer’s work somewhat, without neglecting the 
problematic aspects of his position.   
The main premise of Walzer’s approach to just war theory serves as an indicator of 
the liberal aspirations of his philosophy. There exists, Walzer assumes, an 
international society of independent states which is anarchical in the sense that there 
is no world government to police it (JUJW: 61). Accordingly, Walzer’s account of 
MHI as well as just war theory in general is state-centric; that is, MHI is carried out 
by states in response to crimes perpetrated by other states against their own people. 
But Walzer’s claims about the anarchical society are not only intended as a factual 
assessment about the nature of international politics. Rather, they also have a clear 
normative dimension: 
‘To tear down the walls of the state is not, as Sidgwick worriedly suggested, to create 
a world without walls, but rather to create a thousand petty fortresses. The fortress, 
too, could be torn down: all that is necessary is a global state sufficiently powerful to 
overwhelm the local communities. Then the result would be the world of the 
political economists, as Sidgwick described it – a world of radically deracinated men 
and women’.75 
In a world of independent states, Walzer contends, communities are able to pursue 
their own conception of the common good, thereby bestowing the benefits arising 
from group membership on individual members. Although it may be too strong to 
call this a liberal argument, Walzer arguably appears to be committed to a form of 
moral individualism that stresses communal belonging as an essential ingredient of 
individual well-being.76 Obviously, the challenge for Walzer’s theory of MHI is to 
specify when state independence ceases to further individual interests in communal 
integrity. In what follows, we will assess whether he can tackle these issues 
satisfactorily.   
                                                           
75 M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 39.  
76 One might detect certain parallels between Walzer’s just war theory and contemporary liberal 
nationalist arguments in favour of collective self-determination see A. Margalit & J. Raz, ‘National 
self-determination’, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 87/No.9 (1990), pp. 439-461 & D. Miller, On Nationality. 
Note that JUJW refers to the rights of political associations. The latter might or might not be 
equivalent to nations. We return to this issue later.     
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B. The Legalist Paradigm and the moral standing of states  
The famous Legalist Paradigm constitutes the normative core of JUJW. It provides a 
philosophical rationale for why state aggression is a crime. In later writings, though, 
Walzer implicitly differentiates between justified and unjustified aggression. As we saw 
in Chapter I, this distinction is crucial for the debate about MHI because the 
intervening state must initiate hostilities against the target state without having 
suffered an attack by the latter. For Walzer, as will be explained later, aggression for 
humanitarian reasons can sometimes be justified.77 With regard to the normative 
status of state aggression, Walzer pursues two projects in his theory of MHI. The 
first, which this section discusses, concentrates on the question when MHI counts as 
an act of unjust aggression. The other, analysed in Section D, is concerned with MHI 
as a justified act of aggression. Interestingly, Walzer’s work is predominantly 
concerned with the first project. This indicates that the overriding aim of his theory 
is to minimise instances of MHI.  
According to the Legalist Paradigm, states are holders of rights in rem not to be 
attacked. The latter are derived from the state-held rights to territorial integrity and 
political sovereignty (JUJW: 61-63). Any unjustified violation of these two rights 
constitutes an act of unjust aggression which is the only crime states can commit 
against other states (JUJW: 51). The next question, then, is in what sense states can 
qualify as right holders. Though the Legalist Paradigm takes international law as a 
point of orientation, Walzer, like all liberals, rejects PSE’s claim that states qua states 
hold rights. States gain their moral standing in international society by exercising 
legitimate authority over those under their rule. Let us refer to this claim as the 
Argument from Moral Legitimacy:  
1. The rights of states are derived from the moral rights to life and liberty of 
those under their rule (JUJW: 54). 
2. The exercise of authority by the state depends on the consent of the 
governed (JUJW: 54). 
                                                           
77 M. Walzer, ‘Arguing for Humanitarian Intervention’, in: N. Mills & K. Brunner (eds.), The New 
Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention (New York: Basic Books, 2002), pp. 19-35, at p. 22; 
reprinted as: M. Walzer, ‘The Argument about Humanitarian Intervention’, in: M. Walzer, Thinking 
Politically: Essays in Political Theory, edited and introduced by D. Miller (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2007), pp. 237-250. 
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3. The people have a right to revolution that entitles them to overthrow an 
illegitimate government that violates their rights.78 
 
The Argument from Moral Legitimacy appears Lockean in character, but Walzer 
departs from Locke in significant respects. First and foremost, he does not 
understand the social contract as involving the ‘express’ or ‘tacit’ consent of 
individuals. Instead, it serves as a metaphor for our ‘cooperative activity’ and ‘shared 
experiences’ as members of a ‘political association’. Unfortunately, Walzer does not 
tell his readers what kind of experiences and traditions constitute a political 
association. But leaving these ambiguities aside, the implications of this revised 
version of the social contract for the issue of state legitimacy are illustrated by the 
following quotation:    
‘When states are attacked, it is their members who are challenged, not only in their 
lives, but also in the sum of things they value the most, including the political 
association they have made. We recognise and explain this challenge by referring to 
their rights. If they were not morally entitled to choose their form of government 
and shape the policies that shape their lives, external coercion would be no crime ...’ 
(JUJW: 53-54).  
First, contrary to Locke’s theory, the rights of the state are not derived from natural 
rights which we hold qua human persons. Instead, they result from what Walzer calls 
our ‘shared rights’ held in virtue of our membership in a political association (JUJW: 
54). Second, as Walzer’s assertion that the people are ‘entitled to choose their form 
of government’ indicates, the rights of the state are not merely derived from the 
rights of individual citizens. Perhaps more importantly, they are founded upon the 
right to collective self-determination which, logically, can only be held by groups. 
Third, the revised version of the contract adds a strong teleological element to the 
Argument from Moral Legitimacy.79 In Walzer’s case, the state is justified precisely 
because of its ability to defend the ‘common life’ against ‘external encroachment’ 
(JUJW: 54).  
                                                           
78 M. Walzer, ‘The Moral Standing of States: A reply to four critics’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 
9/No. 3 (Spring 1980), pp. 209-229, at p. 214, reprinted in: M. Walzer, Thinking Politically, pp. 219-236.  
79 Teleological approaches seek to justify the institutions of the state in terms of what they accomplish, 
see D. Schmidtz, ‘Justifying the State’, Ethics, Vol. 101/No. 1 (1990), pp. 89-102, p. 90.  
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But the Argument from Moral Legitimacy poses a variety of problems.80 For 
instance, it is not clear why the institutions of the state are the best guarantors of 
communal self-determination. Given that many states are home to more than one 
community, the state’s right to territorial integrity is often in tension with the right to 
collective self-determination. This problem could be overcome by an inclusive 
account of political association that transcends narrower claims to nationhood. But 
since Walzer leaves the notion of a political association vague, it is impossible to 
resolve this matter here.     
Furthermore, given that the Legalist Paradigm plays down the importance of 
individual consent, one wonders what Walzer means when he writes that a state 
‘stands guard over a community’. His response is that the ‘representativeness’ of a 
government is an indicator of state legitimacy. But there are two reasons for why this 
argument is dubious.  
First, Walzer has to specify the relationship between the institutions of government 
and those of the state. It is true that Walzer maintains that a state is a union of the 
government and the people.81 Yet, although it is unlikely that an illegitimate state 
would have a legitimate government, it is not inconceivable that an otherwise 
legitimate state might have an illegitimate government. This means that the legitimacy 
of a state is not wholly decided by the legitimacy of its government. 
Second, Walzer’s account of ‘representation’ does not offer a reliable proof of state 
legitimacy either. To explain, for Walzer, ‘a fit’ between governors and the governed 
is a sufficient condition for representative government. As he puts it, a ‘fitting’ 
government is not a gang of rulers acting in their own interests, but one that governs 
the people according to its own traditions. The community’s acquiescence in the 
government’s exercise of authority through the state apparatus must be taken as a 
sign of state legitimacy. But Walzer neither considers the possibility that revolution 
might be impossible nor that powerful governments are often able to create a ‘fit’ 
through intimidation and threats.82   
                                                           
80 For two penetrating critiques, see D. Luban, ‘Just War and Human Rights’, Philosophy & Public 
Affairs, Vol.  9/No. 2 (1980), pp. 160-181 & G. Doppelt, ‘Walzer’s Theory of Morality in International 
Relations’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 8/No. 1 (1978), pp. 3–27.  
81 Walzer, ‘The Moral Standing of States’, p. 212.  
82 This point is raised by G. Doppelt, ‘Statism without foundations’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 
9/No. 4 (1980), pp. 398-404 & D. Luban, ‘The Romance of the Nation State’, Philosophy & Public 
Affairs, Vol. 9/No. 4 (Summer 1980), pp. 392-397.    
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Faced with these problems, Walzer proposes that the international community 
should treat states as if they were legitimate. It may be impossible to ascertain 
whether a state genuinely represents a community, but we should generally give states 
the benefit of the doubt. This argument seems to be motivated by Walzer’s fear that, 
if the criterion of state legitimacy was too demanding, widespread armed intervention 
would become permissible, leading to a) more disorder in international society and b) 
a loss of communal integrity.  Hence Walzer abandons the Argument from Moral 
Legitimacy and reverts to the Principle of Sovereign Equality. This implies that, for 
Walzer, MHI will almost always constitute an act of unjust aggression under the Legalist 
Paradigm. 
It is questionable, however, whether the move towards the Principle of Sovereign 
Equality is necessary. This is so because Walzer overlooks that the permissibility of 
MHI does not solely hinge on the question of state legitimacy. Clearly, a lack of state 
legitimacy is a necessary precondition for the permission to intervene. For MHI to 
qualify as an act of just aggression, the target state must lack a right not to be 
interfered with. But the lack of a right to rule cannot be a sufficient condition for 
MHI. It is, therefore, possible that an armed intervention in the internal affairs of an 
illegitimate state is unjust, although the intervening state does not violate the rights of 
the target state. This means that even a demanding conception of state legitimacy 
does not necessarily give rise to broad interventionism.  
For instance, interventions that violate the ‘proportionality’ or ‘right intention’ 
criteria inherent in JAB remain impermissible, regardless of the (moral) standing of 
the target state. Moreover, armed interventions in an illegitimate state may be unjust 
because they violate the rights of communities and individuals that reside within its 
territory. If S lacks a right not to be interfered with, it is not necessarily permissible to 
impose the costs arising from a military campaign on those residing in S’s territory. 
We need a separate argument, then, that justifies the imposition of the (human) costs 
of MHI on those in the target state.   
Walzer could reply that because these considerations hardly deter potential 
interveners, we should put more emphasis on the rights of states, notwithstanding 
our uneasiness about their justification. But now suppose that the people (P) of S 
rebel against their government (GS) because there is no ‘fit’. For the sake of 
argument, let us also assume that GS and S are both illegitimate. If we employ 
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Walzer’s own ‘fit’ criterion of legitimacy, it seems inappropriate to treat S as if it was a 
legitimate state. In this case, Walzer replies that S is internally illegitimate but 
externally, i.e. in the context of international society, legitimate.83 But states are either 
illegitimate or not. In light of these criticisms, it becomes apparent that Walzer must 
appeal to P’s right to collective self-determination to show why MHI is 
impermissible. While Walzer goes to great lengths to link the rights of states with the 
rights of those under their rule, he must acknowledge some normative independence 
between them.         
C. The right to collective self-determination and the Millian Argument  
Leaving the issue of state legitimacy aside, let us explore the ramifications of Walzer’s 
account of collective self-determination for MHI. In order to do so, let us make two 
preliminary assumptions. First, since Walzer repeatedly stresses the importance of 
citizenship for individuals, let us utilise the interest theory’s collective conception of 
group rights as a loose analytical framework. This version of the interest theory 
assumes that group rights protect the shared, collective interests of individual group 
members, provided these are sufficiently weighty to hold another party under a 
corresponding duty.84 Second, given that the concept of unjust aggression already 
signals violations of the rights of states by another state, let us use the term ‘undue 
interference’ to denote the violation of a community’s right to collective self-
determination. In what follows, we will assess when MHI counts as an act of ‘undue 
interference’ rather than ‘unjust aggression’.  
In his discussion of the Legalist Paradigm, Walzer gives three main reasons for why 
political associations should have a right to collective self-determination:  
1. A political association is entitled to choose a form of government that reflects 
its own traditions.  
2. Citizens value the political association they made.  
3. Citizens should be able to shape the policies that shape their lives.  
 
                                                           
83 Walzer, ‘The Moral Standing of States’, p. 212.  
84 The corporate account of the interest theory, by contrast, maintains that groups qua groups are 
holders of rights. For a longer treatment of the relationship between the interest theory and the right 
to collective self-determination, see C. Fabre, Justice in a Changing World (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 
chapter 4.       
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Since the right to collective self-determination seeks to protect the interests of 
individual citizens in the exercise of their ‘shared rights’ in particular and the 
continued existence of their political community more generally, it is not too 
farfetched to interpret Walzer’s theory as a (quasi-) liberal defence of collective self-
determination. But contrary to liberal accounts of collective self-determination that 
make the right to collective self-determination conditional upon the observance of 
human rights, Walzer’s account of self-determination has illiberal implications. These 
result from his differentiation between ‘political liberty’ and ‘collective self-
determination’. The former, he contends, is a sufficient but not a necessary condition 
for the latter. That is to say, political associations can be said to be self-determining 
even though their members are not free. As a result, Walzer maintains that highly 
illiberal, internally unstable, violent, and oppressive political associations must be 
protected from undue interference.  
From the perspective of the interest theory, let us note that it is doubtful whether a) 
the existence of such societies furthers individual well-being and b) the oppressors 
and the oppressed have sufficiently strong shared interests that justify holding another 
party under a duty not to unduly interfere in their internal affairs. It seems, in fact, 
that Walzer unjustifiably privileges the interests of the powerful over those of the 
vulnerable. Walzer might be able to overcome this challenge by appealing to John 
Stuart Mill’s famous essay ‘A few words on non-intervention’. Because this thesis is 
not an exercise in the history of political thought, we can leave open whether 
Walzer’s interpretation of Mill is sound:85  
‘The members of a political community must cultivate their own freedom, just as the 
individual must cultivate his own virtue. They cannot be set free, as he cannot be 
made virtuous, by an external force. Indeed, political freedom depends on the 
existence of individual virtue, and this the armies of another state are unlikely to 
produce … Self-determination is the school in which virtue is learned (or not) and 
liberty is won (or not) […] Self-determination, then, is the right of a people ‘to 
become free by their own efforts’ if they can, and non-intervention is the principle 
                                                           
85 J.S. Mill, ‘A Few Words on Non-Intervention’, reprinted in: C. Brown, T. Nardin & N. Rengger 
(eds.), International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greek to the First World War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 486-493. For some interesting thoughts on Mill’s 
account of (non-) intervention, see C. A. L. Prager, ‘Intervention and Empire: John Stuart Mill and 
International Relations’, Political Studies, Vol. 53/Issue 3 (2005), pp. 621-640.   
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guaranteeing that their success will not be impeded or their failure prevented by the 
intrusions of an alien power’ (JUJW: 87-88).   
As one can see, Walzer argues that although oppression is in no one’s interest but the 
oppressor’s, citizens must be left to fight for their liberty themselves. Utilising the 
tools of contemporary political philosophy, there are two possible interpretations of 
what we can call the Millian Argument. Let us refer to these as the Argument from 
Excessive Harm and the Argument from Undue Interference, respectively.  
The Argument from Excessive Harm is relatively uncontroversial. It assumes that it 
is practically impossible to force a people to become virtuous at the barrel of a gun. 
Again, this appears to be an empirical statement of fact, but, like Walzer’s argument 
in favour of state independence, it has a normative dimension. If the people whom 
MHI is supposed to liberate are not yet ready for liberty due to their lack of civic 
virtue, it is likely that MHI will be unsuccessful, producing more harm than good. 
The Argument from Excessive Harm is consequentialist in orientation because it 
assesses the permissibility of MHI in terms of its consequences for the affected 
community. It is virtually shared by all theorists of MHI, even those who would 
normally be critical of Walzer. Simon Caney, one of Walzer’s strongest contemporary 
critics, maintains that ‘there is no case for intervention if it does not work’.86  
But like most consequentialist arguments, the Argument from Excessive Harm does 
not offer a strong defence of non-interventionism. If harms did not outweigh the 
benefits, MHI would be permissible. For this reason, as we saw in Chapter I, the 
non-consequentialist position in ethics stresses that, while assessments of 
consequences are important for the ethics of war, we must introduce certain side 
constraints into just war theory. Drawing on Nozick’s idea of rights as side-
constraints, the Argument from Undue Interference maintains that, even though 
MHI may be beneficial for the oppressed, it violates their right to collective self-
determination.  
However, in order to account for why an external party is under a duty not to 
interfere with an oppressed people, it must be shown that the right to collective self-
                                                           
86 S. Caney, Justice beyond Borders: A global political theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 234. 
Also, see C. Beitz, ‘Non-intervention and Communal Integrity’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 3/No. 
4 (1980), pp. 385-391. 
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determination protects the shared interests of members of a political association ‘to 
become free by their own efforts’. Roughly, one could argue as follows:  
1. Individuals qua citizens have an interest they share with fellow citizens to live 
in a free political community that pursues its own conception of the common 
good.   
2. The creation of a free political community is possible if (and only if) its 
members have civic virtue.  
3. Civic virtue can only be acquired via a collective struggle for liberation. 
Therefore: 
4. Individuals qua citizens have an interest they share with fellow citizens that 
no one interferes with their struggle for liberation. 
5. This shared interest is best protected by the right to collective self-
determination. Therefore: 
6. MHI in order to dispose of an oppressive regime is unjust because it violates 
the right to collective self-determination, to wit, it constitutes a form of 
undue interference.   
 
If sound, outside parties must not deprive individuals of their opportunity to become 
virtuous citizens by their own efforts. Accordingly, the right to collective self-
determination not only protects our interest to be a member in a distinct political 
association, but also to become a good citizen. This line of reasoning, though, leads to 
two problems.  
First, the right to collective self-determination, Walzer argues, protects the success as 
well as the failure of members of a political community to liberate themselves. But it 
is difficult to see why intervention in aid of a ‘virtuous’ yet unsuccessful people 
should count as undue interference. Walzer seems to assume that failure to become 
free reflects an insufficiently developed sense of civic virtue. But given the immense 
powers at the disposal of governments to crush opposition, this is a dubious 
assertion.  
Second, the Argument from Undue Interference gives rise to a tension between our 
interests qua citizens protected by the right to collective self-determination and our 
interests qua human persons protected by what Chapter I called basic rights. Suppose 
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that GS uses S’s state apparatus to prosecute and torture members of P. If the 
Argument from Undue Interference is correct, we must maintain that non-
intervention is in the interest of those members of P who are being tortured.87 It is 
not clear, though, that the latter would consider their (long-term) interest in civic 
virtue to be stronger than their (immediate) interest in bodily (and mental) integrity.  
If these two criticisms hold, the Argument from Undue Interference faces 
considerable challenges, casting doubts over whether it can provide a strong moral 
case against MHI. That said, it also reflects that Walzer not only writes as a political 
philosopher but as an activist for whom solidarities have to be built, political 
movements must be formed, and individuals must be prepared to endure the 
significant hardships resulting from the fight for freedom. In other words, Walzer’s 
theory relies on a model of ‘political men and women’ that is difficult to represent via 
contemporary liberal political theory with its narrower focus on individual interests 
and autonomy. This explains why outsiders cannot and must not replace the 
‘political’ via a ‘moralised’ version of armed intervention where Cruise Missiles, US 
Marine Corps, and F-16s take over the tasks of citizens. 
Obviously, Walzer’s philosophical critics can reply that ‘citizens’, virtuous or not, 
have interests in not being tortured, arbitrarily detained, or otherwise subjected to 
severe state repression. But Walzer recently clarified the Millian Argument. It does 
not, he argues, prohibit the rendering of non-military assistance via non-state actors to 
those suffering at the hands of oppressive states. Compared to states, individual 
members of ‘free’ communities have more extensive rights to interfere in the 
sovereign domain of an oppressive state.88 Although it is not the purpose of this 
chapter to assess this particular hypothesis, it illustrates that it is unfair to solely read 
Walzer as an apologist of authoritarian or oppressive politics. His theory seeks to 
establish the practical and moral limits of what military force can, and should, achieve 
                                                           
87 It is worth pointing out that the above analysis of Walzer’s defence of collective self-determination 
yields different results from those of Walzer’s critics. For instance, Fernando Teson rightly opposes 
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Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention’, in: J.L. Holzgrefe & R. O. Keohane, Humanitarian 
Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 93-
129.   
88 Walzer, M., ‘On Promoting Democracy’, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 22/Issue 4 (2008), pp. 
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in international society. Nevertheless, since Walzer does not advocate an absolutist 
version of (military) non-interventionism, we must now turn to his defence of 
‘narrow interventionism’.    
D. Walzer’s defence of military humanitarian intervention  
While the Legalist Paradigm and the Millian Argument are more concerned with the 
‘rights of citizens’ than the ‘rights of man’, Walzer is not entirely opposed to the 
claim that the latter sometimes warrant protection in international society. Although 
he does not explicitly say so, human rights set a threshold of state legitimacy in 
international society, albeit a fairly minimal one. Although states should generally be 
treated as if they were legitimate, they lose their equal standing under the Legalist 
Paradigm when they abuse the human rights of those under their rule. Moreover, as 
Walzer admits, in case of human rights abuses, ‘talk of community or self-
determination [is] cynical and irrelevant’ (JUJW: 90). For Walzer, MHI undertaken to 
rectify human rights abuses violates neither the rights of the target state nor the right 
to collective self-determination held by the community in its territory. Walzer refers 
to the circumstances under which MHI becomes permissible as the ‘Standard Case’.89 
Essentially, the Standard Case entails that the target state uses its power and 
organisational capacity to carry out genocide and/or ethnic cleansing.          
Although his account of the Standard Case does not explicitly mention human rights, 
it points us towards Walzer’s conception of human rights. For Walzer, we have 
human rights to life and liberty which prohibit ‘massacre’ and ‘enslavement’.90 This is 
congruent with Shue’s idea of basic rights, especially security rights. In JUJW, the 
Nazi Holocaust and the killing of the Bengali people at the hands of the Pakistani 
government serve as historical examples of massacre. In later writings, they are 
complemented by mass killings that took place in Rwanda and ex-Yugoslavia. The 
notion of ‘enslavement’ remains obscure, though. As Gerald Doppelt speculates, it 
involves the ‘forceful resettlement of a people’.91 Yet, as Caney critically observes, 
this shortened list of human rights seems rather arbitrary. As he puts it, ‘one might 
reasonably ask why Walzer justifies intervention only when people are being 
                                                           
89 Walzer, ‘Arguing for Humanitarian Intervention’, p. 20.   
90 (ibid), p. 21.  
91 Doppelt, ‘Walzer’s Theory of Morality in International Relations’, p. 7.   
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massacred or put into slavery --- why not ‘political murder’ or ‘torture’? Why not 
when they do not have enough to eat’?92  
Without restating the Millian Argument, Walzer’s answer is likely to be twofold. On 
the one hand, the shortness of the list of human rights seems to be normatively 
motivated. That is to say, a short list of human rights is normatively desirable because 
it a) preserves pluralism and b) prevents excessive interventionism. We shall return to 
b) in Part IV when we discuss John Rawls’ Law of Peoples. In regard to a), as Charles 
Taylor shows, it is not necessarily true that a more expansive list of human rights 
undermines pluralism, as there are different political models in which observance of 
human rights can be realised.93 Walzer, as one can see, overstates the cultural 
inflexibility of human rights discourse.  
On the other hand, Walzer’s rejection of a longer list of human rights is also likely to 
be methodologically motivated, reflecting his distinction between thick and thin 
moralities.94 The former can only exist in a communal context, whereas the latter 
represent the lowest common moral denominator across communal boundaries. 
Since the anarchical society of states is not comparable to a morally ‘thicker’ political 
association, our list of human rights can only represent a ‘minimal morality’ or a 
‘threshold of minimal decency’ rather than a more ambitious moral ideal. Especially 
Walzer’s use of the phrase ‘crimes that shock the conscience of mankind’ is revealing 
here. It suggests that there are certain acts that are considered to be morally 
intolerable across cultures. Crimes of this type seem to lead to a consensus on human 
rights. Moreover, they indicate what is morally distinctive of certain crimes, namely 
their moral shock value.  
But the methodological reply fails. As Peter Singer rightly objects, different cultures 
have disagreed over what is shocking.95 Claudia Card complements this argument 
through her analysis of moral evils.96 Put simply, many evils are so pervasive that we 
do not find them shocking. There is a tendency, writes Card, to tolerate the 
intolerable due to its commonness. Under many totalitarian regimes, killings are not 
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rare. For instance, in his penetrating analysis of mass killing during the Third Reich, 
Harald Welzer, a noted German social psychologist, points out that killing became 
nothing more than a job for many perpetrators.97 If this is correct, the fact that we do 
not find q shocking has little to do with the question whether q constitutes a moral 
wrong. The relevant question is whether q violates the interests, and thus the rights, 
of another party. Neither our notion of human rights nor our notion of those types 
of human rights abuses that warrant MHI can rely on some form of cross-cultural 
anthropology. Inevitably they are the outcome of a process of philosophical 
reflection, notwithstanding the controversy this engenders.  
Before we move on to some of Walzer’s more recent concerns, let us look at a 
related shortcoming of the Standard Case. Walzer does not answer how the notion of 
‘crimes that shock the conscience of mankind’ relates to the permission of potential 
intervening states to declare a non-self-defensive war against the target state. The 
reason for this omission lies in the very construction of Walzer’s just war theory. As 
we saw above, the social contract provides the rationale for the state-held right to 
self-defence. Obviously, this model faces difficulties in justifying the defence of ‘the 
rights of man’. We need to know, then, what replaces the ‘social contract’ in theories 
of MHI. The notion of ‘crimes that shock the conscience of mankind’ is in itself 
insufficient to do so. Unfortunately, Walzer has not addressed these problems, as his 
interests have shifted from the permissibility of MHI towards an engagement with 
the duty to intervene and the question of post-atrocity reconstruction.  
E. Recent Developments 
As was indicated in Chapter I, recent years witnessed the emergence of the 
‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P). Although Walzer does not explicitly refer to R2P, he 
offers his own defence of a ‘duty to intervene’.98 He argues that if states fail to stop a 
large-scale humanitarian crisis, their own security will eventually be threatened. In 
other words, mass murder has a destabilising effect on the international community.  
This defence of the duty to intervene is problematic for two reasons. First, the duty 
to intervene is an extension of the duty of states to defend their citizens against 
external threats. To be sure, as Chapter I noted, it is possible that the motives for 
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MHI may include considerations of self-defence. But even if this was true, Walzer’s 
position is not satisfying. For one thing, the empirical link between a humanitarian 
crisis and global security is shaky at best. For another, it seems bizarre that the duty 
to intervene makes no reference whatsoever to the interests of those who are 
imperilled by genocide and ethnic cleansing. 
Second, given that Walzer’s just war theory is state-centric, he assigns the duty to 
‘intervene’ to states. But if we assign the duty to intervene to a corporate agent, i.e. 
the state, we must also show that it can be distributed amongst those who constitute 
that corporate body. This confronts us directly with the problem of mandatory 
killing introduced in Chapter I. For it must be shown that the duty to intervene can 
be distributed amongst members of potential intervening states. It is probably too 
much to expect Walzer to tackle this weighty issue in his brief comments on the duty 
to intervene. All he argues is that ‘soldiers are destined for dangerous places, and they 
should know that (if they don’t, they should be told)’.99 It unclear, though, what this 
means. After all, soldiers who are drafted into the army could well be aware that they 
are going to be sent into ‘dangerous’ places without having any real opportunity not 
to go.    
Walzer’s second recent interest has to do with the question of post-atrocity 
reconstruction. Although he initially argued that a quick withdrawal by the forces of 
the intervening state is mandatory, he now accepts that some internal restructuring in 
the target state is necessary in order to prevent the reoccurrence of atrocities.100 
Walzer does not offer a systematic exploration of the ethics of reconstruction. But he 
briefly addresses two issues that will be vital for any theory of post-intervention 
justice. First, he maintains that our expectations as to what reconstruction can 
reasonably achieve politically should be modest. We can hope for replacing a 
murderous regime with a less murderous one, but not a model democracy.101 The 
second issue concerns the supervision of the reconstruction process. Walzer 
advocates a form of neo-trusteeship according to which the intervening power rules 
the target state and acts in the trust of its inhabitants. Alternatively, the intervening 
state brings a coalition of local agents to power and defends them against challengers 
(protectorate).        
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Taken together, these two recent developments in Walzer’s theory are good 
indicators of the direction of the contemporary debate about MHI. The ‘traditional’ 
debate, represented by the Legalist Paradigm and the Millian Argument, was 
overwhelmingly concerned with the permission to intervene in a world governed by 
PSE and a restrictive interpretation of the UN Charter. Recent years have witnessed 
a broadening of the debate, not least because of R2P and the phenomenon of 
‘internationalised territories’ or ‘humanitarian occupations’. Walzer’s thoughts on 
these new challenges may not constitute a coherent theory, but they provide a 
starting point for contemporary theorists of MHI.   
F. Conclusion  
It is hard to overestimate Walzer’s contribution to the contemporary debate about 
just war theory. His theory of MHI is the most complete we currently have in 
contemporary political theory, as it touches upon all philosophically relevant issues in 
the field. Ironically, though, it is predominantly concerned with the question of when 
MHI is not justified. This indicates that Walzer defends a limited (military) form of 
interventionism. Despite its complexity, his theory revolves around four core ideas. 
First, states are to be treated as legitimate entities and are therefore immune to attack, 
provided they do not engage in genocide and ethnic cleansing. Second, MHI is 
permissible, perhaps even mandatory, if (and only if) states commit acts of genocide 
or ethnic cleansing. Third, oppression does not warrant armed intervention but must 
be confronted by the people themselves. Fourth, the rendering of non-military aid via 
non-state actors to the oppressed is not impermissible.  
The above drew attention to the theoretical weaknesses of Walzer’s argumentation, 
but also hinted at its political strengths. Hopefully, this should prompt a more 
balanced assessment of his work. We must now turn to a thinker whose work on 
MHI is more ambitious than Walzer’s, namely Fernando Teson. 
III 
Rawls, Kant and Locke: Teson’s liberal case for broad interventionism 
A. Teson’s theory: a preliminary look  
Fernando Teson’s work Humanitarian Intervention: An inquiry into law and morality is one 
of the few book-length treatments of MHI in analytical political philosophy, though 
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half of it, as the title suggests, is actually concerned with the legal implications arising 
from Teson’s philosophical reflections.102 It is partly a response to Walzer’s limited 
interventionism, which Teson criticises for being too restrictive. Since we have just 
engaged in a detailed analysis of Walzer’s work, we do not need to engage with 
Teson’s criticism of it here. Instead, let us examine Teson’s defence of broad 
interventionism. It involves five steps:  
1. A philosophical critique of the absolutist interpretation of PSE via what the 
chapter calls the Rawlsian Argument. 
2. A justification of universal human rights and a subsequent defence of a 
liberal, quasi-Rawlsian conception of state legitimacy via what we refer to as 
the Kantian Argument.  
3. The (partial) attempt to define ‘extreme tyranny’ via what Section C calls the 
Argument from Historical Injustice. 
4. The justification of the right to intervene as a derivative of the Lockean ‘right 
to revolution’ via what we refer to as the Lockean Argument. 
5. A solution to the problem of non-combatant immunity via what we call the 
Argument from Hypothetical Consent.    
 
Section B surveys the Rawlsian Argument, while Section C addresses the Kantian 
Argument and the Argument from Historical Injustice, respectively. Second D and E 
examine the Lockean Argument and the Argument from Hypothetical Consent, 
respectively 
B. The Rawlsian Argument and the case against absolute non-interventionism.  
Teson’s critique of absolutist non-interventionism results from his legal engagement 
with PSE and his philosophical interest in John Rawls’ conception of justice as 
fairness. Briefly, in A Theory of Justice, Rawls initially argues that representatives of 
states would, when placed behind the famous Veil of Ignorance in the Original 
Position, decide on an international norm that allows a people to settle its own affairs 
without foreign intervention. Teson’s Rawlsian Argument holds that, if we take into 
account Rawls’ maximin principle, it would be unreasonable to suppose that the 
                                                           
102 F.R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An inquiry into Law and Morality. An up-dated version of the 
argument can be found in, F.R. Teson, ‘The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention’.   
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parties would adopt the absolute non-interventionism of PSE.103 Being risk-averse, 
the parties would want to avoid a situation where, once the Veil of Ignorance has 
been lifted, they find themselves in an oppressive state with no prospect of being 
rescued.  
But the Rawlsian Argument does not automatically entail that the contracting parties 
agree on broad interventionism. Gillian Brock, for instance, who also operates with a 
quasi-Rawlsian approach, argues that the representatives in the Original Position 
should know that powerful states have meddled inappropriately in the affairs of less 
powerful ones, supposedly for their own good.104 While the parties would not go to 
the extreme of adopting a form of absolutist anti-interventionism, they have an 
interest in avoiding another extreme, namely constant, and possibly illicit, 
intervention. As becomes apparent, the Rawlsian Argument is not predisposed to a 
specific form of interventionism.   
C. The Kantian Argument and the problem of state legitimacy.    
Teson’s Kantian Argument assumes that states can be instrumentally valuable if (and 
only if) they protect the status of human persons as autonomous agents with an 
ability to pursue their own conception of the good life.105 At least in this regard, 
liberal legalism and Teson are in agreement. Now, for Teson, states are legitimate if 
(and only if) a) they observe the liberal civic and political rights of their citizens and 
b) their exercise of authority rests on the (hypothetical) consent of those under their 
rule. In what follows, let us leave aside whether this is a sound theory of state 
legitimacy. Let us also ignore whether the version of liberal legalism defended here 
agrees with it, notwithstanding its endorsement of autonomy. Rather, we must focus 
on the implications of the Kantian Argument for Teson’s theory of MHI.  
The Kantian Argument, it seems, lends itself to broad interventionism because only 
very few states (if any) enjoy the protection against outside interference offered by 
the right to rule.106 Teson’s work, in principle, seems to give rise to a wide-ranging 
                                                           
103 Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, p. 66.  
104 Brock, Global Justice: A cosmopolitan account, p. 176.  
105 Teson, A Philosophy of International Law, p. 4.   
106 Incidentally, Kant himself was critical of interventionism. The fifth article of his famous sketch for 
perpetual peace demands that ‘no state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of 
another state’. Rather confusingly, though, intervention, Kant contends at a later stage of the 
argument, may be permissible if ‘a state was split into two parts due to internal discord’. It is not 
entirely clear what this means, but it is apparent that Kant’s position is more complex than absolute 
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permission for liberal states to militarily intervene in the internal affairs of all illiberal 
ones. Perhaps shying away from such a radical conclusion, Teson restricts the scope 
of broad interventionism to cases of what he refers to as ‘extreme tyranny’. Regimes 
of this type are extremely oppressive, but because they have not yet implemented 
policies of genocidal proportions, do not fall under Walzer’s Standard Case.  
Yet the notion of ‘extreme tyranny’ remains obscure. There are many oppressive 
states that abuse the civil and political rights of those under their rule. Especially if 
we consider that Teson would argue for a fairly comprehensive list of those rights, he 
may have to concede that all illiberal governments are tyrannical, which is 
tantamount to arguing that all non-democratic regimes are potentially legitimate 
targets for intervention. 
On the other hand, in Teson’s work, the notion of ‘extreme’ tyranny seems to have a 
strongly historical dimension. The latter is expressed via the Argument from 
Historical Injustice. For instance, in his discussion of the second Iraq War, Teson 
argues that Saddam Hussein was an ‘extreme tyrant’ not only because of the 
oppressive nature of his regime, but also due to his actions against the Kurdish 
minority in Northern Iraq in the 1980s and immediately after the end of the first 
Gulf War.107 But it is questionable whether the Argument from Historical Injustice 
can settle the issue of tyranny satisfactorily. Most states were borne out of 
considerable bloodshed, and the effects of past injustice are still manifest in the 
operation of present institutions. While the Argument from Historical Injustice may 
show that none of our actually existing political institutions are legitimate, it is 
insufficient to separate ‘extreme tyranny’ from other types of regimes.108 In response 
to this problem, Teson provides two further arguments, the Lockean Argument and 
the Argument from Hypothetical Consent.   
D. The Lockean Argument: two sides of the same coin?  
The Lockean Argument contends that the ‘right to intervene’ is derivative of the 
‘right to revolution’. That is to say, if the people in the target state have justified 
                                                                                                                                                               
non-interventionism. Kant’s theory, though, seems to be more applicable to cases of secession than 
atrocities. See, I. Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace: A philosophical sketch’, in: I. Kant, Political Writings, 2nd 
enlarged edition, edited by H. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-130.    
107 Teson, ‘Ending Tyranny in Iraq’, Ethics & International Affairs Vol. 19/Issue 2 (2005), pp. 1-20. 
Also, see T. Nardin’s critical reply, ‘Humanitarian Imperialism’ in the same volume, pp. 21-26.  
108 On the violent birth of states and its implications for their legitimacy, see Copp, ‘The Idea of a 
Legitimate State’, pp. 31-36.  
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grounds for exercising their ‘right to revolution’ against their government, it is 
permissible for another party to intervene in the internal affairs of the target state. 
Before we can scrutinise the Lockean Argument in detail, two preliminary points are 
on order. First, as the term Lockean Argument suggests, Teson is forced to abandon 
the Kantian emphasis that has so far dominated his theory. This is so because Kant 
did not recognise the existence of ‘a moral right to revolution’.109 Second, the ‘right 
to revolution’ does not disambiguate the concept of ‘extreme tyranny’. The people 
may have a right to revolt against a highly oppressive government that violates their 
natural rights, even though it may not yet have become ‘extremely tyrannical’. With 
these two comments out of the way, let us now try to assess whether the right to 
revolution and the right to intervene are two sides of the same coin.  
To tackle this point, we must ask whether the right to revolution is a) ‘agent-neutral’ 
in the sense that, once a ground for revolution has been established, any party is 
allowed to overthrow an oppressive government or b) ‘agent-relative’ in the sense 
that it is only held by a particular party, i.e. the people who reside within the territory 
of the target state. It is useful to restate the point in Hohfeldian terms. The right to 
revolution entails a liberty, initially for those whose natural rights are being violated, 
to remove an oppressive government. But as Chapter III explains, a right to 
revolution is usually also correlated to a negative duty which obliges third parties not 
to interfere with the actions of the right holder. Because of this, the Lockean 
Argument cannot exist independently of the Argument from Hypothetical Consent. 
For MHI to be permissible, then, the holders of the right to revolution must waive 
the negative duty that prohibits non-consensual outside interference.  
Before we turn to the Argument from Hypothetical Consent, it is useful to consider 
two further points that indicate why the Lockean Argument is problematic. First, as 
we saw above, Walzer agrees with Teson that there is a right to revolution, but, via 
the Millian Argument, denies that outsiders should be allowed to overthrow 
oppressive regimes. In particular, the Argument from Undue Interference holds that 
our interests in having our rights secured as well as our interests to be good citizens 
go hand in hand. That is to say, if we follow Walzer by placing the ‘right to 
revolution’ within the periphery of the right to collective self-determination, there are 
                                                           
109 See, Teson, Philosophy of International Law, p. 6. For a critical discussion of Kant’s rejection of the 
right to revolution, see K. Flikschuh, ‘Reason, Right and Revolution: Kant and Locke’, Philosophy & 
Public Affairs, Vol. 36/Issue 4 (2008), pp. 375-404.  
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good grounds for considering it agent-relative. Citizens must be given the 
opportunity to become free by their own efforts.  
Second, it is questionable whether the Lockean Argument can successfully deal with 
the problem of non-combatant immunity. For the sake of the argument, let us 
assume that the right to revolution entails a permission to use force, subject to 
various constraints. Now, being a non-consequentialist, Teson argues that any 
forceful actions undertaken by the interveners are constrained by DDE. A ‘strict 
deontological’ approach that categorically rules out harming the innocent is, 
according to Teson, normatively undesirable. It means that a revolution against an 
oppressive regime or a self-defensive war against an unjust aggressor would never be 
permissible, for it is usually impossible to avoid harming the innocent in the course 
of a revolution or a self-defensive war.    
But while Teson is right to reject what he calls ‘strict deontology’, the analogy 
between self-defensive wars/revolutions and MHI is flawed. If we have weighty 
duties not to harm the innocent, then, as Thomas Hurka suggests, the special 
relationships obtaining between members of the same political association in a self-
defensive war account for why it is permissible to override strong negative duties not 
to inflict (unintended) harm on innocent individuals in the aggressor state.110 
Likewise, following Hurka’s logic, one could argue that only members of the same 
political association are allowed to expose each other to unintended harm during the 
exercise of the right to revolution. These are the burdens that citizens must accept if 
they, as Walzer suggests, value the political association they have made. Since MHI 
takes place in the name of non-citizens, the interveners are not allowed to impose the 
costs of ‘revolution’ on those in the target state even if their actions were suitably 
constrained by DDE. Put differently, negative duties not to harm the innocent 
outweigh positive duties to aid victims of ‘extreme tyranny’.   
If the above observations are sound, the right to revolution and the right to intervene 
militarily are not two sides of the same coin. This is not to say, though, that Teson’s 
argumentative strategy is entirely flawed. The right to revolution provides (part of) a 
justification for the rendering of non-military assistance to the oppressed. If the people 
of an oppressive state were not permitted to overthrow their government, it would 
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not be permissible for outsiders to assist them in becoming free. But insofar as 
military assistance is concerned, the Lockean Argument must be read in conjunction 
with the Argument from Hypothetical Consent.     
E. The Argument from Consent: Contracts without duties?  
Our definition of MHI states that MHI is coercive because it is undertaken without 
the consent of the target state. However, while Teson agrees that interveners do not 
need to secure the consent of the target state, he argues that MHI must not be 
undertaken without the consent of those whom it seeks to liberate. The argument 
appears desirable for two reasons. First, if the intervening state was authorised by 
those in the target state to act on their behalf, it is self-evident that the former has a 
permission to engage in an act of aggression against the latter. Second, the invocation 
of consent also seems to solve the problems of combatant liability and non-
combatant immunity. Perhaps contractualism provides the most elegant solution to 
the challenges faced by a non-consequentialist approach to just war theory.   
Yet it is difficult to secure consent from those in the target state for obvious reasons. 
In contemporary international affairs, the problem of consent is solved via the state’s 
ability to enter into contracts with other sovereign entities. But given that 
intervention is not in the interests of the rulers of the target state, the chances of 
securing their consent are negligible. Teson, therefore, appeals to hypothetical 
consent via the Original Position. Stated simply, since they do not know whether 
they would find themselves in the position of perpetrators, victims, or bystanders 
once the Veil of Ignorance has been lifted, the parties will agree to MHI, subject to 
constraints. Being risk averse, they seek to minimise the risk of falling victim to 
tyranny.111 But there are two reasons for why Teson’s appeal to the Rawlsian version 
of the Argument from Hypothetical Consent is unlikely to succeed.  
First, the possibility that innocent individuals might be harmed during MHI is 
problematic for the ‘maximin’ criterion. If death, albeit at the hands of different 
agents, is the worst case scenario under MHI as well as tyrannical government, there is 
no minimum that could be maximised. In this case, it seems more appropriate to argue 
that the parties would abandon maximin by employing the Bayesian principle of 
expected utility maximisation. According to the latter, the parties consider the 
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probability of death at the hands of the tyrant and the interveners, respectively.112 If 
the risk of being killed by the interveners during the course of MHI is significantly 
lower than the risk of being killed by the tyrant, a choice in favour of MHI is risky 
yet reasonable. Still, the parties would require access to large amounts of highly 
context-sensitive information about the interveners, the nature of tyranny and the 
dynamics of mass killing. It is not clear that reliable information is readily available 
and could be introduced into the Original Position.  
Second, Teson does not realise that the contractualist defence of MHI generates a duty 
of non-resistance. It is contradictory if parties consented to MHI, while at the same 
time acknowledging the existence of a permission to repel the interveners. In order 
not to run into the problem of self-contradiction, the decision in favour of MHI 
must encompass a duty of non-resistance. But the problem is that, as German 
political theorist Lothar Fritze observes, the duty of non-resistance may sometimes 
entail a duty of self-sacrifice for individual citizens.113 That is to say, in case they are 
attacked by the interveners, non-combatant/citizens in the target state would be 
obliged not to resist, so those who are currently imperilled by Atrocity Crimes can be 
rescued. 
This argument is deeply problematic as it is, but it is especially damaging for the 
Rawlsian version of the Argument from Hypothetical Consent. This is so because 
Rawls assumes that parties in the Original Position are motivated by self-interest. It is 
thus highly unlikely that they would agree not resist in case they are attacked. 
Furthermore, even if, contrary to all expectations, the parties in the Original Position 
hypothetically agreed to a duty of non-resistance, it is unlikely that self-interested 
citizens would, under certain circumstances, comply with it once the Veil of 
Ignorance has been lifted. This is a particularly stark illustration of Ronald Dworkin’s 
                                                           
112 J.C. Harsanyi, ‘Can the Maximin Principle serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’s 
Theory’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 69/No. 2 (1975), pp. 594-606, at p. 595.  
113 L. Fritze, Die Tötung Unschuldiger [Killing the Innocent] (Berlin: DeGruyter, 2004), pp. 62-67. The 
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well-known argument that a hypothetical contract is no contract at all.114 If these 
observations are correct, the Argument from Hypothetical Consent fails. As a result, 
the invocation of hypothetical consent cannot vindicate Teson’s Lockean Argument 
examined in the preceding section.           
To sum up, then, Teson advances a philosophically and politically ambitious defence 
of broad interventionism. MHI is not only justified to stop genocide and ethnic 
cleansing, but also to topple tyrannical governments and replace them with liberal 
ones. The core of his theory is constituted by the Lockean Argument and the 
Argument from Hypothetical Consent. Neither of the two arguments, however, 
proves that foreign states have a permission to intervene in the internal affairs of the 
target state. It is doubtful, therefore, that Teson’s case for broad interventionism 
succeeds. On the other hand, Teson’s theory is useful for the current project 
because, like the other-defensive conception of MHI developed later, it shares a 
commitment to autonomy and deontological constraints. It clearly indicates many of 
the problems a non-consequentialist theory of MHI must solve.     
As we saw above, Teson is heavily influenced by Kant and the procedural liberalism 
of Rawls. Interestingly, though, Rawls’ own views on MHI are much closer to 
Walzer’s than Teson’s.  
IV 
Military Intervention as the Enforcement of Human Rights? 
Peter Singer once noted that, strikingly, Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, a work of 600 pages 
no less, had very little to say about the extreme disparities in wealth and life chances 
existing in the international sphere.115 More than a quarter of a century after its 
publication, Rawls remedied this shortcoming in the Law of Peoples.116 Paradoxically, 
MHI is central and peripheral to Rawls’ reflections on international justice. It is 
peripheral in the sense that Rawls only devotes a few lines to it. On the other hand, it 
is central because Rawls’ treatment of state legitimacy and human rights is indivisible 
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from his thoughts on MHI. To understand the status of MHI in the Law of Peoples, 
let us begin by outlining some of its background assumptions.    
According to Rawls, the Law of Peoples is ‘a political conception of right and justice 
that applies to the principles and norms of international law and practice’ (LP: 3). 
Overall, the Law of Peoples is intended to outline a progressive case for an ethical 
foreign policy. As we saw in Chapter I, Rawls believes that the great evils of human 
history, including unjust war, oppression, religious persecution, starvation, genocide 
and mass murder, are the result of political injustices (LP: 7). For Rawls, the social 
contract, represented by the Original Position, provides the mechanism through 
which we can formulate principles for a just world order that overcome the 
shortcomings of present institutions.  
Unlike in a Theory of Justice, where, as we saw above, the parties in the [international] 
Original Position were representatives of states, the parties in the Law of Peoples 
represent ‘peoples’, which, according to Rawls, are the main actors in international 
politics. More specifically, they represent liberal peoples, which a) are committed to a 
political, i.e. non-metaphysical, form of liberalism, b) practice a constitutional form of 
government that serves the fundamental interests of their citizens, and c) are united 
by what Mill called ‘common sympathies’ (LP: 23-25).  
The shift from states towards (liberal) peoples is significant because it represents a new 
understanding of sovereignty that reflects the development of the UN Charter 
system, while retaining some ambivalence with regard to PSE. The Law of Peoples 
concurs with the UN Charter that peoples have no right to declare war for any other 
reason than self-defence. Consequently the principles of the Law of Peoples chosen 
in the Original Position are non-interventionist (for a full list of the principles, see 
LP: 37). But, unlike states under PSE, the power of peoples to choose their internal 
constitution is limited via human rights. More precisely, human rights have a 
threefold role in the Law of Peoples:  
 
1. [The] fulfilment [of human rights] is a necessary condition of the decency of 
a society’s political institutions and of its legal order.  
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2. [The] fulfilment [of human rights] is sufficient to exclude justified and 
forceful intervention by other peoples, for example, by diplomatic and 
economic sanctions, or in grave cases by military force. 
3. They set a limit of pluralism among people (LP: 80).   
 
The third aspect of human rights, though, seems surprising. Given that the social 
contract takes place between liberal peoples, (3) seems redundant. But this riddle is 
easily resolved by the most interesting aspect of Rawls’ theory, namely the idea that 
the Law of Peoples can be extended to what he calls decent hierarchical peoples 
(abbreviated as Decent Hierarchical Peoples hereinafter). In a second run of the 
international version of the Original Position, the representatives of Decent 
Hierarchical Peoples are invited to decide on principles of international justice. They 
would, Rawls contends, choose the same principles as the representatives of liberal 
peoples. The result would not be a modus vivendi between liberals and Decent 
Hierarchical Peoples, but a well-ordered and stable conception of international 
justice.   
Decent Hierarchical Peoples differ from liberal peoples because they a) pursue a 
specific comprehensive, i.e. metaphysical doctrine, b) do not view their citizens as 
free and equal but as members of associations, and c) do not have institutions of 
representative democracy but operate with a decent consultation hierarchy through 
which the country’s leaders take into account their citizen’s wishes (LP: 71-72). Since 
much more could be said about the construction of Decent Hierarchical Peoples 
than is possible here, let us reflect on the broader rationale for why Rawls thinks that 
the Law of Peoples should be extended from liberal peoples to Decent Hierarchical 
Peoples. One reason is that Rawls, like Walzer, seeks to create stability in 
international affairs. The second reason is that Rawls considers toleration as a key 
component of liberalism. It would, therefore, be unreasonable to expect non-liberal 
peoples to change their way of life and demand, like Teson, that all states should 
have liberal constitutions.   
Nevertheless, Rawls recognises that diversity in international society must be limited. 
First, since war for reasons other than self-defence is prohibited, Decent Hierarchical 
Peoples must not pursue an expansionist foreign policy. Second, since human right 
are a fundamental component of the Law of Peoples, Decent Hierarchical Peoples 
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must, in addition to operating with a decent consultation hierarchy, ‘honour human 
rights’. Yet, if Decent Hierarchical Peoples are not required to govern themselves 
according to a liberal constitution, the ideal of human rights must be narrower than 
that advocated by some contemporary liberals. According to Rawls, human rights 
should not be confused with liberal constitutional rights. Rather, human rights 
‘express a special class of urgent rights, such as freedom from slavery and serfdom, 
liberty (but not equal liberty) of conscience, and security of ethnic groups from mass 
murder and genocide’ (LP: 79). The list resembles Walzer’s account of ‘crimes that 
shock the conscience of mankind’, but the demands the Law of Peoples makes on 
Decent Hierarchical Peoples are stricter than the ones Walzer makes upon states. 
This difference is largely due to Rawls’ insistence on the importance of a decent 
consultation hierarchy rather than a mere ‘fit’ between governors and governed.  
Considering Rawls’ list of human rights, we are faced with the question why it is so 
short. In order to think about the issue, Alistair McLeod proposes a useful 
distinction between ‘justificatory minimalism’ and ‘enforcement minimalism’.117 The 
former assumes that is difficult to philosophically justify a long list of human rights. 
As McLeod points out, justificatory minimalism can take a pragmatic form in the 
sense that it tries to advance the least controversial justification of human rights in 
order to secure a consensus. These pragmatic considerations surely stem from Rawls’ 
emphasis on the value of toleration. Clearly the same rationale also underlies Walzer’s 
distinction between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ moralities. But since we have already raised 
some critical issues about ‘justificatory minimalism’ in the discussion of Walzer’s 
work, we do not need to dwell on this point here.  
The idea of ‘enforcement minimalism’ maintains that the list of human rights must 
be kept short in order to be enforceable. As we saw above, ‘enforceability’ is one of 
the key roles of human rights in the Law of Peoples, otherwise Rawls would not have 
stressed that their observance guarantees immunity from outside interference or 
diplomatic sanctions. Again, Rawls’ theory evidently shares some similarities with 
Walzer’s thoughts on the subject. For, as we saw above, Walzer also links, perhaps 
unconsciously, human rights to enforcement. It demands assessment, then, whether 
any list of human rights should be kept short precisely because it could not otherwise 
be enforced via military intervention.  
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The answer is likely to be negative for two reasons. First, a comprehensive list of 
human rights does not solve the moral problems inherent in the use of force. It does 
not show why it is permissible to kill in defence of human rights. Second, as James 
Nickel points out, our political practices aimed at the protection of human rights do 
not solely rely on the use of military force.118 For instance, they include the 
pressuring of countries by recalling ambassadors or engaging in public criticism of a 
particular regime.  
Defenders of the Law of Peoples can reply to Nickel’s argumentation in two ways. 
First, they can argue that even actions like public criticism are incompatible with the 
demand for toleration. This seems to be implied by Rawls’ claim that observance of 
human rights guarantees immunity from diplomatic sanctions. If this was true, we 
must abandon nearly all of our political practices. The world Rawls describes is 
strangely apolitical, which is normatively undesirable. This reply is also a 
misrepresentation of the value of toleration. The concept of toleration describes X’s 
principled non-intervention in situation Y, despite X’s ability to halt or change Y.119 
It does not rule out acts of public criticism. For Nickel, we must differentiate 
between disrespectful forms of criticism which are incompatible with a commitment 
to toleration, and public criticism. Criticism is legitimate as long as it is not hurtful or 
dishonours the opponent.  
The second reply could appeal to the concept of a right as such. As we saw in 
Chapter I, following Hohfeld, one characteristic aspect of (claim-) rights is their 
enforceability, not least because they are correlated to duties. In this sense, defenders 
of the Law of Peoples could maintain that, if we separate human rights from 
enforceability, we cannot, conceptually speaking, think of them as rights anymore. 
There is some truth to this argument, but we must not lose sight of the fact that 
human rights are not only legal but also moral rights. They aspire to a certain political 
and moral ideal whose realisation cannot simply be ‘enforced’. The successful 
implementation of human rights is a multifaceted and complex process that should 
not be reduced to military intervention.       
                                                           
118 J. W. Nickel, ‘Are Human Rights mainly implemented by intervention?’, in: Martin & Reidy (eds.), 
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In sum, Rawls’ work falls into the camp of limited interventionism. Its merits consist 
in drawing out some of the complexities associated with human rights discourse. 
However, if the above observations are sound, a commitment to human rights does 
not automatically lead to an endorsement of MHI, not least because the issue of 
enforceability is ambiguous. As a result, we should reject an artificially short list of 
human rights that is justified via an appeal to ‘enforcement minimalism’. A better 
strategy, it seems, is not to artificially delimit the list of human rights, but to examine 
why acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing and mass murder are morally distinctive forms 
of human rights abuses. This is a task to which we turn in Chapter III.     
V 
Global justice and the ethics of military humanitarian intervention120 
A. The cosmopolitan thesis 
The term cosmopolitanism ordinarily describes an ideal of world citizenship. 
Although there are important normative and methodological differences between 
contemporary cosmopolitan thinkers, they usually converge on three assumptions 
which jointly constitute what we can refer to as the Cosmopolitan Thesis: 
a) The human individual is the prime unit of moral concern regardless of his or 
her communal affiliations. Therefore: 
b) The scope of justice is universal. Therefore:   
c) Demarcated communities are not the prime source and loci of our moral 
obligations, especially those of justice.  
 
The Cosmopolitan Thesis accounts for the liberal element of contemporary 
cosmopolitanism. Perhaps it constitutes the pure expression of liberal morality in 
political theorising. It is not the purpose of this part of the chapter to assess the 
validity of the Cosmopolitan Thesis as such, though liberal legalism is critical of it. 
Instead, the following analysis focuses on two aspects of the cosmopolitan debate 
about interventionism. First, we shall scrutinise the claim, upheld by Simon Caney, 
                                                           
120 For a rare critical treatment of the cosmopolitan position on MHI, see Heinze, Waging Humanitarian 
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the chapter broadens the debate by including more recent thinkers. The arguments developed below 
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permissive.    
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Darrell Moellendorf, and Gillian Brock, that we should not divorce the issue of 
intervention from the broader question as to what individuals are entitled to as a 
matter of justice. According to Caney, separating the two would be arbitrary, but 
there remain doubts whether linking them is a good idea.121 Second, in addition to 
linking justice with the ethics of MHI, cosmopolitans provide a welcome critical 
assessment of just war principles. There proposals for a reformed just war theory 
warrant further scrutiny. In Section B, we examine the relevance of theories of justice 
for the ethics of MHI, whereas Section C turns to cosmopolitanism’s critical 
engagement with just war theory. 
B. The value of justice and the use of force: some doubts 
According to Caney, the egalitarianism inherent in the Cosmopolitan Thesis 
stipulates that individuals have economic, civil and political rights and that they 
should be accorded equality of opportunity. Likewise, Moellendorf’s book 
Cosmopolitan Justice defends an egalitarian conception of global justice. For both 
theorists, the question of intervention cannot be separated from the issue of justice. 
As a result, as Moellendorf puts it, armed intervention in the domestic affairs of a 
state is, in principle, justified if  
1. an injustice exists in the basic structure or [because of] the international 
effects of [its foreign] policy.  
 
This condition is intended to satisfy JAB’s just cause criterion. But Caney and 
Moellendorf agree that a mere concern for justice is not sufficiently weighty for war 
to be permissible. For Moellendorf, three additional criteria must be met:  
2. It must be reasonable to believe that the intervention is likely to reduce 
injustice.  
3. The intervention is proportional to the existing injustice. 
4. The intervention is a last resort after diplomatic means have failed.  
 
Roughly, these three conditions are meant to satisfy JAB’s reasonable likelihood of 
success, proportionality, and last resort criteria, respectively. Caney also agrees that 
the classic just war principles can serve as background conditions for the 
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cosmopolitan approach to MHI. But let us disregard these criteria here. After all, all 
theorists in the debate, regardless of their affiliation, subscribe to something 
resembling the Argument from Excessive Harm outlined above. If MHI produces 
more harm than good, it remains impressible, even if this means that specific 
injustices will continue to exist.  
To render the relationship between theories of justice and the ethics of MHI more 
precise, Moellendorf contends that armed intervention is permissible to replace a 
comparatively unjust basic structure. The idea of a ‘comparatively unjust’ basic 
structure appears to have three dimensions:  
1. A comparatively unjust basic structure exhibits a wide range of persistent 
injustices that are not merely the effect of a single unjust policy. Hence, as 
Moellendorf emphasises, MHI is permissible if (and only if) it replaces a basic 
structure that is unjust as such.122  
2. There are comparatively just basic structures that set a standard of legitimacy, 
thereby providing an account of ideal theory.  
3. In terms of non-ideal theory, states that ‘stand over’ a comparatively unjust 
basic structure are not holders of a right to rule, that is, they lack a negative 
claim not to be interfered with.  
 
But now imagine two countries called Libertaria and Egalitaria. The former has high 
inequalities, but also a model legal system that enforces property rights. The latter, 
too, has a good record on rights, but also implements extensive redistributive 
policies. Redistribution is anathema for the ‘Libertarians’ as it ‘enslaves’ Egalitarians 
by denying them the full fruits of their labour. Conversely, Egalitarians find the 
inequalities arising in Libertaria’s basic structure appalling because they deny the 
worst off amongst Libertaria’s citizens their just claim to assistance. If we employ 
Moellendorf’s idea of a comparatively unjust basic structure, then, in both cases, we 
cannot merely speak of some isolated policies that are unjust. Rather, the categorical 
denials of socio-economic rights in Libertaria and absolute property rights in 
Egalitaria constitute the very essence of those two basic structures, respectively.  
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The Libertaria-Egalitaria case illustrates three general problems for Moellendorf’s 
and Caney’s approach. First, justice must allow some room for reasonable 
disagreement. It is impossible to conduct international politics if disagreements about 
justice led to a situation where political entities constantly derecognised each other’s 
legitimacy. If this was the case, cosmopolitanism would lead to an excessively 
permissive form of interventionism. Of course, we should not go so far as to follow 
Copp’s suggestion that we should separate justice from legitimacy altogether. 123 
Eventually we should establish an order that is just. But doing so will require a slow 
piecemeal process of reform. As a starting point, a minimalist conception of 
legitimacy is more likely to further this aim because it is not so idealistic as to be self-
defeating.  
Second, the overall relationship between justice and the ethics of war remains 
obscure. Intuitively, it does not seem permissible for Libertaria to declare a war 
against Egalitaria to end slavery by taxation. Libertarians are permitted to try and 
persuade Egalitarians to change their economic system, but the declaration of war is 
grossly disproportionate. Further, if Moellendorf and Caney followed Teson by 
arguing that it is permissible to end large-scale violations of civil and political rights 
through the removal of extremely tyrannical regimes, they would have to account for 
what differentiates ‘extreme tyranny’ from the Egalitaria-Libertaria case. In this 
regard, Moellendorf’s and Caney’s theories are less developed than Teson’s. Rather 
than relying on the mere invocation of the value of justice, Teson’s theory tries to 
derive the right to intervene from the Lockean right to revolution.        
Third, as has been stressed throughout Chapter I, military campaigns encompass 
corporate and individual levels of analysis. In regard to the latter, Caney and 
Moellendorf must specify whether it is permissible to kill in defence of justice. 
However, neither of the two thinkers engages with the ethics of killing any detail. To 
be sure, injustices arise because of (individual) non-compliance with duties of justice. 
But considering Claudia Card’s work on atrocities, it is doubtful that non-compliance 
with duties of distributive justice can establish liability to attack.  
To be precise, violations of duties of distributive justice, Card contents, are less 
weighty than violations of negative natural duties not to cause intolerable harm.124 
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Even large-scale non-compliance with duties of distributive justice does not 
necessarily cause intolerable harm. Free-riding on public goods, for example, 
constitutes a violation of duties of fairness and reciprocity, and, in a worst case 
scenario, the public good in question simply ceases to be supplied. But there are 
normative differences between someone who does not pay the subway fare and 
someone who sets out to hack his neighbours to death. The consequences of these 
two acts differ greatly on any moral scale, and, as a result, our responses to them 
must differ too.  
For Card, the difference between atrocities and injustices may, roughly, be described 
as follows. Perpetrators of atrocities, Card maintains, deprive their victims of the 
opportunity for a decent life or a dignified death. While injustices often hinder our 
pursuit of a conception of the good, they do not always make life intolerable or 
unbearable. Less affluent members of Libertaria, for instance, may still have decent 
lives due to charity provisions. In this light, it seems permissible to use force against 
perpetrators of atrocities but not against free-riders or right-wing libertarians. 
Although this intuition needs to be rendered more precise, it raises doubts over the 
link between (distributive) justice and the ethics of war.  
Perhaps it is possible to rescue the link between global justice and the ethics of MHI 
by making the former less demanding. As was indicated above, Brock argues that 
representatives in the Original Position choose principles that will help each 
individual secure a minimum for a decent life.125 A minimally decent life is defined in 
terms of five basic needs: physical and psychological health; security to be able to act; 
understanding the options one is choosing between; autonomy; decent social 
relations with at least some others. Being more cautious than Caney and 
Moellendorf, Brock argues that MHI is permissible if (and only if) individuals are 
deprived of those means necessary for the fulfilment of their basic needs in security 
and physical and psychological health. Arguably, Brock’s theory would rule out 
intervention in the Libertaria-Egalitaria example. Though both countries disagree 
over a ‘more comprehensive’ set of principles of justice, we can assume for the sake 
of the argument that they have mechanisms in place in order to fulfil the basic needs 
of their members, albeit in different ways. As a result, intervention in their internal 
affairs is prohibited.      
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But Brock’s minimalist theory of justice raises two problems. First, it is questionable 
whether her minimalist approach can be described as a theory of ‘justice’. The value 
of justice, on an egalitarian understanding at least, has two features. It requires a) 
impartial treatment of individuals and b) compensation for undeserved disadvantages. 
This entails making comparative assessments of the standing of individuals within a 
given social structure. In other words, it matters that some fare better or worse than 
others, especially if they are better or worse off for reasons that are arbitrary from a 
moral point of view. Accordingly, the unjustifiably partial applications of a rule or the 
existence of double standards fall into the category of injustices. The rejection of 
equally qualified applicants on grounds of height, race or gender is an injustice. 
Compared to others, the rejected applicant is worse off due to factors beyond her 
control.  
Brock’s theory, on the other hand, does not have this structure. It is essentially non-
comparative. Indeed, the wrongness of killing, rape, bodily mutilation, sensory 
deprivation, preventable mass starvation, torture or non-consensual medical 
experiments neither depends on an appeal to undeserved disadvantages nor on 
comparative judgements. As Card points out, the notion of atrocities suggests that 
there are certain acts no human being should suffer. It does not matter how 
deserving or undeserving a person is. Nor does it matter whether other individuals 
experience similar wrongs. For an egalitarian at least, atrocities are not analysable 
through the framework of justice. It seems, intuitively, as if Brock’s theory describes 
something other than (in)justice, and Chapter III will discuss this intuition in detail.     
Second, even if we assume that Brock’s minimalist approach could be classified as a 
theory of justice, it is unclear whether anything is gained from the introduction of the 
concept of (minimal) justice into MHI. The normative and conceptual space in the 
analysis of atrocities is already occupied by other concepts. As we saw above, for 
Rawls, who rejects the application of justice to relations between peoples, decency is 
one of the defining features of those societies which can be tolerated. By definition, 
for the Law of Peoples, political institutions that commit atrocities are indecent or 
cruel rather than unjust.126 For Card, whose work features prominently in the next 
chapter, atrocities are paradigmatic of evil rather than injustice. If this was true, 
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atrocities are worse than mere injustices. Theorists of MHI, then, who operate with a 
minimalist theory of justice, must show that the concept of justice is preferable, 
perhaps even superior, to the concepts of decency or evil.   
The above reflections on the relationship between global justice and theories of MHI 
reveal three problems for cosmopolitans. First, those who operate with a relatively 
demanding conception of justice face the charge that their theories encourage 
excessive interventionism. Second, the charge of excessive interventionism becomes 
even more problematic when one considers that, in cosmopolitan thought at least, 
there is no engagement between the ethics of killing and saving and theories of 
justice. Third, in addition to the argument that minimalist theories of justice do not 
adequately represent the value of justice, it is not clear what they can add to our 
understanding of atrocities. As a result, an appeal to justice may either be dangerous 
or superfluous. 
C. Revising just war principles     
Cosmopolitan theorists have also tried to revise just war principles. Moellendorf, for 
instance, argues that the right intention criterion is redundant because the warring 
parties are obliged to ensure that rights are protected, regardless of their intentions.127 
However, it may be premature to abandon the right intention criterion. To see why 
this is so, it is useful to distinguish between an intrinsic and instrumental 
interpretation of it. According to the former, an act may be impermissible, or is at 
least corrupted, if carried out with the wrong intention, even though it does not 
violate any rights.128 For the latter, the right intention criterion is instrumentally 
valuable because it may help to reduce rights violations during a military campaign. 
This is because, if a campaign is fought with the wrong intentions or in the ‘wrong 
spirit’, the potential for the abuse of rights, or non-compliance with the laws of war 
more generally, is much greater. While it is difficult to defend the intrinsic version of 
the right intention criterion without recourse to complex and controversial 
metaphysical assumptions, we should retain an instrumentalist version of it.  
Second, Moellendorf wants to abandon the right authority criterion. This is point is 
particularly relevant for the tension between capacity and efficiency briefly 
                                                           
127 Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice, p. 121-122. 
128 Augustine’s famous requirement that soldiers must not kill out of hatred for the enemy can serve as 
an example for the intrinsic interpretation. A soldier who kills an enemy out of hatred might not 
violate the latter’s rights but would be acting wrongly.  
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introduced in Chapter I. The right authority criterion, Moellendorf claims, protects 
order at the expense of justice because it will unnecessarily delay intervention. In 
other words, if we are concerned with the efficiency of MHI, we should drop the 
right authority criterion. As I said in Chapter I, the other-defensive conception of 
MHI, to be developed in the remaining chapters of this thesis, does not take a line on 
this issue. It would, suitably conceived, be compatible with Moellendorf’s views on 
right authority.  
Nevertheless, though the other-defensive conception of MHI is agnostic about the 
status of right authority, it is worthwhile taking into account Caney’s criticism that 
the abandonment of the right authority criterion is unlikely to resolve the issue. 
There will be, Caney points out, disagreement about whether to intervene or not, and 
someone just has to make an authoritative decision at some stage.129  
Perhaps, then, we should aim to construct institutions, or revise existing procedures, 
to deal with the problem of possible delays. In this regard, Brock’s proposal for what 
she calls the Vital Interest Protection Organisation (VIPO) is interesting. For Brock, 
the representatives in the Original Position decide to set up VIPO, charging it with 
the task to protect our basic needs in case our own states fail to do so.130 Indeed, she 
proposes that MHI should be authorised by VIPO, though it is not clear whether 
VIPO would carry out MHI itself. The attractive feature of this proposal, for Brock, 
is that the illicit intentions of powerful states are kept in check because MHI can only 
be authorised via unanimous vote.131  
This is surely problematic. For one thing, it would have to be specified how voting 
rights are to be distributed within VIPO. For another, even if we devised a feasible 
and just distribution of voting rights, the requirement of unanimity is too demanding. 
Powerful states are presumably going to use their voting rights in order to block 
MHI if it affects their partners or their sphere of interests more broadly defined, 
while weaker states are going to form alliances in order to protect themselves from 
stronger states. This will lead to an inevitable deadlock.  
Nonetheless, Brock’s account of VIPO signals a new development in the ethics of 
MHI. As we saw in Chapter I, MHI was considered as a form of self-help during the 
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Cold War era. Arising in a post-Cold war environment, one of R2P’s tasks is to 
replace the self-help conception. Depending on how one interprets Brock’s proposal 
it may be congruent with R2P or go beyond it. If VIPO relies on the assistance of 
states, it is similar to R2P. While R2P assigns the responsibility to intervene to the 
‘international community’ via the UN Security Council, the actual discharge of the 
duty to intervene will be undertaken by member states. On the other hand, if VIPO 
has sufficient power to undertake MHI, its existence challenges the state-centric 
nature of current international politics, which, as we saw above, underlies Walzer’s 
Legalist Paradigm. This would also differentiate Brock’s theory from Teson’s and 
Rawls’s, both of which are, ultimately, state-centric.  
If anything, Brock’s argument indicates that there may be a nascent ‘post-statist’ 
conception of MHI that even surpasses R2P. But there are reasons to be doubtful 
that a post-statist framework, as opposed to a statist one, can entirely resolve the 
tension between efficiency and capacity. In regard to the former, given the 
aforementioned doubts over institutional design, Brock has to show that VIPO (or 
something closely resembling it) is more efficient in responding to atrocities than the 
current state system. In regard to capacity, since VIPO must have the capacities to 
effectively police the globe, its advocates must also defuse Walzer’s worry that a 
‘global state’ would ride roughshod over the interests of local communities. Walzer’s 
concerns about communal integrity is amplified when one consider the background 
of Brock’s theory. Regardless of whether one views justice in minimalist or more 
demanding terms, cosmopolitanism gives rise to a fairly permissive intervention 
regime. As a result, it is to be feared that VIPO would authorise interventions on a 
regular basis. There is a real danger, then, that local communities would indeed be 
overwhelmed by global institutions. 
Arguably, it may well be the case that the tension between capacity and efficiency will 
haunt theories of MHI for some time to come. Neither statism nor post-statism 
seems to have a convincing answer to it. If we are to make any progress in 
formulating a normatively sound theory of MHI, it is necessary to set the issue aside.         
After this rather negative assessment of contemporary cosmopolitanism let us end 
the discussion on a more positive note. It was pointed out above that the interests of 
the victims of mass murder hardly impact on Walzer’s defence of a duty to intervene. 
The great advantage of Moellendorf’s and Caney’s Cosmopolitan Thesis is that it 
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turns our attention towards the interests of the imperilled. In particular, moral 
cosmopolitanism seems well suited to defend a duty to intervene precisely because its 
adherents assume that a) we have strong and universal moral duties to render 
assistance to the needy and b) the individual is the prime unit of moral concern.132  
Although the argument is a step into the right direction, two issues have to be 
clarified. First, cosmopolitans must show when a duty to render assistance becomes a 
duty to intervene via military force. Second, as Moellendorf rightly notes, successful 
MHI will depend on the actions of collective and corporate bodies, such as states 
and armies. Although the duty to intervene is analytically reducible to the duties of 
individuals, it is likely to be assigned to states. Cosmopolitans must, therefore, specify 
the link between individual duty bearers and the collective agents that will undertake 
a military intervention.  
To sum up, how should we judge the success of the cosmopolitan approach to MHI? 
The answer is mixed. On the one hand, insofar as they advocate ‘broad 
interventionism’, cosmopolitans run into similar problems as Teson. On the other 
hand, cosmopolitanism represents an interesting development for theories of MHI. 
Cosmopolitan thinkers have begun to critically explore the very rationale of the 
principles of just war theory itself, though, as we saw above, they disagree over the 
importance of particular principles. Cosmopolitanism shows that just war theory is 
not a dogmatic body set in stone, but warrants critical scrutiny. Especially the 
emergence of a possible ‘post-statist’ conception of MHI poses a number of 
challenges to the traditional debate about the ethics of war, though it is yet unclear 
whether it amounts to an improvement over statism.   
VI 
Conclusion 
Despite some agreement, liberal political philosophers have offered conflicting 
accounts of the ethics of MHI. Following Teson’s classifications of different types of 
interventionism, Walzer and Rawls are in favour of limited interventionism, whereas 
Teson, Moellendorf, and Caney defend broad interventionism. Brock seems to fall 
between the two camps, as her approach is neither as restrictive as Walzer’s and 
Rawls’ nor as permissive as Moellendorf’s and Caney’s. If the above arguments are 
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sound, there are good reasons to support ‘limited interventionism’ with respect to 
military interventions. The aims of broad interventionists are better served by non-
military means of intervention and the development of a sense of solidarity with the 
oppressed.  
In light of the foregoing, the biggest problem with the contemporary debate about 
MHI is that liberal political philosophers fail to seriously engage with the ethics of 
killing. Contemporary theories of MHI lack a clear framework for the non-self-
defensive use of force. Now, while it is true that a more or less modified version of 
just war theory serves as a background to all of the theories discussed above, it is 
questionable whether it can serve as a reliable normative guide for the ethics of MHI. 
As we saw in Chapter I, for just war theory, the paradigm of a just war is a self-defensive 
one. If the above observations on, say, Teson’s invocation of DDE are sound, the 
challenge MHI poses for just war theory is greater than previously assumed. Indeed, 
as Walzer’s theory shows, the problem of the ‘missing link’ between the rights of the 
intervening state and the rights of those in the target state goes, with the exception of 
Teson’s Lockean Argument and the Argument from Hypothetical Consent, 
unmentioned in the literature on MHI. This serves is a potent reminder of how our 
thinking about war is shaped by self-defence.     
In addition to the aforementioned issues, the failure to engage with the ethics of 
killing leads to two further problems. First, the foundation of the duty to intervene 
remains vague. Given that self-defence is considered to be the paradigm for a just 
war, it is not surprising that, for Walzer, the duty to intervene stems from the duty of 
states to protect their own citizens. Contrary to Walzer, cosmopolitans are correct in 
asserting that we have duties of assistance towards those outside of our borders, but 
the question remains under what circumstances these include duties to kill on behalf 
of others. Second, because killing is such an extraordinary act, it is undeniable that 
the interveners will acquire some obligations towards those in the target state once 
the intervention is over. This seems to be fundamental for tackling the emerging 
discourse of the post-intervention justice which, with the exception of Walzer, is 
overlooked by most theorists of MHI.   
What we need, then, is a framework that connects the traditional debate about MHI 
with the contemporary one by telling us a) when and why it is permissible to use 
lethal force in defence of those outside our borders, b) when it is obligatory to do so, 
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c) what kind of obligations those who use lethal force acquire towards their targets 
and d) how the use of force can be suitably restricted. It is the task of the following 
chapters to shed some light on these questions by developing the other-defensive 
conception of MHI.  
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Chapter III 
Military Humanitarian Intervention as other-defensive war 
 
‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs’ 
(United Nations Charter, Article 51).  
 
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined – not least by forces of 
globalisation and international cooperation. States are now widely understood to be 
instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa.  
(Kofi Annan).133   
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I 
Military Humanitarian Intervention: in search of normative foundations 
The preceding two chapters gave an overview of the key issues a normative theory of 
MHI must tackle. In this chapter, we begin to develop the other-defensive 
conception of MHI. From the perspective of just war theory, the chapter is 
concerned with JAB. In particular, it seeks to find a sound interpretation of JAB’s 
just cause criterion. In doing so, it raises some points about the ‘right intention’ 
criterion. To a lesser extent, the discussion will also offer some thoughts on JAB’s 
proportionality criterion. In what follows, however, we shall leave aside the last 
resort, reasonable likelihood of success and right authority criteria that form part of 
JAB.  
It is assumed here that the last resort and reasonable likelihood of success criteria 
should be incorporated into the proportionality criterion. As we saw in Chapter I, 
assessments of proportionality require that the harm caused by war is not excessive 
to its benefits. If MHI was not the last resort, the harm caused by an other-defensive 
military campaign is likely to be excessive. If there were alternative ways of ending a 
humanitarian crisis, they should be pursued. Similarly, if there was no realistic 
prospect of being able to halt a humanitarian crisis via military action, the use of 
force is disproportionate. Certainly it is disproportionate to endanger the lives of 
intervening combatants in a pointless military campaign. Moreover, if MHI was 
doomed to fail, it is excessive to impose the costs of war on those located in the 
target state. 
In regard to the right authority criterion, as we saw in Chapter I, the other-defensive 
conception of MHI is statist in orientation, though it can be seen as an interpretation 
of R2P. The problem with R2P, however, is that its notion of international 
community is rather vague. Until a suitable post-statist conception of MHI has been 
developed, it is reasonable to assume that MHI should be carried out by states. 
Hence the chapter does not provide a detailed examination of the right authority 
criterion.134 It does not discuss the tension between efficiency and capacity either, 
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though it will soon become apparent why the latter is important for the other-
defensive conception of MHI.  
The endorsement of statism raises two critical points. First, it must be answered 
whether any state is allowed to halt a humanitarian crisis via military force. Michael 
Walzer thinks that those states with the capacity to intervene are automatically 
permitted to do so. Though, as has just been indicated, the other-defensive 
conception of MHI attaches importance to capacity, this chapter raises some 
concerns about Walzer’s claim. Second, in our discussion of Walzer’s just war theory 
in Chapter II, we saw that the state-held right to self-defence is derived from the 
rights of the state’s citizens. But it is unclear how states can gain permissions, or even 
rights, to act in defence of non-citizens. It is one of the tasks of the ensuing 
discussion to shed light on this question.                        
This takes us to the broader objectives of what is to follow. Based on our analysis of 
the MHI debate in Chapters I & II, the current chapter pursues two main aims. First, 
it is concerned with finding an analogue to the crime of aggression that could justify 
the declaration of an other-defensive war. As we shall see, large-scale atrocities, most 
notably genocide, politically motivated mass murder and ethnic cleansing, can serve 
as suitable analogues to the crime of aggression. Second, Chapter I pointed out that 
theorists of MHI defend what is normally rejected in international politics, namely 
state aggression. The declaration of an other-defensive war by the intervening state is 
an act of aggression, not least because the intervening state has not suffered an attack 
at the hands of the target state. In what follows, then, it must be shown that 
aggression can be justified. Further, given that the target state is the victim of an 
unprovoked attack, we must also determine whether it is allowed to defend itself 
against the intervening state.       
As was indicated in Chapter I, one way of meeting these challenges consists in 
drawing an analogy between MHI and domestic rescue killings. Utilising the idea of 
the Domestic Analogy, we must try and reconcile our considered judgements about 
the ethics of killing and saving in domestic circumstances with the ethics of war. 
According to the ethics of private self-defence, when the victim of an attacker is 
unable to defend herself, it is usually deemed morally permissible for a third party to 
come to her assistance by killing the attacker, subject to certain restrictions. In this 
chapter, we examine whether the rationale of this argument can be extended to MHI. 
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In other words, it needs to be shown that, morally speaking, MHI can be understood 
as a private rescue killing writ large. 
In Part II, we begin with a brief overview of the main issues in the ethics of private 
self-defence. Part III develops an analogue to the crime of aggression. Part IV then 
defends the idea of a prima facie right to intervene. It rounds off the discussion with 
some brief reflections on the problem of proportionality.   
II 
From self-defence to rescue killings 
A. The use of force: A normative taxonomy 
Before we examine the ethics of self-defence in more detail, it is important to 
introduce a fourfold normative taxonomy for the use of force.  
1. Excusable uses of force: If Amy was not permitted to kill Ben, Amy’s use of 
force is excusable if (and only if) there is a strong exculpating reason for her 
actions.135  
2. Permissible uses of force: Amy is permitted to use force against Ben if (and only 
if) Amy’s use of force is not wrong, that is, if Amy is not under a moral duty 
not to use force against Ben. One can represent this argument in terms of the 
Hohfeldian concept of liberties introduced in Chapter I. To wit, the 
permission to use force indicates the absence of a duty not to use force. If 
Amy is at liberty to use force against Ben, Ben is liable to attack, that is, he 
must have lost his right not to be attacked.   
3. Justified uses of force: Amy’s use of force against Ben is justified if (and only if), 
in addition to not being morally wrong, there is a strong normative reason in 
favour of her actions. For instance, there might be certain facts about Ben 
that tip the moral scale in favour of using force against him.    
4. A right to use force: Amy’s use of force may be permissible or even justified, but 
this does not mean that she is the holder of a right to use force against Ben.136 
                                                           
135 Excusable uses of force will not play a role in this chapter. We return to the problem of excuses in 
Chapters IV and V.  
136 Conversely, Amy may have a right to do x, although she is neither morally permitted nor justified 
to do x. In this case, Amy is holder of a right to do wrong. We shall not discuss this problem here. For 
an account of the right to do wrong, see J. Waldron, ‘A right to do wrong’, in: J. Waldron, Liberal 
rights: collected papers 1981-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 63-87.   
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We must understand the concept of a right in terms of Hohfeld’s idea of 
claim-rights introduced in Chapter I. For Hohfeld, a (claim-) right is 
correlated to duties. In the present context, the right to use force is correlated 
to two negative duties. First, Amy holds a negative claim against Carol not to 
interfere with her exercise of force against Ben. Second, Amy holds a 
negative claim against Ben not to ward off her attack. Arguably, it would be 
too radical to conclude that Ben is under a duty to die. He may always duck 
the bullet, run away, hide or wave a white handkerchief. Amy’s right only 
obliges him not to use retaliatory force against her.     
 
Let us note that the use of force is always subject to considerations of necessity and 
proportionality, regardless of whether it is merely permitted, justified, or rightful. As 
was argued in Chapter I, the problem of proportionality consists in establishing how 
harms and benefits should be balanced against each other. As we saw earlier, it 
matters how people are killed and how many are killed. For instance, if Amy had the 
option of killing Ben a) via an extremely painful method or b) painlessly, she is 
obliged, for reasons of proportionality, to pursue b). Likewise, if killing Ben was 
unnecessary, Amy must use different means to protect herself or another victim. For 
example, if Amy could scare Ben into retreat, she is obliged to do so. 
 
The problem of proportionality points to an important issue for the ethics of rescue 
killings. In cases of self-defence, it is reasonable to assume that the victim is allowed 
to attach greater weight to her life than the attacker’s. But in cases of other-defence, 
the rescuer is not threatened by the actions of the attacker.137 It must be clarified, 
then, why the rescuer is permitted to attach greater weight to the victim’s life than 
the attacker’s. Sections B and C provide answers to this and related issues. 
B. Self-defence: the justice-based perspective 
In order to show that rescuers are permitted to intervene on behalf of victims, we 
must first inquire under what circumstances (if any) victims are permitted to defend 
themselves.  Logically, Carol’s permission to kill Ben on behalf of Amy depends on 
the existence of a moral permission for Amy to kill Ben. If Amy does not have a 
                                                           
137 Nancy Davis stresses this point in her critique of the self-defence-based argument in favour of 
abortion, see N. Davis, ‘Abortion and Self-Defence’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 13/No. 3 (1984), 
pp. 175-207.   
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permission to kill Ben, Carol cannot have such a moral permission either. 
Consequently, in order to approach the problem of rescue killings, we must first 
discuss the ethics of self-defence. 
Let us begin by assuming that, unlike in Hobbes’ depiction of the state of nature 
where everyone has a ‘right to everything’, individuals possess a moral right not to be 
subjected to violent attack. Following the Hohfeldian scheme, it is correlated to a 
negative duty not to aggress others. The right not to be attacked is held in rem, to wit, 
it is held against every other moral agent in the world. It is the outcome of three 
normative considerations. First, it is based on Rawls’ idea of natural duties 
introduced in Chapter I. These, you recall, include duties not to be cruel and not to 
kill. Importantly, for Rawls, natural duties are also held in rem, as they exist 
independently of membership in a cooperative venture. Second, for Shue, so-called 
security rights form an important part of the list of basic rights. As their name 
indicates, these rights protect our bodily integrity. Third, drawing on the interest 
theory of rights, we have strong interests in bodily integrity that are sufficiently 
weighty to hold others under a negative duty not to attack us. 
For the ethics of self-defence, the main problem consists in showing that the attacker 
is liable to attack. For the attacker, too, is holder of a right not to be attacked. As Jeff 
McMahan succinctly puts it, ‘in order to avert harm to herself, the agent who engages 
in self-defence intentionally affects a person [i.e. the aggressor] in a way that she 
believes will, if successful, kill that person. Her action offends against both the 
presumption against doing harm and the presumption against intentional harming’.138 
It must be shown, then, that a) it is not wrong to intentionally harm the attacker and 
b) harming the attacker is compatible with the ends-not-means-thesis, which 
underlies the version of non-consequentialism introduced in Chapter I.   
The problem can be solved by arguing that the attacker forfeits his right not to be 
attacked.139 The victim harms the attacker because she ‘sets back’ his interest in 
                                                           
138 J. McMahan, ‘Self-Defence and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker’, Ethics, Vol. 104/Issue 2 
(1994), pp. 252-290.  
139 Critics might detect a tension between the interest theory of rights and the argument that attackers 
forfeit their right not to be attacked because the possibility of forfeiting one’s right makes more sense 
if we subscribe to the choice or will theory of rights formulated by H.L.A. Hart and others. However, 
it is reasonable to assume that, although attackers have interests in not being attacked, these interests 
are not weighty enough to hold their victims (and, perhaps, even a third party) under a duty not kill 
them. As Joseph Raz’s formulation of the interest theory makes clear, merely having an interest is in 
itself not sufficient to hold others under a corresponding duty.  
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physical integrity. But she does not wrong him because she does not violate his right 
not to be attacked. Bearing in mind the normative taxonomy outlined above, the idea 
of forfeiture establishes the permissibility of self-defence. It shows, in other words, 
that self-defensive killings are not wrong because the attacker has made himself liable 
to attack. Moreover, the idea of forfeiture indicates that self-defensive killing is 
compatible with a general concern for equality. Simply put, the forfeiture of the right 
not to be attacked leads to a moral asymmetry between victim and attacker. It accounts 
for why the victim, by defending herself, is permitted to depart from a general 
presumption in favour of equal and impartial treatment.  
In order to defend this argument, we must provide a more detailed account of the 
mechanism of forfeiture. In the contemporary literature on the ethics of self-defence, 
there are two influential approaches to it. The first, defended by Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, assumes that those who threaten a right lose their own right not to be 
attacked.140 For Thomson, it is morally irrelevant how this threat has come about. 
Accordingly, a person whose body has become an involuntary missile due to a 
sudden gust of wind forfeits her right not to be attacked. Similarly, an assassin who 
has been plotting to kill his victim for weeks forfeits his right not to be attacked. But 
intuitively, it is odd that the former should be morally on a par with the latter. After 
all, the threat posed by the assassin is the outcome of his agency, whereas the 
involuntary human missile is the victim of bad circumstances. 
The importance of human agency for the idea of forfeiture is better captured by Jeff 
McMahan’s justice-based approach.141 In a nutshell, McMahan argues that attackers 
who are morally responsible for posing an unjust threat to their victim forfeit their 
right not to be attacked.142 Considerations of justice demand that the attacker should 
suffer the harm he would have otherwise inflicted on his victim. This argument is 
reinforced by the fact that the attacker is morally responsible for having brought 
about a forced choice between lives.143 Compared to Thomson’s theory, the justice-
based approach exhibits greater compatibility with the non-consequentialist ends-
                                                           
140 J.J. Thomson, ‘Self-Defense’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 20/No. 4 (1991), pp. 283-310.   
141 McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), p. 402; McMahan, Killing in War, pp. 34-35; 162-167.  
142 For the sake of convenience, whenever the thesis uses the term ‘attacker’, it is assumed that, unless 
otherwise indicated, the attacker is morally responsible for the threat he poses.   
143 McMahan, ‘Self-Defence and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker’.  
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not-means-thesis because it insists that the attacker’s (autonomous) choices establish 
his liable to attack. 
McMahan’s justice-based perspective has important implications for the idea of a 
right to self-defence. First and foremost, because it connects forfeiture with agency, 
it clearly accounts for why killing the attacker is permissible. Second, the considerations 
underlying the justice-based position also indicate that killing the attacker is justified 
because he should suffer the harm for which he is morally responsible. Third, given 
that the attacker is morally responsible for having brought about a forced choice 
between lives, he cannot be allowed to resist efforts that prevent the victim from 
being harmed. In this sense, the victim is the holder of a right to self-defence. In our 
following discussion of the ethics of rescue killings, let us proceed on the 
(background) assumption that, under the circumstances outlined above, victims of 
unjust aggression are holders of a right to self-defence.      
C. The right to intervene: agent-neutral or agent-relative?  
If the observations of the preceding section are sound, we have fulfilled one 
precondition for a rescue killing: we have shown that, under certain circumstances, 
victims have a right to defend themselves against their attackers. Suzanne Uniacke, 
for instance, argues that, because the forfeiture of his right not to be attacked has 
resulted in a moral asymmetry between the attacker and all other moral agents, anyone 
has a right to attack him.144 For Uniacke, the right to strike against the attacker is 
‘agent-neutral’. Some might object that, from the standpoint of causality, the rescuer 
has to ‘aggress’ the attacker in order to rescue the victim. But from a moral point of 
view, the rescuer is a just aggressor. Moreover, given that the attacker is morally 
responsible for a forced choice between lives, it is intuitively acceptable that the 
rescuer can hold him under a duty not to repel his use of other-defensive force. If 
other-defensive force is the only way to ensure that the victim is not harmed, the 
attacker is not permitted to prevent the rescuer’s act of rescue. In this light, Uniacke’s 
argument seems reasonable. 
But it is premature to conclude that any third party should be recognised as a just 
aggressor. The fact that the victim is holder of a right to self-defence against the 
attacker is necessary but not sufficient for a rescue killing. As our normative 
                                                           
144 S. Uniacke, Permissible Killing: The Self-defence justification of Homicide (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), p 157.  
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taxonomy for the use of force revealed, the idea of a right implies that outside parties 
are not allowed to interfere with the right holder’s exercise of his right. Thus, if the 
victim is holder of a right to self-defence, third parties are not allowed to interfere 
with her use of self-defensive force against the attacker. In order to have a right to 
intervene, then, the rescuer must secure the victim’s consent to the intervention.  
However, even victim’s consent is not sufficient to ground the right to intervene. For 
the rescuer might have illicit intentions unbeknownst to the victim. In order to be 
recognised as a just aggressor, the rescuer must fulfil the right intention criterion. To 
be sure, when defending herself against the attacker, the victim’s intentions are not of 
overriding normative importance. After all, the justice-based perspective on self-
defence reflects this because the moral permission to use force is determined by the 
responsibility of the attacker rather than the intentions of the victim. But intuitively, 
the right intention criterion may be of greater relevance for the ethics of rescue 
killings, even if we follow McMahan’s framework. What needs to be clarified, 
though, is how demanding the right intention criterion should be. If it is too 
demanding, rescue killings will remain a mere hypothetical possibility. If it is not 
sufficiently demanding, we risk that ‘illicit’ rescuers exploit the vulnerability of 
victims. To deal with the problem, let us consider the following thought experiment: 
Mob Boss:145 The Mob Boss of the Jersey Crew, Big P, has attempted to kill Lil’ Frankie, a 
member of his ‘family’, in the past, but decided to let him live because he would be more useful to 
him alive. Now Lil’ Frankie must carry out Big P’s wishes, otherwise he will be killed. 
Unfortunately for Lil’ Frankie, the rival mafia boss of the New York crew, Meat Cleaver Marco, 
whose clan the Jersey Crew has not aggressed, has captured him and is about to kill him in order to 
intimidate Big P. At the last minute, however, Big P appears and could (only) save Lil’ Frankie by 
killing Meat Cleaver Marco. As a result, Frankie would survive and, as a side-effect, Big P’s 
family would become more powerful due to the disappearance of an important rival.  
Leaving aside the issue of consent, it is possible to argue that Big P is prohibited 
from acting because he would rescue Frankie for ‘the wrong reasons’. It is the perfect 
opportunity for him to cement his rule in the underworld. But why should this 
count? At the time of the rescue killing Big P does not wrong Frankie, 
notwithstanding his ulterior motives. The fact that Big P’s criminal empire becomes 
more powerful does not impinge on Frankie’s interest in being rescued. Similarly, it 
                                                           
145 I owe this example to Cecile Fabre’s love of gangster movies.  
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would be odd to argue that Meat Cleaver Marco is wronged because he is killed by 
someone with ulterior motives. Meat Cleaver Marco, it must be stressed, is liable to 
attack anyway. If this is sound, the thought experiment suggests that the right 
intention criterion is superfluous.  
But we should not jump to conclusions. Let us assume that once Frankie has ceased 
to be useful, Big P wants to kill Frankie because this will send out a clear message to 
fellow mobsters as to who is the boss. Though protecting Frankie’s interests in 
physical integrity from Meat Cleaver Marco, Big P is plotting to violate Frankie’s 
rights in the future. It is not clear, though, that his future plans disqualify Big P from 
acting. We do not know, for instance, whether Big P is going to be successful in 
putting his plans into practice. Big P clearly poses a threat to Frankie, but, unlike 
Meat Cleaver Marco, he is not yet an immediate threat. Of course, considering Big 
P’s behaviour towards Frankie in the past, the likelihood that Big P is going to harm 
him is fairly high. But there is nothing inevitable about him killing Frankie. 
On the other hand, if Big P was about to shoot Frankie immediately after he had 
killed Meat Cleaver Mike, he would be an immediate threat. In this case, killing Meat 
Cleaver Marco, the ‘competing’ aggressor, is merely Big P’s way of ensuring that his 
own immediate aggression is going to be successful. Under those circumstances, it is 
impossible to speak of a genuine rescue killing.  
However, we should not treat potential threats as morally on a par with immediate 
ones. The possibility that Big P plans to kill Frankie at t20+is not sufficiently weighty 
to bar him from using lethal force against Meat Cleaver Marco at t1. Even if we take 
the rescuer’s culpability for separate threats in the past/future or on-going potential 
threats into account, this does not affect his right to intervene. As Mob Boss 
indicates, being guilty of having done x to Y in the past or planning to do it in the 
future does not automatically disqualify an agent from trying to prevent someone else 
from doing x to Y. If these arguments are correct, the right intention criterion is a 
fairly thin one. Essentially, it demands that rescuers must not plan to immediately 
aggress the victim. In other words, the rescuer must not use other-defensive force in 
order to substitute one unjust threat, i.e. the original attacker, with another, i.e. 
himself.       
103 
 
D. Conclusion 
Following McMahan’s work on the ethics of self-defence, we argued that the right to 
intervene exists if (and only if) three conditions are met.  
Attacker-centric conditions: The attacker must be morally responsible for a forced choice 
between his life and the victim’s. First and foremost, in virtue of having created a 
forced choice between lives, the attacker forfeits his own right not to be attacked, 
creating a moral asymmetry between him, the rescuer and the victim. As a result, 
there is no tension between the ends-not-means-thesis and the ethics of self-
defence/rescue killings because the culpable attacker incurs liabilities to attack 
through his own culpable wrongdoing. For a right to intervene to exist, though, it 
must also be shown that the attacker is not allowed to repel the rescuer’s attack. The 
duty not to repel the rescuer results from our intuitive understanding of justice. The 
attacker, rather than his victim, should suffer the consequences of the forced choice 
between lives he created.  
Victim-centric conditions: As we saw above, a right to intervene can exist if (and only if) 
the victim has a right to defend herself against the attacker. But contrary to Uniacke, 
the latter does not automatically translate into the former. This is so because the 
concept of a right entails that no third party is (initially) allowed to interfere with the 
exercise of self-defensive force by the victim. Thus, although the rescuer does not 
violate any negative duties not to harm the attacker, an unauthorised intervention 
violates negative duties owed to the victim. Therefore, in order for a rescue killing to 
be permissible, let alone be ‘rightful’, the victim must consent to the rescuer’s 
intervention.    
 
Rescuer-centric conditions: In addition to securing the victim’s consent, the rescuer must 
meet the ‘right intention’ test. The test is not very demanding, but it is still important 
for the ethics of rescue killings. A rescuer meets the right intention criterion if he 
does not use the intervention to aggress the victim.   
Having outlined the basic assumptions behind the ethics of self- and other-defence, 
we can now turn to the implications of the idea of a rescue killing for the ethics of 
war. More precisely, we must scrutinise how far the former can serve as a normative 
foundation of the latter. Let us begin with an analysis of atrocities.   
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III 
Atrocities: Crimes and Paradigms 
The claim that the ethics of private self-defence underlies our moral thinking about 
war receives support from a very important strand of just war theory. According to 
the Domestic Analogy, just as individuals are allowed to defend themselves against 
attackers in domestic society, states are permitted to repel an unjust aggressor in 
international society. Accordingly, as Chapter I pointed out, many just war theorists 
have assumed that the paradigmatic just cause for war is self-defence. Just as a the 
attacker violates natural duties by striking his victim, aggressor states, in international 
society, violate the rights to territorial integrity and political sovereignty held by 
victim states. As Chapter II explained, for Walzer, these two rights are derived from 
the rights of those under a state’s rule. Consequently state aggression is a crime 
precisely because it forces men and women to fight for their rights. But 
unfortunately, as was observed before, theorists of MHI have not developed a 
suitable analogue to the crime of aggression.  
In order to address this shortcoming, let us draw on Claudia Card’s idea of an 
Atrocity Paradigm. It indicates why a) certain crimes are morally distinctive and b) an 
interventionist response to them is justified. Most importantly, as we shall see, it also 
neatly intersects with our justice-based approach to rescue killings outlined in Part II.  
For Card, what we can refer to as Atrocity Crimes, including mass murder, genocide 
and ethnic cleansing, are not mere injustices but grave moral evils. In fact, although 
Atrocity Crimes are not the only evils, they unite all the core features of evil writ 
large, and, as a result, they have paradigmatic status for Card’s theory of evil.146 
According to Card, evils are foreseeable, intolerable harms produced by culpable 
wrongdoing.147 They 1) are reasonably foreseeable, 2) culpably inflicted (tolerated, 
aggravated or maintained), and 3) deprive or seriously risk depriving others of the 
basics that make life tolerable or at least not indecent.148 In light of this definition, 
Atrocity Crimes must have two core elements. The first can be termed the ‘agency 
component’, while we can refer to the second as the ‘harm component’.  
                                                           
146 Card, Atrocity Paradigm, p. 9. 
147 (ibid.). p.3.  
148 (ibid.), p. 16.  
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Beginning with the agency component, evils consist in the culpable violation of 
certain normative standards.149 Card is somewhat silent on the standards that are 
being violated. Drawing on our earlier observations in Chapter I, we can fill this gap 
via an appeal to natural duties and Shue’s notion of basic rights. Atrocity Crimes, 
then, involve culpable violations of natural duties and basic rights.  
The harm component of Atrocity Crimes follows directly from the agency 
component. For Card, culpable violations of natural duties and basic rights must 
produce intolerable harm in order to amount to evil. Evils ruin victims’ lives. Victims 
may never be able to recover from them, or recovery may be extraordinarily 
difficult.150 Of course, since murder, arguably the gravest of all evils, is often part of 
the strategy behind Atrocity Crimes, many victims will not survive. Hence there is no 
question about the possibility of recovery. But the notion of intolerable harm also 
raises some interesting questions about death. For instance, we intuitively distinguish 
between a ‘dignified’ or ‘undignified’ death. In all cultures death involves certain 
rituals. Being denied the social relationships and rituals necessary for a dignified 
death can be intolerably harmful.151 To be killed at an anonymous killing site without 
access to loved ones, for instance, is, in addition to being murder, intolerably 
harmful.  
As one can see, the agency and harm components show that the Atrocity Paradigm 
intersects with the justice-based approach to the ethics of rescue killings. Card’s 
argument that Atrocity Crimes involve large-scale culpable wrongdoing is certainly 
compatible with McMahan’s point that attackers must be morally responsible for 
creating a forced choice between lives in order to be liable to attack.  In fact, if 
culpability, and not just moral responsibility, is one of the characteristics of Atrocity 
Crimes, those who participate in them exceed the criteria for liability to attack laid 
down by the justice-based approach to rescue killings. If this is true, it would 
strengthen the justice-based approach considerably. Indeed, it would present an 
almost unchallengeable rationale for a ‘right to intervene’, which is correlated to a 
                                                           
149 In a later version of her theory, Card de-emphasizes moral culpability in favour of inexcusability. 
Some evils are so common that those who participate in them are not necessarily blameworthy for 
doing so. Nevertheless, for Card, even non-culpable participation in evil is inexcusable. As Chapter IV 
suggests, however, many of those who participate in Atrocity Crimes are in fact morally culpable for 
their actions. Hence let us operate with Card’s earlier account of the agency component. See, Card, 
Confronting Evil, chapter I.     
150 Card, Atrocity Paradigm, p. 4.  
151 Card, Confronting Evils.   
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duty of non-resistance falling (at least) upon perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes. But let 
us leave aside this issue until Chapter IV. For now, we will focus on the question in 
how far the idea of rescue killing can be applied at the level of states, rather than 
individuals.  
While the agency component presents a strong normative link with the idea of 
forfeiting one’s rights, the harm component inherent in the Atrocity Paradigm also 
indicates that a forceful response to atrocities is, in principle, proportionate. Because 
atrocities cause intolerable harm to victims, the use of force is intuitively more 
acceptable than in the case of mere injustices. If this is sound, the Atrocity Paradigm, 
in conjunction with the ethics of rescue killings, represents a significant step towards 
the formulation of a sound analogue to the crime of aggression.  
Critics could reply that the Atrocity Paradigm is less helpful than it initially seems. 
This is so because it does not provide a sound rationale for why MHI should only be 
permissible in order to halt Atrocity Crimes. After all, there are many ordinary evils 
that also cause intolerable harms. In this sense, the Atrocity Paradigm does not seem 
to constitute a theoretical advance over the broad interventionism advocated by 
Teson and the various cosmopolitan theorists discussed in Chapter II. In fact, it runs 
into fairly similar problems. Like Teson’s invocation of tyranny, the notion of 
Atrocity Crimes remains vague and arbitrary. Like the cosmopolitan emphasis on the 
importance of justice, the Atrocity Paradigm apparently generates an excessively 
permissive form of interventionism. Defenders of the Atrocity Paradigm can 
respond to these two challenges as follows.  
First, the use of other-defensive force is constrained by considerations of 
proportionality and necessity. Many ordinary evils cannot be solved via military 
measures but only social reform. For instance, Card rightly points out that domestic 
violence and child abuse are grave evils.152 Though it is often brushed under the 
carpet, domestic violence is also a relatively wide-spread phenomenon. But in order 
to conquer domestic violence, a military intervention is misplaced. Instead, it is 
necessary to, say, rethink the gender-based division of labour and introduce more 
liberal divorce laws. By contrast, when we consider genocide, mass murder or ethnic 
cleansing, there is little reforms could achieve to halt these crimes. Atrocity Crimes 
necessitate a military response, whereas many other evils don’t.  
                                                           
152 Card, Atrocity Paradigm, chapter 7.  
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Second, Atrocity Crimes are morally distinctive forms of evil.153 As was indicated 
above, they often involve the indiscriminate killing of defenceless individuals. 
Perpetrators of atrocities wilfully break down the distinction between combatants 
and non-combatants. In this way, as Chapter V shows, the underlying rationale of 
Atrocity Crimes is fundamentally opposed to just war thinking. Even if perpetrators 
of Atrocity Crimes bother to draw a distinction between those who are liable to 
attack and those who aren’t, they mostly rely on indefensible arguments. While the 
ethics of war assumes that individuals incur liabilities to attack because of what they 
do, perpetrators target their victims because of who they are. This means that victims 
of Atrocity Crimes are defenceless in a twofold sense. On the one hand, they lack the 
practical means of resistance. On the other hand, they cannot escape the 
exterminatory logic of the perpetrators. For we have little control over our identities 
and usually cannot change them at will.               
In addition to involving the ‘politics of physical murder’, Atrocity Crimes are also 
morally distinctive because they are often aimed at bringing about ‘social death’. The 
concept of social death is the opposite of what Card terms ‘social vitality’. The latter 
obtains when individuals are embedded in meaningful social relations. Social vitality, 
according to Card, can be interpersonal or institutionally-mediated; it encompasses 
contemporary and intergenerational relationships.154 Social death occurs when the 
dense net of social relationships that define us is destroyed. Because it aims to 
destroy groups, genocide may be the ultimate form of social death, though the intent 
to bring about social death may not be the only defining feature of genocidal acts.155  
But it is worthwhile pointing out that non-genocidal atrocities can also lead to the 
social death of victims. Territory, for instance, plays a complex role in the lives of 
many communities. The forcible removal of groups from their territory can, 
therefore, result in the destruction of relationships that define a group or at least 
lessen their strength. Even the children of survivors, once a group has been removed 
from its homeland, may not be able to establish socially vital relationships amongst 
                                                           
153 For Card, the Atrocity Paradigm does not rule out that some evils are worse than others. (ibid.). p, 
15  
154 Card, Confronting Evils, p. 237.   
155 (ibid.), pp- 261-266. For a sympathetic yet critical discussion of the social death thesis, see L. May, 
Genocide: A normative account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 84-01. For a critical 
response to it, see S.P. Lee, ‘The Moral Distinctiveness of Genocide’, Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 
18/No. 3 (2010), pp. 335-336; especially, pp. 341-345. It would be beyond the scope of this project to 
treat the debate about genocide in detail. The case of genocide only serves as an example that some 
evils are morally distinctive. 
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each other. In addition to being a sexual crime, the use of rape as a weapon leads to 
social death.156 It disrupts many of the social patterns that define a community. In 
traditional communities, women who have been raped may be ostracised, while 
children born as a result of rape are unlikely to be accepted as full members. As Card 
argues, the children would already be born socially dead. Contrary to Derek Parfit’s 
work on the non-identity problem, there are serious doubts that a socially-dead 
existence is better than non-existence.157 
If these observations are correct, it is not arbitrary to distinguish between ordinary 
evils and Atrocity Crimes. As a result, while the just cause for a self-defensive war 
consists in the repulsion of unjust aggression, the other-defensive conception of 
MHI assumes that the halting of Atrocity Crimes constitutes a just cause for MHI. In 
contrast to the broad interventionist position advocated by Teson and recent 
cosmopolitan theorists, the aim of an other-defensive war is not to topple oppressive 
governments or make societies just. As we saw in Chapter II, although these are 
laudable aims, they do not constitute a just cause for war. Rather, the idea of an 
other-defensive war resembles Walzer’s and John Rawls’ narrow interventionist 
approach to MHI. Both philosophers restrict military interventions to roughly the 
same list of crimes singled out by the Atrocity Paradigm.158  
Before we can pursue the link between the Atrocity Paradigm and the ethics of 
rescue killings further, let us briefly attend to two points. First, it is undeniable that 
the crime of aggression is an evil. But because the Atrocity Paradigm does not 
discourage comparisons between evils, it is possible to argue that unjust aggression is 
not as bad as Atrocity Crimes. The reason for this argument harks back to the issue 
of indiscriminate killing. According to one prominent view, subject to further 
examination in Chapter IV, it is possible to fight an unjust war via just methods, 
primarily by observing the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. By 
contrast, perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes transgress this very distinction. They kill 
indiscriminately, targeting defenceless individuals. If we assume that unjust 
                                                           
156 Card, Confronting Evils, chapter 10. 
157 See, D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), chapter 16.    
158 But the Atrocity Paradigm constitutes advancement over Walzer’s theory in particular. As we saw 
in Chapter II, Walzer’s notion of crimes that shock the conscience of mankind runs into serious 
problems. The Atrocity Paradigm, rightly, maintains that the distinctiveness of certain states of affairs 
arises from intolerable harm caused by culpable violations of basic rights rather than the ‘shock value’ 
of a particular act. Of course, Atrocity Crimes are often shocking, but this does not account for our 
moral judgment of them.    
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aggression is a lesser evil than Atrocity Crimes, MHI may be a better paradigm for a 
just war than self-defence against unjust aggression. The Atrocity Paradigm, then, 
forces just war theorists to rethink their (normative) priorities. 
Second, some critics may baulk at the invocation of the notion of evil. There is 
probably no other term that has been misapplied so consistently throughout history. 
This is hardly surprising since evil is the worst opprobrium one can level at a person 
or political organisation. Rather worryingly, the concept evil could undermine the 
humanitarian impulse not to resort to Manichean thinking. Interestingly, however, 
Card maintains that the Atrocity Paradigm supports humanitarian values.159 Indeed, 
there are three reasons that indicate why Manichean thinking is misplaced in the 
context of Atrocity Crimes.   
First, as Chapter IV contends, it is not necessarily the case that those who perpetrate 
evils are themselves evil persons. Thus, as Chapter I argued, just as a neat distinction 
between victims and perpetrators is difficult to achieve, a Manichean division of 
individuals along of lines of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ is a myth.  
Second, a strict division between us (good) and them (evil) is historically unsound 
and morally mistaken. As we observed during the discussion of Teson’s Argument 
from Historical Injustice in Chapter II, the birth of almost all modern states involved 
considerable bloodshed, whose effects are still prevalent nowadays.  
Third, as Chapter VI makes clear, the causes of evil are never limited to the target 
state and its society. External factors often have an impact on the dynamics of 
Atrocity Crimes. Good and evil exists on all sides.   
IV 
In defence of a prima facie right to intervene 
A. Self-Defence, Consent and Sovereignty  
In Part III, we outlined an analogue to the crime of aggression. To develop the 
other-defensive conception of MHI, let us pursue the link between rescue killings 
and Atrocity Crimes further. We argued that, in a domestic context, the right to 
intervene depends on three conditions. Beginning with the victim-centric conditions, 
                                                           
159 Card, Confronting Evils, p. 9.  
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let us the Domestic Analogy to defend a state-held right to intervene. To recapitulate, 
in order for the use of other-defensive force to be permissible, the victim-centric 
conditions require that a) the victim is holder of a right to self-defence against the 
attacker and b) the victim consents to the intervention. By analogy, for an other-
defensive war to be permissible, victims of Atrocity Crimes must a) hold a right to 
defend themselves against what we can refer to as genocidal attackers and b) 
authorise potential intervening states to act on their behalf.  
With regard to the right to self-defence, just war theorists who advocate the 
Domestic Analogy pursue two strategies.160 The first, the reductive strategy, 
maintains that military resistance to unjust aggression represents the centrally 
coordinated mass exercise of individual rights to self-defence. For the reductive 
strategy, the statist right to self-defence is directly reducible to the individual right to 
self-defence. The analogical strategy, on the other hand, contends that self-defensive 
war is normatively reducible to the exercise of group rights to defend certain public 
goods against external threats.161 Accordingly, the statist right to self-defence is 
reducible to the collective or corporate rights of communities. Walzer’s Legalist 
Paradigm, for instance, unites both of these strategies. The rights of the state result 
from the rights of individuals who are parts of communities that provide them with 
certain public goods. Both of these strategies also clearly apply in cases involving 
genocidal attackers.162 
First, because indiscriminate killing is one of the central features of Atrocity Crimes, 
victims usually face an immediate threat to their lives. Unless they defend themselves, 
they will be killed. Second, as we saw above, Atrocity Crimes often bring about the 
social death of their victims by destroying those goods that make social relations 
between members of a community possible. Cultural values are usually public goods, 
and, it seems, a state attacked by a genocidal attacker can rightly claim to be acting in 
defence of a community.  
                                                           
160 This discussion follows David Rodin’s classification of the various strands of the Domestic 
Analogy; see Rodin, War and Self-Defence.  
161 For the idea of a public good, see J. Raz, ‘Right-based moralities’, in: J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of 
Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) especially p. 187. Public goods are non-excludable 
once they are shared by members of a group (of course, one can always exclude individuals from the 
group, but this does not affect the distribution of the relevant public good within the group as such).   
162 Even Rodin, one of the strongest critics of the incorporation of the ethics of self-defense into just 
war theory, acknowledges this, see Rodin, War and Self-Defence, pp. 139-140.  
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If this is true, there is little doubt that victims of genocidal attackers are holders of 
individual and collective rights to self-defence. Of course, this presupposes that the 
various attacker-centric conditions are met. But since the Atrocity Paradigm assumes 
the centrality of culpable wrongdoing for Atrocity Crimes, let us assume that this is 
the case. Further, we can assume that the moral distinctiveness of Atrocity Crimes 
provides a strong normative justification for holding genocidal attackers under a duty 
not to repel the victim’s counterattack.  
But the victim’s right to defend herself against a genocidal attacker is not sufficient to 
prove that the rescuer has a right to intervene. As we saw above, the right to strike an 
attacker is generally not agent-neutral. Rather, because the right to self-defence is 
correlated to a negative duty held against third parties not to interfere with the 
victim’s exercise of her right, the rescuer must seek the victim’s consent before he 
kills the attacker. As we already saw in Chapter II, the problem of consent is complex 
for theories of MHI. In order to make the discussion more manageable, let us begin 
by establishing whose consent is morally relevant. Suppose that Red attacks a large 
group called Minority Ethnicity located in its territory and Blue is about to intervene 
to halt Atrocity Crimes. In a domestic rescue killing, the rescuer is only required to 
secure the victim’s consent but not the attacker’s. Assuming that Red is analogous to 
an attacker, Blue does not need to secure Red’s consent. According to the Domestic 
Analogy, Blue must only secure Minority Ethnicity’s consent.  
However, there are two problems with this argument. First, from a practical 
perspective, it is not clear how Blue can secure Minority Ethnicity’s consent. In 
international politics, as has been mentioned before, the practical problem of 
obtaining consent is solved via the state’s ability to enter into contracts with other 
corporate entities on behalf of its citizens. But given that Red is the perpetrator of 
Atrocity Crimes, it is highly unlikely that Red will consent to MHI. Interventionist 
action contradicts Red’s interests.       
Second, although the rescuer does not need to obtain the attacker’s consent, the 
rescuer may have to secure consent from bystanders in case his actions will impact 
on them. By contrast, the victim does not need to secure consent from bystanders. 
The fact that her life is threatened usually means that the victim is allowed to attach 
greater weight to her life than that of bystanders, provided she abides by certain 
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constraints that restrict the harms she can permissibly inflict on bystanders.163 Yet, as 
was pointed out before, the rescue does not share this agent-relative reason. Thus it 
is reasonable to assume that the rescuer must also secure consent from bystanders. 
By analogy, since military campaigns also affect those who are not engaged in 
hostilities, Blue may have to secure Majority Ethnicity’s consent.   
Fernando Teson, as we saw in Chapter II, tries to solve both of these problems via 
the Original Position. First, since it is a hypothetical contract, the Original Position 
shows that the express consent of the victims of Atrocity Crimes is not necessary for 
the permission to intervene militarily. Second, it also solves the problem of 
‘bystander consent’. Placed behind the veil of ignorance, representatives would 
choose suitably constrained pro-interventionist principles because they do not know 
whether they are going to be perpetrators, victims or bystanders.  
But Chapter II argued that a hypothetical contract is no contract at all, not least 
because the duty of non-resistance that is hypothetically chosen would not be 
binding on real individuals in case their lives are threatened by the interveners. 
Furthermore, the construction of a hypothetical contract already relies on a large 
number of pre-contractual assumptions. Since all the important theoretical work is 
done prior to the contract, the device of the contract is redundant. Instead of taking 
a detour via a hypothetical contact, it is better to directly appeal to the conditions 
that would justify an interventionist response. To do so, let us utilise the liberal 
legalist claim that sovereignty is an enabling condition. Summarising a complex body 
of thought, liberal legalism offers a fourfold defence of sovereignty.164   
First, many important political goals, such as the pursuit of justice, depend on the 
existence of sovereign institutions. To illustrate the point, in Hobbes’ depiction of 
the state of nature progress is impossible. Second, given that we are physically 
vulnerable creatures, we depend on the protective services of the state. Third, 
assuming the existence of pluralism as a social fact, sovereign institutions are needed 
to preserve the peace between individuals who pursue rival conceptions of the good. 
                                                           
163 On this issue, see T. Hurka, ‘Proportionality in the Morality of War’. Usually, the Doctrine of 
Double Effect (DDE), Hurka argues, would constrain the victim’s actions. Accordingly, the victim is 
only allowed to non-intentionally harm bystanders. The victim, for instance, is not allowed to use the 
bystander in order to shield herself from the attacker.      
164 The discussion in this section follows and builds on the works of Michael Blake, Thomas Nagel 
and Andrea Sangiovanni. Blake, ‘Distributive Justice, State Coercion and Autonomy’; Nagel, ‘The 
Problem of Global Justice’; Sangiovanni, ‘Global Justice, Reciprocity and the State’.     
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Fourth, as was pointed out in Chapter I, the brand of liberalism defended in this 
thesis assumes that individuals have the capacity for autonomous action. 
Autonomous action, however, is only possible if we can make reasonable 
assumptions about how others are going to act. In the Hobbesian state of nature, we 
do not act autonomously but are motivated by fear. Sovereign institutions, by 
preserving the peace, protect our capacity for autonomous choice.165 
For the liberal legalist position, the state carries out these functions by enforcing the 
law against its subjects. This reinforces the definition of the state as an animated legal 
system. But although the rule of law and a sovereign order are public goods, it would 
be odd to argue that individuals qua individuals had rights to them. Bearing in mind 
the interest theory of rights introduced in Chapters I and II, individuals have a 
collective right to sovereign institutions qua members of a group.166 Note that this 
interpretation of a group right does not rely on a ‘thick’ or communitarian notion of 
a group as defined by shared meanings and traditions. Given that liberalism is a 
response to pluralism, members of a state may disagree fundamentally about 
conceptions of the good. But notwithstanding their disagreements, they have 
collective interests in sovereign institutions. Drawing an analogy with Rawlsian 
primary goods, they have a collective interest in sovereign institutions, regardless of 
whatever else they want. 
In light of the above, the other-defensive conception of MHI assumes that JAB’s just 
cause criterion needs to be broadened. Unlike earlier conceptions of MHI, the just 
cause of MHI is not merely negative, to wit, it does not solely rest on the claim that 
Atrocity Crimes should be halted. In addition, it has a strong positive component, 
namely that interveners should bring about sovereign institutions in the target state. 
For the occurrence of Atrocity Crimes signals that the target state does not fulfil its 
basic sovereign function of preserving the peace amongst those under its rule. The 
                                                           
165 Admittedly, this conception of autonomy falls short of the more demanding version of autonomy 
found in the works of Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Autonomy, for the other-defensive 
conception of MHI, means that we can organise our desires by making reasonable predictive 
assessments of the effects of different courses of action. This ‘thin’ understanding of autonomy could 
even be accommodated by societies that do not value a stronger version of autonomy. The main point 
of the other-defensive conception of MHI is that autonomy, however demanding it may be as a value, 
depends on the existence of certain public goods. This point is explicitly recognised by Raz, but it can 
also be found in Rawls’ work. For Rawls, the realisation of justice as fairness depends on the existence 
of a reasonably stable basic structure.     
166 For the whole debate about public goods and collective rights, see Raz, ‘Right-based moralities’; J. 
Waldron, ‘Can communal goods be human rights?’, in: J. Waldron (ed.), Liberal Rights (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), chapter 14; P. Jones, ‘Group Rights and Group Oppression’, 
Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 7/Issue 4 (1999), pp. 353-377.  
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task of MHI is to re-establish decent law governed institutions that prevent a relapse 
into Atrocity Crimes. In this respect, the other-defensive conception of MHI closely 
follows R2P. R2P also contends that there is a responsibility to rebuild the target 
state once Atrocity Crimes have been halted.  
As was indicated above, the invocation of public goods can assist us in dealing with 
the issue of consent. Although it may be impossible to secure the express or 
hypothetical consent of victims and bystanders, MHI is justified if (and only if) it 
provides certain public goods that are in the interest of all those located in the target 
state, subject to certain constraints.167 The liberal legalist argument that a sovereign 
order is required by a commitment to pluralism and autonomy indicates that MHI, 
suitably conceived, is in the interest of all those in the target state. One attraction of 
this view is that it is compatible with the humanitarian values of neutrality and 
impartiality because it stresses that MHI should benefit all members of a society in 
crisis. MHI does not consist in defending ‘good’ against ‘evil’. Instead, MHI should 
make a peaceful, law governed future for all those in the target state possible. 
But while the invocation of public goods renders an appeal to express or hypothetical 
consent superfluous, it would be premature to abandon all forms of consent. There 
is, in fact, a tradition of ‘consent’ that has not received attention so far. Mostly 
associated with John Locke’s work, the idea of tacit consent supposes that X tacitly 
consents to the laws of the land simply by obeying them and enjoying their 
protection. Conversely, we can assume that X does not consent to the laws of the 
land if X actively opposes them. Perhaps it is possible to utilise the notion of tacit 
consent for the ethics of MHI. If there was wide-spread resistance to the interveners, 
we can assume that members of the target state do not consent to MHI. Of course, 
given what has been said above, we must focus on the tacit consent of the victims 
rather than the bystanders of perpetrators. If victims of Atrocity Crimes demanded 
that MHI should be halted, MHI should indeed be abandoned. The invocation of 
public goods and sovereignty, then, only provides a prima facie permission to 
intervene.  
                                                           
167 For a similar argument, see J. McMahan, ‘Humanitarian Intervention, Consent, and 
Proportionality’, in: N. Davis, R. Keshen & J. McMahan (eds.), Ethics and Humanity: Themes from the 
Philosophy of Jonathan Glover (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 44-74.  McMahan thinks that 
MHI should be in the interest of the majority of individuals in the target. It should also be welcomed 
by them. We return to the last point in a short moment.   
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If the above observations are sound, we have overcome two theoretical hurdles. 
First, we have shown that those threatened by genocidal attackers are holders of a 
right to defend themselves. Second, we have argued that the intervening state neither 
needs to secure the express consent nor hypothetical consent of the victims of 
Atrocity Crimes.    The price for the abandonment of consent, however, is a more 
demanding conception of MHI. But this is not a bad price to pay. The goal of MHI, 
as Walzer once put it, cannot be to ‘get in and get out’. More realistically, MHI must 
include efforts to stabilise the target state. That said, if the victims of Atrocity Crimes 
explicitly rejected these efforts, MHI should be abandoned. Thus, the permission to 
intervene can only be a prima facie permission. 
Having explored the implications of the victim-centred conditions of a rescue killing 
for the ethics of MHI, let us now turn to the attacker-centric conditions.      
B. Liability to attack and asymmetry  
As we saw above, for the justice-based approach, the use of force against the attacker 
is permissible because the attacker forfeits his right not to be attacked. This results in 
an asymmetry between the attacker and the victim, which, subject to further 
conditions, allows the rescuer to use other-defensive force against the attacker. By 
analogy, states guilty of engaging in or tolerating Atrocity Crimes also forfeit their 
right not to be attacked. This means that the intervening state, by declaring an other-
defensive war, acts permissibly. It does not violate negative duties not to aggress the 
target state. This diffuses the charge that theorists of MHI defend what is normally 
rejected in international affairs, namely state aggression. Unjust aggression violates 
the rights of states not to be attacked. Just aggression, by contrast, does not, precisely 
because the target state has made itself liable to attack. The analogy between rescue 
killings and MHI is useful because it enables us to distinguish between just and 
unjust aggression. For the other-defensive conception of MHI, the intervening state 
must be considered as a just aggressor.  
Let us render the process of forfeiture more precise. In domestic circumstances, the 
attacker forfeits his right not to be attacked because he is morally responsible for 
bringing about a forced choice between lives. In the international context, we can 
argue that the target state forfeits its right not to be attacked when it engages in or 
tolerates Atrocity Crimes. Bearing in mind the arguments of the preceding section, 
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the target state fails to fulfil its sovereign function of preserving the peace amongst 
those under its rule. Because of this, it cannot be considered as a member of equal 
standing in international society. To avoid confusion, the argument does not suggest 
that the target state ceases to be a state because it incurs liabilities to attack. The 
other-defensive conception of MHI only maintains that the target state cannot claim 
immunity from attack.  
The claim that states guilty of committing or tolerating Atrocity Crimes forfeit their 
right not to be attacked is supported by three observations. First, as we saw in 
Chapter II, liberal political philosophers reject the statist interpretation of the 
Principle of Sovereign Equality, which, as we saw in Chapter II, claims that states 
have intrinsic value. As the liberal legalist position indicates, states have instrumental 
value because their institutions fulfil certain functions for those under their rule. 
Second, Walzer’s Legalist Paradigm maintains that the rights of the state cannot exist 
independently of their people. If states violate the basic rights of their members, they 
cannot claim equal status under the Legalist Paradigm. Third, R2P asserts that states 
have a duty to protect their subjects. Sovereignty is increasingly seen as conditional, 
depending on the state’s ability to serve its people. As the quotation by Kofi Annan 
at the beginning of the chapter indicates, states are servants of their people.   
Of course, the representatives of the target state could reply that their state does not 
forfeit its right not to be attacked because its policies, violent though they may be, 
are necessary to fulfil its task as a sovereign. Its actions, in other words, are necessary 
to preserve the peace. This is likely to be a cynical distortion of the truth. But even if 
it was not, evils, according to the Atrocity Paradigm, can arise if an agent chooses 
illegitimate means to pursue otherwise legitimate goals. In this respect, the Atrocity 
Paradigm reinforces the non-consequentialist perspective that underlies this thesis. 
As we saw in Chapter I, individuals have rights that act as side-constraints on the 
pursuit of otherwise laudable social and political goals. For just war theorists and 
non-consequentialists alike, the ends do not justify the means.   
While the above shows that the intervening states is permitted, perhaps even 
justified, to aggress the target state, we must clarify whether the latter is permitted to 
declare a self-defensive war against the former. If we consider the idea of a domestic 
rescue killing, the answer must be negative. For the rescuer holds the attacker under 
a duty not to repel his attack. For the other-defensive conception of MHI, the same 
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holds with regard to relations between the target and intervening states. In order to 
defend this point, let us turn to the analogy between domestic self-defence and self-
defensive wars.  
First, it is unlikely that the declaration of a self-defensive war against the intervening 
state could be justified via the reductive strategy. It is to be feared that, in a malicious 
twist, the target state simply ends up defending individual perpetrators against their 
victims. Furthermore, MHI, according to the just war approach, does not involve 
indiscriminate killing. If it did, the intervening state would be a genocidal attacker, 
and resistance to the genocidal attacker is usually justified. But as Chapter I argued, 
MHI is regulated via certain deontological constraints that seek to protect the status 
of individuals. Needless to say, this throws up the problems of combatant liability 
and non-combatant immunity. Moreover, we must clarify what should happen if the 
intervening state adopted some illegitimate means to carry out the intervention. But 
let us defer the discussion of these problems until Chapters IV and V, respectively. 
Second, it is not the case that a self-defensive war against the intervening state could 
be justified via an appeal to public goods. For the other-defensive conception of 
MHI, MHI is necessary precisely because the target state fails to supply certain public 
goods to those under its rule. It would be odd to claim that the target state defends 
exactly those goods that it denies to (some of) its members against an external 
aggressor, i.e. the intervening state.  
Yet illiberal critics of the other-defensive conception of MHI may try to rescue the 
analogical strategy that forms an important part of the analogy between the analogy 
between domestic self-defence and self-defence war. While they could concede that 
the target state cannot claim to defend a sovereign order against the intervening state, 
they can contend that it acts in defence of certain cultural public goods. But this 
argumentation is flawed for two reasons.  
First, many states are home to more than one community. Indeed, the fact that many 
state territories do not coincide with national boundaries often accounts for internal 
conflicts. The question, then, is whose traditions, cultures and values the target state 
defends. The danger is that the target state defends the culture of the dominant 
group at the expense of a minority that finds itself threatened by Atrocity Crimes.         
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Second, even if MHI interferes in and changes the nature of a communal culture, it is 
not necessarily the case that this causes the social death of a community. There may 
be certain aspects of a communal culture that give rise to obnoxious identities, 
perhaps fuelling the perpetration of Atrocity Crimes. While communities have a right 
to preserve some of their ways of living, they cannot claim protection for obnoxious 
traditions. To use an analogy, while it is impermissible to deny supporters of a 
football club their right to associate, it is not impermissible to target the hooligan 
element within their midst.   
If these observations are sound, the intervening state appears to be the holder of a 
prima facie right to intervene. For it can hold the target state under a duty not to repel 
its attack. However, it can only be the holder of such a right if it fulfils the rescuer-
centric conditions of a rescue killing.   
C. Gangsters and Trojan horses    
In a domestic rescue killing, the rescuer has a right to strike against the attacker if he 
fulfils the right intention criterion. In theories of MHI, the right intention of the 
rescuer has often been doubted by critics, most notably international lawyers. Some 
anti-interventionists contend that MHI is something of a ‘Trojan horse’.168 Under the 
cloak of humanitarian engagement, states try to enlarge their sphere of influence. On 
this view, MHI is motivated by self-interest. Although this thesis is not concerned 
with the legality of MHI, there are three immediate non-theoretical replies to the 
Trojan Horse Objection.  
First, it is probably a commonplace that almost any concept can be abused. The 
notion of self-defence is as susceptible to abuse as MHI. While states may pretend to 
be defending themselves against an ‘imagined threat’, their real intentions could be 
the enlargement of their territory. For the sake of consistency at least, those 
international lawyers intent on banning MHI should also ban self-defensive war.  
Second, the other-defensive conception of MHI is rather restrictive with regard to 
the permission to intervene. Interventions that are not aimed at the halting Atrocity 
                                                           
168 The term comes from James Pattison. He calls this criticism the Trojan Horse Objection. J. 
Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who should intervene? (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), pp. 57-59. The most prominent advocate of this claim is David Chandler. D. 
Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention (London: Pluto, 2002).   
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Crimes are not permissible. As a result, it should be apparent when the language of 
interventionism is used for illicit purposes.     
Third, the actual practice of MHI has been much more conservative than the Trojan 
Horse Objections admits. As we shall see in Chapter VII, the current (legal) debate 
about MHI recognises that steps must be taken to stabilise post-atrocity societies. 
For international lawyers, the project of reconstruction is essentially conservative. 
International law has reaffirmed the centrality of the state in international politics. 
This is so because the aim of humanitarian occupation is to reconstruct the target 
state so it can carry out its sovereign functions. Although this leads to all kinds of 
practical difficulties, international law asserts the independence of the target state qua 
state, once it has been suitably reconstructed. Under these circumstances, it will be 
difficult for intervening states to engage in an almost unconstrained enlargement of 
their sphere of influence. 
From a more theoretical perspective, let us draw an analogy between Mob Boss and 
MHI in order to deal with the problem of illicit intentions. In Mob Boss, we argued 
that Big P has a right to use other-defensive force against Meat Cleaver Marco, even 
though doing so will lead to an expansion of his criminal empire. The fact that Big P 
has ulterior motives does not mean that his actions violate Frankie’s rights. Neither 
do Big P’s actions violate Meat Cleaver Marco’s rights. As we argued above, Meat 
Cleaver Marco is liable to attack anyway. What we can expect from Big P, however, is 
that he does not use the rescue killing to immediately engage in an act of unjust 
aggression against Frankie.  
The example can also serve as a rough template for the other-defensive conception 
of MHI. For one thing, the existence of ulterior motives may be compatible with 
MHI. From the perspective of proportionality, one would have to assess whether the 
intervening state’s successful realisation of its ulterior motives would be worse than 
the unabated large-scale perpetration of Atrocity Crimes. Unless the intervening state 
plans to engage in Atrocity Crimes itself, it does not seem that, say, an increase in its 
power through successful MHI would be excessive in relation to the halting of 
Atrocity Crimes. Atrocity Crimes are, as we argued above, paradigmatic of grave evil.  
Directly related to the preceding point, just as Big P is not allowed to intervene if he 
plans to immediately aggress Frankie, we can argue that an intervening state is not 
120 
 
allowed to intervene if it violates the rights of those located in the target state during 
the conduct of MHI or in its immediate aftermath. This argument establishes an 
important theme for the following discussion, as it shifts our attention from the 
declaration of MHI at the level of JAB to the conduct of MHI at the level of JIB. 
The declaration of MHI is impermissible if the intervening state is unlikely to abide 
by central principles of JIB.169 In particular, the intervening state must discriminate 
between combatants and non-combatants. It remains to be seen, though, how exactly 
the line between the two categories of individuals is to be drawn. But provided that 
the intervening state abides by the rules of JIB, it can be seen as the holder of a prima 
facie right to intervene.170 
D. The Problem of Proportionality: some brief thoughts 
Although the arguments of the preceding sections defend the idea of a right to 
intervene, the latter is always constrained by considerations of proportionality. 
Although we turn to the problem of proportionality in Chapter V, let us briefly 
engage with it here. In theories of MHI, proportionality can be understood along 
self- and other-regarding dimensions.  
In regard to the former, the costs of MHI must not be excessive to the intervening 
state. Costs must be understood in terms of the liberal legalist argument about 
‘enabling sovereignty’. Accordingly, the costs of MHI would be excessive for the 
intervening state if it was not able to carry out its governing functions by enforcing 
the law against those in its territory. Put simply, the protection of rights at home 
must not come at the expense of the protection of rights abroad. If, say, the target 
state was to launch a devastating counterattack against the intervening state, the latter 
must refrain from exercising its right to intervention.    
In regard to the other-regarding perspective on proportionality, it is, once again, 
useful to contrast self-defensive action with rescue killings. Suppose that if the victim 
defends herself against the attacker, the attacker’s accomplice is going to vent his 
frustration on the bystander. As we saw above, because the victim’s life is threatened, 
it seems that the victim is permitted to attach greater weight to her life than the 
bystander’s. Now suppose that if the rescuer defends the victim against the attacker, 
                                                           
169 Pattison also argues that the conduct of the intervening state determines the legitimacy of the 
intervention; see Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention, pp. 99-101.  
170 For the sake of convenience, the following chapters will not restate the caveat prima facie every time 
we use the term right to intervene.   
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the accomplice is going to vent his frustration on the bystander. Since the rescuer’s 
life is not threatened by the attacker, it seems that the rescuer, unlike the victim, must 
take the harm caused to the bystander into account. If the harm caused to the 
bystander was excessive to the benefits resulting from rescuing the victim, the 
rescuer must not proceed. As Chapter V explains, negative duties not to harm are 
usually stronger and more stringent than positive duties to assist.  
Of course, so far we have only argued that MHI is permissible. But since acts must 
be permissible in order to be obligatory, we can apply the same rationale to the 
permission to engage in other-defensive uses of force. By analogy, then, it would be 
impermissible for the intervening state to exercise its right to intervene if doing so 
led to the large-scale destabilisation of the international order. Suppose that if Blue 
declares an other-defensive war against Red, Red would launch an attack against 
neighbouring Orange. The effects of Red’s attack on Orange must be balanced 
against the effects of unabated Atrocity Crimes. If, say, Red’s actions against its own 
citizens lead to large-scale streams of refugees that were about to destabilise all other 
neighbouring states, MHI, even though it led to further unjust aggression against 
Orange, may be proportionate.   
V 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, we took the first step towards the other-defensive conception of 
MHI. To do so, we examined when the declaration of an other-defensive war would 
be permissible. The main argument in favour of other-defensive war rests on an 
analogy between MHI and domestic rescue killings. In domestic society, victims of 
unjust aggression are holders of a right to defend themselves against attackers. Third 
parties, provided they secure the consent of the victim and fulfil the right intention 
criterion, are holders of a right to use other-defensive force against attackers. In both 
cases, the victim and the rescuer hold the attacker under a duty not to use self-
defensive force against them.  
We began to build the analogy between rescue killings and MHI by developing an 
analogue to the crime of aggression. The aim of MHI is to halt what we called 
Atrocity Crimes. The latter include genocide, mass murder, ethnic cleansing as well as 
related crimes that usually occur during the perpetration of these atrocities. Atrocity 
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Crimes do not constitute injustices. Rather, they must be considered as grave moral 
evils. The permission to declare an other-defensive war, then, is fairly restrictive. It 
only permits MHI to confront Atrocity Crimes. Contrary to broad interventionism, 
MHI is neither a tool to topple oppressive governments nor to make societies just.  
But the discussion also showed that MHI does not only involve the halting of 
Atrocity Crimes. In addition, interveners must aim to re-establish the rule of law via 
sovereign institutions. This argument has two important repercussions. First, since 
MHI is carried out in the (collective) interest of those in the target state, interveners 
do not need to secure the consent of the victims, though they might have to abort 
the intervention if the victims openly reject it. Second, because the occurrence of 
Atrocity Crimes signals that the target state does not preserve the peace amongst 
those under its rule, the target state forfeits, like a attacker in domestic society, its 
right not to be attacked. In fact, it is not allowed to defend itself against the 
intervening state. In this sense, the intervening state is the holder of a right to 
intervene, obliging the target state not to defend itself.   
However, this does not mean that the intervening state has a moral blank cheque to 
conduct itself as it pleases during MHI. Although the right to intervene is compatible 
with the existence of ulterior motives, the intervening state must abide by the rules of 
JIB. The existence of a right to intervene depends on compliance with JIB. In this 
sense, the conduct of the intervening state is of crucial importance for the other-
defensive conception of MHI. We will turn to the implications of this view for the 
ethics of MHI in Chapter IV and V. 
Before we can do that, let us briefly pause in order to reflect on one of the 
advantages that follow from the analogy between MHI and rescue killings. Previous 
chapters noted that theories of MHI have had little to say about the relationship 
between the rights of intervening states and the rights of its own citizens. As we saw 
in Chapter II, Walzer’s Legalist Paradigm maintains that the state-held right to self-
defence is based on the social contract. It is not clear, though, what replaces the social 
contract in case states go to war in defence of non-citizens. The analogy between 
rescue killings can help us shed light on this ‘missing link’. The idea of a rescue killing 
indicates that the intervening state’s right to intervene also stems from the rights of 
its own citizens. Put simply, just as self-defensive war represents the coordinated mass 
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exercise of individual rights to self-defence, MHI represents the coordinated mass 
exercise of the individual right to use other-defensive force.   
This view is supported by the notion of collective self-defence. Suppose that Yellow 
unjustly aggresses Green and Green asks Blue for assistance. For the Domestic 
Analogy, Blue’s right to come to Green’s assistance cannot be justified independently 
of the rights of Blue’s citizens to come to the assistance of Green’s citizens. Now, 
from a moral perspective, it does not matter whether Blue’s citizens defend Green’s 
citizen from an external threat, i.e. another state, or an internal one, i.e. their own state. 
To be sure, international lawyers would reply that, in the case of collective self-
defence, we are concerned with the relationship between three states, Yellow, Green 
and Blue, whereas, in the case of MHI, we are only concerned with the relationship 
between two states, i.e. the intervening and target states. But the moral differences 
between the two cases are not that great. In both situations, the citizens of an 
unthreatened state have rights to come to the assistance of those threatened by 
unjust aggression and Atrocity Crimes, respectively.      
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Chapter IV 
Military Humanitarian Intervention and the Problem of 
Combatant Liability 
 
I had to obey the orders of my superiors. If they ordered me to do something, I would 
do it. If we didn’t obey we would have been killed.   
(Lor, an ex-Khmer Rouge cadre who served in Tuol Sleng/ S-21, the notorious 
Phnom Penh prison facility where approximately fourteen thousand people were 
killed during the Khmer Rouge’s reign from 1975-79, on why he killed ‘one or two 
people’) 171    
 
Under conditions of terror most people will comply but some people will not, just as the 
lesson of the countries to which the Final Solution was proposed is that “it could 
happen” in most places but it did not happen everywhere. Humanly speaking, no 
more is required, and no more can reasonably be asked, for this planet to remain a 
place fit for human habitation.  
(Hannah Arendt)172 
 
                                                           
171 Quoted in A.L. Hinton, Why did they kill? Cambodia in the shadow of genocide (Berkeley/Cal.: Berkeley 
University Press, 2005), p. 276. Contrary to Lor’s account, the Tuol Sleng genocide documentation 
centre puts the number of his victims at approximately four hundred, whereas Cambodian 
eyewitnesses have suggested that the number might be as high as two thousand; (ibid.) p. 2.   
172 H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Penguin Classics Series) 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 2006 edition).  
125 
 
I 
Two views on combatant liability 
As we saw in Chapter I, military campaigns encompass corporate and individualist 
levels of analysis. Thus, even if the intervening state is the holder of a right to 
intervene in the internal affairs of the target state, this does not yet mean that 
intervening combatants are morally permitted to harm individuals in the target state. 
Having treated the corporate level of analysis in Chapter III, the present chapter 
moves towards the individualist level.  
Confronted with individual members of the target state, just war theory requires us 
to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. The former are liable to 
intentional attack, whereas the latter aren’t. As Chapter I explained, the problem of 
combatant liability consists in specifying on what grounds combatants incur liabilities 
to attack. In this chapter, we examine this problem in the context of MHI. While, as 
Chapter V shows, theorists of MHI have started to pay attention to the problem of 
non-combatant immunity, the problem of combatant liability has so far escaped 
critical scrutiny.  
According to Michael Walzer’s approach in Just and Unjust Wars, the problem of 
combatant liability is solved by what Jeff McMahan calls the Orthodox View.173 This 
position assumes that combatants are moral equals in the sense that they possess an 
equal permission to use force against each other.174 Strictly speaking, then, 
combatants are not holders of a right to self-defence because they lack a negative 
claim against their adversaries not to repel their attack. Rather, combatants are at 
liberty to use force against each other, to wit, they are not under a negative duty not 
to use force. If this is sound, the Orthodox View implies that combatantstarget_state 
are permitted to target combatantsintervening_state and vice versa. This means that, 
while the intervening state qua state holds the target state under a duty not to declare 
a self-defensive war, its own combatants lack a similar right to target 
combatantstarget_state.  
Under these circumstances, it is questionable whether it makes sense to speak of a 
right to intervene at all. When it comes to the actual conduct of MHI, the idea of a 
                                                           
173 J. McMahan, ‘Innocence, Self-Defense and Killing in War’, Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 2/Issue 
3 (1994), pp. 193-221.   
174 M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 34-37.  
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(state-held) right to intervene is rendered meaningless by the Orthodox View. 
Combatantstarget_state are allowed to resist their adversaries anyway, regardless of the 
moral relationship between the intervening and target states. Perhaps the intervening 
state could demand reparations from the target state for any violations of the 
negative duty of non-resistance. But given that the actual conduct of a self-defensive 
campaign against the intervening state does not violate those moral duties that matter 
the most, i.e. negative duties not to kill or cause harm, it is difficult to see what 
exactly the intervening state should be compensated for. Since, for the Orthodox 
View, combatantsintervening_state are liable to attack, no morally relevant harm is done.    
Interestingly, the Orthodox View not only undermines the idea of a right to 
intervene, but also leads to a division of labour between JAB and JIB. Because all 
combatants are morally equal, JAB and JIB are independent of each other. As a 
result, the former pertains exclusively to the declaration of a war, while the latter 
exclusively regulates its conduct. Accordingly, as Walzer notes, a just war can be fought 
unjustly, whereas an unjust war can be conducted justly.175 Let us refer to this claim 
as the Independence Thesis. There is some truth to it. It may well be the case that the 
intervening state, despite its just cause, adopts some unjust methods, if only 
temporarily. Nonetheless, the somewhat rigid division between JAB and JIB is a 
relatively recent phenomenon in just war theory, which, as Chris Brown points out, is 
due to the increasing regulation of warfare via modern international law.176 In the 
older just war tradition, the distinction between JAB and JIB is less rigid. For 
instance, it is impermissible to declare a war if there are doubts about the possibility 
of its just conduct.     
This chapter rejects the Orthodox View by connecting the other-defensive 
conception of MHI with the Neo-Classical View of combatant liability.177 Simply put, 
the Neo-Classical View, which is advocated by Jeff McMahan and others, rejects the 
                                                           
175 (ibid.), p. 21.  
176 C. Brown, Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: International Political Theory Today (Polity: Cambridge, 2002), p. 
108. 
177 To be clear, it is neither the purpose of this chapter nor the thesis as a whole to establish whether 
the Orthodox View is generally invalid. The chapter only shows that the Orthodox View fails to 
generate normatively sound principles for the conduct of MHI. In order to establish whether the 
Orthodox View must also be rejected in other contexts, we would have to try and reconcile the 
insights of the other-defensive conception of MHI with our considered judgements about non-other-
defensive wars. It would be interesting to find out whether the method of reflective equilibrium can 
assist us in formulating a coherent just war theory. But for reasons of space, the scope of the present 
project remains limited to MHI.  
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Independence Thesis. It can be traced back to the Catholic just war doctrine which 
urged soldiers not to serve in war if they had doubts about its justness. It shares, as 
McMahan acknowledges, certain similarities with the works of Francisco de Vitoria, 
Francisco Suarez and, more problematically, Elizabeth Anscombe.178 Drawing an 
analogy with his justice-based approach to the ethics of self-defence outlined in 
Chapter III, McMahan assumes that combatants who participate in an unjust war 
violate stringent negative duties not to harm, provided they are morally responsible 
for their actions. As a result, contrary to the Independence Thesis, unjust combatants 
are not possessors of a liberty to target their adversaries. Just combatants, on the 
other hand, are a) under no duty not to target unjust combatants and b) protected by 
a negative claim not to be subjected to a counterattack.     
Undoubtedly, some will find the Neo-Classical View unsound. Walzer, for instance, 
replies that it would be correct, provided war was a peace-time activity.179 But for the 
discussion of MHI at least, the Neo-Classical View has two advantages. First, it 
enables us to reconcile individual and corporate levels of analysis. If the Neo-
Classical View turns out to be defensible, the intervening state’s right to intervene 
would be replicated, at an individual level, by a moral right held by 
combatantsintervening_state to use force against combatantstarget_state. Second, as this 
chapter will show, the Neo-Classical View enables us to tackle some of the special 
challenges posed by MHI. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Part II explains why, in theories of MHI, the 
problem of combatant liability poses a special challenge. Part III discusses the 
problem of combatant liability as it pertains to perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes. 
Finally, Part IV turns to the moral status of those combatantstarget_state who do not 
participate in the perpetration of Atrocity Crimes, but are ordered to defend the 
target state against combatantsintervening_state.  
                                                           
178 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 39; McMahan, Killing in War, pp. 32-37.  JAB, as we saw in Chapter 
I, is not exhausted by the just cause criterion. A war can have a just cause, but it may neither be 
proportionate nor have a reasonable likelihood of success. Following McMahan, we focus on the 
relationship between the just cause criterion and the permission to use force during MHI.   
179 Walzer, quoted in H. Shue, ‘Do we need a morality of war?’, in: D. Rodin & H. Shue (eds.), Just and 
Unjust Warriors: the Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 87-
111, at p. 89.    
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II 
Military Humanitarian Intervention and the limits of the Orthodox View 
Both, the Orthodox and Neo-Classical Views, have been developed against the 
background of the paradigmatic case of a just war, namely self-defensive war against 
unjust aggressors. In this case, two main groups of combatants confront each other:  
combatantsaggressor_state and combatantsvictim_state. Not surprisingly, Walzer’s 
defence of the Orthodox View and McMahan’s neo-classical critique of it are 
focused on these two groups. Walzer maintains that their members relate to each 
other as moral equals, while McMahan assumes that combatantsaggressor_state lack an 
equal liberty to target combatantsvictim_state.180 In reality, of course, this is a gross 
oversimplification. In most conflicts, there have always been individuals who escape 
rigid categorisation.181 This point is particular pressing for theories of MHI. As was 
argued in Chapter I, there are many ‘grey zones’ in conflicts where moral and 
conceptual boundaries between perpetrators and victims are blurred. Often intra-
state conflicts involve different groups of combatants engaged in various activities. 
Imagine the following scenario.  
Extermination Policy: Red orders its soldiers and secret police to kill most or all members of 
Minority Ethnicity and drive any survivors out of the country. This extermination policy is the 
culmination of a long standing ethnic rivalry between Minority Ethnicity and the majority of Red’s 
population, Majority Ethnicity, that reaches back to the time when the country was under colonial 
rule. Because Minority Ethnicity is generally resented by the majority of Red’s citizens, some 
civilians join in the mass killing. Blue, a neighbouring state with which relations have at times been 
tense, is capable of putting an end to the killing and ethnic cleansing. As soon as Red’s government 
learns that Blue’s troops are underway, it orders its remaining soldiers to resist Blue’s invasion.    
Extermination Policy contains at least three conflicts which have different 
implications for the moral permission to use force against individual combatants.  
1. The first conflict opposes members of Minority Ethnicity to those who are 
threatening them. The chapter will say very little about this conflict here 
because it is primarily interested in the use of force by third parties. Based on 
                                                           
180 See, McMahan, Killing in War; ‘On the moral equality of combatants’; ‘The ethics of killing in war’, 
Ethics, Vol. 114/No. 4 (2004), pp. 693-673.  
181 See, C. Kutz, ‘The Difference Uniforms Make: Collective Violence in Criminal Law and War’, 
Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 33/Issue 2 (2005), pp. 148-180.   
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the arguments of the preceding chapter, we can assume here that members of 
Minority Ethnicity have rights to defend themselves against perpetrators of 
Atrocity Crimes; otherwise, at the corporate level of states at least, MHI 
would not be permissible.  
2. The second conflict obtains between Blue’s soldiers and those individuals 
who are engaged in the ethnic cleansing and murdering of Minority Ethnicity. 
Note that the perpetrator group consists of two sets of individuals. On the 
one hand, there are soldiers and members of Red’s security apparatus who 
have been ordered to exterminate Minority Ethnicity. On the other hand, 
there are citizens who, as private individuals, have joined the killing effort.  
3. The third and final conflict describes the ensuing confrontation between 
Blue’s soldiers and Red’s remaining soldiers who have been ordered to 
defend their ‘homeland’ against the interveners.  
 
Theorists of MHI, then, face what one might term the Problem of Multiple 
Conflicts. Most just war theorists are oblivious to it and assume the relevance of the 
Orthodox View, or something like it, as a regulatory framework for interactions 
between the combatantsintervening_state and combatantstarget_state. But this is clearly a 
mistake. The Orthodox View confers equal moral status on those individual 
members of an army if (and only if) they engage in military acts that are 
1. taking place in a conflict where parties have entered into the legal relations of 
war;   
2. discriminatory by observing the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants; 
3. necessary and proportionate by not inflicting harm that is excessive to a 
particular good; and  
4. duly authorised through the chain of command within the political-military 
apparatuses of the warring states.  
 
But needless to say, none of these criteria are met by perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes. 
In the first two conflicts mentioned above, those engaged in the killing of members 
of Minority Ethnicity are not carrying out acts of war that fulfil the second, third and 
fourth criteria. As we saw in Chapter III, one of the prominent features of Atrocity 
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Crimes is that their perpetrators, by killing indiscriminately, break the moral (and 
legal) rules that govern conflict. In addition, civilian perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes 
do not fight under the command of a sovereign power, but act on their own account. 
Even for the staunchest defender of the Orthodox View, it must be apparent that 
perpetrators of atrocious mass killing cannot relate to Blue’s soldiers as moral equals. 
Walzer, in his defence of the Orthodox View, recognises this when he says that the 
atrocities a soldier commits are his own, regardless of superior orders.182 But, 
regrettably, in his version of just war theory, he does not pursue this point further 
with regard to MHI.  
All being said, the third conflict in Extermination Policy between Red’s and Blue’s 
combatants is assessable in terms of the Orthodox View. This is because its pursuit 
can potentially satisfy the five requirements that render military acts permissible. 
‘Regular’ combatantstarget_state can resist combatantsintervening_state by observing the 
laws of war. For the Orthodox View, the confrontation resembles a more 
conventional self-defensive war. In fact, since Blue’s soldiers are victims of an 
unprovoked attack, it does not seem entirely unreasonable to suppose that they 
should be recognised as moral equals.      
If this is sound, (more conservative) theorists of MHI can potentially adopt a 
twofold or ‘hybrid’ approach to the problem of combatant liability. On the one hand, 
it is possible to argue that other-defensive military action against participants in 
Atrocity Crimes falls outside the scope of the Orthodox View, though it remains to 
be seen which normative framework could replace it. On the other hand, one can 
maintain that military action against those with ‘regular’ combatant status is still 
governed by the Orthodox View. The chapter contends, though, that we should 
reject the ‘hybrid’ position. It argues that the normative relationships between 
combatantsintervening_state, perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes, as well as regular 
combatantstarget_state should be regulated via the justice-based perspective of the 
Neo-Classical View. As we shall see, it is the great asset of the Neo-Classical View 
that its rationale can be extended to all types of combatants during MHI. 
In what follows, let us first examine the problem of combatant liability as it pertains 
to the perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes. We can then turn to the relationship between 
regular combatantstarget_state and combatantsintervening_state.    
                                                           
182 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 39.  
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III 
Participation in Atrocity Crimes and the problem of combatant liability 
A. Perpetrators: guilty, responsible, or excused? 
For its defenders, the purpose of the Orthodox View is to separate those who engage 
in legitimate military acts from those who engage in indiscriminate mass killing. 
Accordingly, soldiers who participate in an unjust war but conduct themselves justly 
are not criminals. But those who engage in conflicts, just or unjust, in order to 
perpetrate massacres are not protected by the moral equality of soldiers. As we saw 
above, Walzer thinks that any atrocities a soldier commits ‘are his own’. It is not 
clear, though, what he means by this. Does he mean that perpetrators are culpable or 
at least morally responsible for their deeds? Intuitively, there is a certain reluctance to 
answer this question affirmatively. This is because regimes that order or tolerate 
Atrocity Crimes tend to be highly oppressive, often threatening their own people. 
Arguably, individuals who live under such regimes have fewer options than those 
who are members of relatively stable and peaceful societies.  
To illustrate the point, consider Lor, the Khmer Rouge cadre quoted at the beginning 
of this chapter, who feared that he was going to be killed if he failed to comply with 
his orders. Alternatively, recall the case of Serb villagers, mentioned in Chapter I, 
who, during the Bosnian civil war, were forced, at gunpoint, by Serb militias to 
identify their Muslim neighbours. Since Lor and the villagers were acting under 
duress, one wonders whether their actions were really ‘theirs’.  
In addition to duress, domestic criminal law recognises a variety of further excuses 
for wrongdoing, including brainwashing, (non-negligent) mistake, and provocation.183 
It is not difficult to apply these to Extermination Policy. Members of Red’s security 
services, for example, might participate in Atrocity Crimes because they have been 
entirely brainwashed by their government’s propaganda. Or civilian members of 
Majority Ethnicity who join into the killing could have been reacting to past 
provocations that resulted from the longstanding tensions with Minority Ethnicity. 
Perpetrators, as Chapter I argued, can often be found on both sides. 
                                                           
183 J. Horder, Excusing Crime, paperback ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
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From a more philosophical, and less legalistic, perspective, our uneasiness about the 
status of those who participate in Atrocity Crimes is reflected in Claudia Card’s 
revision of the Atrocity Paradigm. As we saw in Chapter III, whereas Card’s earlier 
theory stressed the centrality of culpable wrongdoing for the Atrocity Paradigm, her 
latest formulation emphasises the inexcusability and intolerability of certain acts. 
Because social evils can be institutionalised and wide-spread, individuals, Card 
contends, may not necessarily be blameworthy for participating in them. 
Nevertheless, since evils lead to intolerable harms, (non-culpable) participation in 
them is inexcusable. Card’s revision does not seem to unhinge the tight fit between 
the Atrocity Paradigm and the justice-based perspective on rescue killings. As we saw 
in Chapter I, culpability is not required in order to incur liabilities to attack. Moral 
responsibility, McMahan contends, suffices. An agent must be responsible for his 
actions, without necessarily also being morally blameworthy for them.     
But some doubts remain over Card’s perceived lack of excuses as well as, more 
generally, over the presence of moral responsibility in all perpetrators of Atrocity 
Crimes. For instance, child soldiers, who have been used to perpetrate Atrocity 
Crimes in some conflicts, have little deliberative agency due to their lack of moral 
development.184 Often, apart from brutalisation and brainwashing, child soldiers are 
also drugged by their captors in order to lower their threshold for aggression and 
ensure compliance. The harm caused by child soldiers is certainly intolerable, but, 
intuitively, the children seem to be excused for their actions, especially if they have 
been drugged. 185  Under those circumstances, it is also questionable whether they are 
morally responsible for their actions. To be sure, they may have some agency. But this 
may not be sufficient to consider them liable to attack.  
Child soldiers, then, may (sometimes) have the status of what we can call non-
responsible attackers, who, by definition, lack meaningful agency, and are, therefore, 
not liable to attack. Michael Otsuka, in fact, thinks that non-responsible attackers are 
                                                           
184 For a critical view that suggests that child soldiers are not entirely passive, see D. M. Rosen, Armies 
of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism (Camden/N.J., Rutgers University Press, 2005). For an 
account of various issues involving child soldiers, see P.W. Singer, Children at War (Berkeley/CA., 
University of California Press, 2006).    
185 It is worthwhile adding that the use of child soldiers is also a grave moral evil. The process of 
becoming a child soldier, for instance, often subjects children to intolerable harms, radically 
diminishing their prospects for a minimally decent life.     
133 
 
equivalent to bystanders who, also by definition, are not liable to attack. 186 The result 
is what Otsuka calls Bystander-Equivalence Thesis. It accounts for why it is 
impermissible and inexcusable for a third party to use other-defensive force against 
non-responsible attackers.  
The question, then, is how we can shed light on the moral status of those who 
participate in Atrocity Crimes. Because social psychologists, historians, and lawyers 
have treated the phenomenon of atrocities in more detail than philosophers, it is 
useful to draw their work into the discussion. More precisely, let us use the so-called 
Nuremberg Defence as a rough template for the philosophical analysis of individual 
participation in Atrocity Crimes.    
As its name suggests, the Nuremberg Defence arose during the course of the 
Nuremberg Trials. To explain why they had participated in atrocious mass killing, 
one of the reasons commonly cited by German soldiers was that they ‘were just 
following orders’. As Larry May points out, the rationale behind the then valid 
Superior Orders Defence was that ‘soldiers do not intend or plan to kill, but only 
intend what they are ordered to do’.187 According to the Superior Orders Defence, 
soldiers had to prove that they genuinely believed to be following a duly authorised 
order at the time.  
The Nuremberg Defence, however, has replaced this kind of reasoning. The 
Nuremberg Defence is more demanding than the Superior Orders Defence because 
it requires soldiers to show that a) they thought the actions set out by a [duly 
authorised] order were morally and legally permissible (moral perception) and b) 
following the order was the only morally reasonable course of action available at the 
time (moral choice).188 In what follows, let us examine the relevance of the moral 
perception and choice components for the other-defensive conception of MHI.   
B. Atrocity Crimes and moral perception  
The moral perception criterion demands that soldiers demonstrate that actions set 
out by an order were morally permissible. Of course, this requires a set of principles 
                                                           
186 M. Otsuka, ‘Killing the Innocent in Self-Defence’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 23/No. 1 (1994), 
74-94.   
187 L. May, Crimes against Humanity: a normative approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
p. 181 
188 (ibid.), pp. 181-184. 
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that enables soldiers to assess the moral permissibility of a specific order. These must 
be a) universal in scope and b) responsive to the highly stressful conditions soldiers 
face. According to May, the bare moral minimum we can expect from soldiers is not 
to intentionally attack those who are materially innocent. The intentional killing of 
defenceless individuals is usually deemed a great evil across cultures.189 Whatever the 
precise nature of a conflict, because those who are defenceless are particularly 
vulnerable, soldiers have special duties of care towards them.190 But despite its 
simplicity, two objections can be raised against the moral perception criterion. Let us 
outline these in more detail in order to assess whether they can potentially exculpate 
individuals from participating in Atrocity Crimes, or indeed show that individual 
perpetrators are not even responsible for their actions. 
The first objection stresses the epistemological difficulties soldiers face when 
assessing who poses a threat. In some conflicts, it might be the case that enemy 
fighters are not directly marked or, in fact, pose as defenceless civilians. This can 
make the situation incredibly stressful for soldiers, and, as a result, mistakes are likely. 
But history shows that mass murderers deliberately target their victims when they 
expect the least resistance. In this sense, the circumstances of Atrocity Crimes are 
often not analogous to conditions on a battlefield.  
For example, the Serb forces who executed 8000 Muslim men in Srebrenica did not 
face resistance from local groups or UN peacekeepers.191 The killing of Jews in 
Eastern Europe, at the hands of the various military and paramilitary organs of the 
Germany state, customarily involved putting victims deliberately into a defenceless 
position, e.g. by stripping them naked and shooting them in the back. Finally, the 
objection becomes even weaker when we consider a society like Democratic 
Kampuchea where armed resistance movements did not exist. Like many mass 
murderers, Lor and his comrades did not have to fear that their victim’s might attack 
them. Hence those who participate in Atrocity Crimes can usually not be excused for 
killing defenceless individuals by mistake.    
This leads us to the second objection. Imagine that, in Extermination Policy, Red’s 
soldiers have been told by their government that members of Minority Ethnicity 
posed a threat to the country’s security. Given that it will be difficult for the soldiers 
                                                           
189 (ibid.), pp. 188-191.   
190 (ibid.), p. 189.    
191  See, J.W. Honig & N. Both, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1996).  
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to verify this claim, one might argue that they are excused for following orders to 
ethnically cleanse Minority Ethnicity. There are two replies to this objection.  
First, Red’s soldiers will be able to assess the situation once they have been 
dispatched to the killing site. Given the above argument that the conditions of mass 
killing are much less stressful for soldiers than actual battlefield encounters with 
enemy troops, it must also be easier for Red’s soldiers to verify whether their victims 
are defenceless individuals.  Second, Red’s soldiers must question whether orders to 
kill Minority Ethnicity were duly authorised. For David Estlund, although soldiers 
are sometimes obliged to (knowingly) follow orders that involve a moral wrong-
doing, these orders are only binding if they are the product of sound deliberative and 
epistemic procedures.192 Taking into account that Red’s government will be likely to 
be authoritarian, Red’s soldiers must know (or at least suspect) that Red fails on both 
counts.193 It is, therefore, doubtful that soldiers of oppressive states can always cite 
non-culpable ignorance as an excuse for participating in mass murder.  
Our engagement with the moral perception criterion reveals that perpetrators of 
Atrocity Crimes can often not be excused for indiscriminate killing because they 
morally misperceive the situation. Imagine the example of an attacker who strikes his 
victim in a case of mistaken identity. The attacker thinks that the victim is a famous 
serial killer, while, in reality, he is facing the serial killer’s identical twin brother.194 
Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to excuse the attacker for his use of force 
due to the cognitive error he suffers.  
But social psychological and historical research on mass killing reaffirms the 
argument of this section that perpetrators do not suffer from cognitive error. Rather, 
they suffer from a cognitive dissonance.195 That is to say, they know that killing 
defenceless individuals is wrong, but, for a variety of reasons, also intend to comply 
                                                           
192 D. Estlund, ‘On following orders in an unjust war’, Journal of Political Philosophy Vol. 17/Issue 2 
(2007), pp. 213-334. It would be beyond the scope of this chapter to treat Estlund’s argument in full 
detail. 
193 German soldiers during WW II, for example, knew that the Nazi regime did not take due care of 
these considerations, Estlund, ‘Following Orders’.  
194 This ingenious thought experiment comes from McMahan, The Ethics of Killing, p. 402; also, see 
McMahan, Killing in War, pp. 162-163.   
195 On this point, see H. Welzer, Täter & Hinton, Why did they kill?. For further social-psychological 
and sociological perspectives, see J. Weller, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass 
Killing, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); M. Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: 
Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). For two critical historical 
studies, see D.J. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners (Lancaster: Abacus, 1997) & C. R. Browning, 
Ordinary Men: Reserve Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (London: Penguin, 1992).     
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with their orders. There may be various psychological strategies available to those 
implicated in mass killings in order to overcome this cognitive dissonance. But this 
should not distract from the fact that perpetrators perceive the ‘wrongness’ of the 
situation correctly. Lor, the Khmer Rouge cadre, does not deny that ‘killing one or 
two people’ was wrong. Instead, he argues that he would have been killed if he had 
failed to comply with his order. To assess the moral strength of Lor’s argument, we 
must turn to the Nuremberg Defence’s moral choice criterion.  
C. Atrocity Crimes and moral choice   
As we saw above, the moral choice criterion requires that there are morally 
reasonable alternatives to following an order. If the agent has justified concerns that 
disobedience is going to lead to his death, his scope for action seems severely limited. 
He may even be excused for his actions, though Card’s argument that some acts are 
inexcusable raises doubts over this. Of course, the status of duress during actual 
campaigns of mass killing will be difficult to ascertain. Perpetrators will commonly 
claim that they had no choice to act otherwise. Surviving victims will typically 
disagree. There are indeed four reasons that explain why the excusatory appeal to 
duress is not as strong as it initially appears.  
First, there are some well-documented cases where perpetrators did not act because 
they were under duress. In Christopher Browning’s famous historical study of the 
role of the (German) Reserve Police Battalion 101 during the Final Solution in 
Poland, police officers were asked whether they wanted to take part in the killing of 
Jews. Most of the men complied, but not out of fear of death. There is not a single 
documented case that the refusal to kill Jews led to the death of potential 
perpetrators. Rather, the police officers acted out of loyalty to the head of the 
Battalion and a sense of camaraderie. Building on Browning’s analysis, killing, the 
noted German social psychologist Harald Welzer argues, was nothing more than a 
‘job’ that had to be done properly.         
Second, Atrocity Crimes are morally distinctive because they either make a decent 
existence impossible or deny their victims a dignified death. Gang rape, (sexually 
motivated) torture and even cannibalism are part of Atrocity Crimes.196 In an 
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influential article on the Bosnian civil war, Catherine McKinnon describes how ‘one 
woman was allowed to live so long as she kept her Serbian captor hard all night 
orally, night after night after night’, and how Muslim women who were taken away to 
be killed ‘were raped, had their breasts cut off and their wombs ripped out’. From 
the perspective of duress, the pure gratuitousness of violence and (sexual) sadism 
suggest that a shocking number of individuals, such as the Serb captor in 
McKinnon’s example, are not coerced into their role, but take advantage of the 
opportunities provided by their state to commit unspeakable crimes.  
Third, it is notoriously difficult to determine what constitutes a justified belief that 
one’s life is endangered. Someone held at gunpoint will experience a different form 
of duress than someone who has a mere suspicion that his life is at risk.197 Consider 
Lor’s account of why he killed ‘one or two people’. A senior Khmer Rouge cadre 
asked him to prove that his ‘heart was cut out for it’,198 but the cadre did not threaten 
Lor with a weapon; however, it is not unreasonable to suppose that he could have 
taken action against Lor that might have led to Lor’s death in the future, e.g. by 
removing him from his post and ordering him to work in the fields. Generally, the 
greater the likelihood that the dreaded event is going to occur immediately, the more 
it seems appropriate to speak of duress. Conversely, if the likelihood is low (say, the 
threatening party is bluffing) or the consequences of non-compliance are vague or 
unclear, the less it seems appropriate to speak of duress.   
Finally, even in cases where the death of the threatened party is likely, the criminal 
law does usually not recognise duress as an excuse for intentionally killing the 
innocent.199 To illustrate the point, if Coerced Andy is about to kill Berta under 
duress, he still activates a forced choice between lives. It is true that the forced choice 
between Coerced Andy’s and Berta’s lives was created by someone else. To be 
precise, it was created by the agent, Threatening Tom, with whose demands Coerced 
Andy complies. If Threatening Tom had not structured the situation in a certain way, 
Coerced Andy would not have killed Berta. However, we can still deem Coerced 
                                                                                                                                                               
Hinton offers an anthropological account of the practice of cannibalism during the reign of the 
Khmer Rouge, see Hinton, Why did they kill?, pp. 34-35.   
197 May, Crimes against Humanity, p. 193.    
198 Cutting one’s heart out is a euphemism for the ability to mercilessly kill in the name of the 
communist revolution; Hinton, Why did the kill?, p. 293.     
199 Rodin, War and Self-Defence, p. 171. But a thirteen year old boy who kills under duress has a very 
strong case to be excused for the killing. Hence it is doubtful that duress can never excuse murder. See, 
Horder, Excusing Crime, p. 63. 
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Andy morally responsible for activating the forced choice. After all, since Coerced 
Andy chooses to avert a threat to his life by killing Berta, he would be liable to attack, 
notwithstanding the fact that he finds himself in an extremely difficult situation and, 
unlike Threatening Tom, does not act out of malicious intent.  
That said, although agents who kill under duress share the necessary feature of moral 
responsibility, it is important not to equate them with those who culpably participate 
in Atrocity Crimes. This is so because the criteria governing the exercise of the right 
to other-defence, including necessity, proportionality, and the duty to retreat, have 
greater stringency in cases involving merely morally responsible attackers than in 
cases involving culpable attackers.200 Imagine that, in Extermination Policy, Blue’s 
soldiers are faced with the following two scenarios.  
OPTION 1: A group of Red’s elite soldiers and security officers, many of whom are 
fully committed to Red’s policies, are about to enter a Minority Ethnicity village to 
kill its inhabitants. The only way to prevent the ensuing massacre is an air strike on 
the advancing vehicles of Redelite. But there is a small chance that Redelite would 
withdraw if the fighter pilots destroyed their mobile command centre located at some 
distance from the village. Blue’s pilots are not required to target the command centre 
first (this might change if the chance of withdrawal was greater) because, ceteris 
paribus, one is generally not required to take costly steps to avoid confrontation with 
someone who is morally culpable for creating a threat.  
OPTION 2: But now imagine that the soldiers charged with the destruction of the 
village are extremely young recruits, most of who have been coerced into fighting. In 
this case, Blue’s pilots are under an obligation to target the command centre first, 
provided that they can still stop Redyoung_recruits if the destruction of their command 
centre does not lead to the desired result. Of course, if they were unable to return in 
time or if the chances that Redyoung_recruits would withdraw were low, Blue’s pilots 
are not required to undertake risky steps to spare their lives. If it is strictly necessary to 
kill an attacker in other-defence, then third parties have a right to do so.  
If the observations of this section are sound, duress does not always function as a 
moral excuse for perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes. Generally, although highly 
oppressive societies reduce the options available to individual agents, perpetrators do 
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not always face moral alternatives that are entirely unreasonable. More 
disconcertingly, many perpetrators kill simply because they ‘want to do their job 
right’. Often they also exploit the killing opportunities offered to them by their state.  
In conjunction with the arguments of the preceding section, our analysis of the moral 
choice criterion reveals that many perpetrators are indeed morally culpable for their 
participation n Atrocity Crimes. There are some exceptions to the rule. But we 
argued that coerced agents are also liable to attack because they exercise moral 
agency, albeit non-culpably. That said, considerations of proportionality are more 
stringent in rescue killings involving regular attackers than in those involving culpable 
attackers.  
Still, it would be too optimistic to suppose that there will be no non-responsible 
attackers amongst the perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes. Let us therefore briefly look 
at the problem of non-responsible attackers in Section D.                        
D. Child Soldiers: From the Bystander-Equivalence Thesis to the Harm-Numbers Thesis  
The case of child soldiers is a difficult one, not least because the category of child 
soldiers is rather broad. As McMahan points out, the difference between a six- or 
sixteen-year old in terms of moral and psychological development can be immense, 
while the difference between a seventeen-year old child combatant and an eighteen-
year old adult-combatant may be minimal.201 In case of older ‘child’ combatants, 
there are good reasons to view them as possessing the necessary moral agency to 
incur liabilities to attack. Of course, older child combatants could have been 
socialised into their role from a very early age onwards. This would mean that their 
moral development is seriously stunted. Nevertheless, it may still be appropriate to 
consider them as having ‘diminished responsibility’ for their actions. If this is true, 
they are liable to attack, though, given what we just said in Section C, proportionality 
criteria would have greater stringency than in cases involving fully responsible 
attackers. 
However, there are doubts over whether the same applies to smaller children and 
those who have been drugged by their captors. Although it is difficult to reach a 
general judgement on the status of those types of child soldiers, it may not be 
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inappropriate to argue that they fall into the category of non-responsible attackers. If 
this is true, Otsuka’s Bystander-Equivalence Thesis would apply to them. 
There are two potential responses to the problem posed by non-responsible 
attackers, though. First, Otsuka concedes that the Bystander-Equivalence Thesis only 
applies in cases where the number of (potential) victims does not play a role, e.g. if a 
single victim would die at the hands of a single non-responsible attacker.202 This may 
change, however, once numbers come into play. As we saw in Chapter I, non-
consequentialists do not need to reject the claim that numbers count morally. In 
cases involving Atrocity Crimes, numbers matter more strongly than in ordinary 
forced choices between lives due to the extraordinarily high number of potential 
victims. If this is sound, it is morally acceptable to kill, say, two non-responsible 
attackers in order to save twenty victims.  
Second, we must consider that the victims of some non-responsible attackers are 
often subjected to gratuitous violence and sadistic harm, especially in the case of 
child soldiers who act under the heavy influence of drugs. Interveners not only save a 
large number of individuals, they also spare them from the severest harm imaginable. 
Certain forms of harm are intolerable, regardless of who perpetrates them. The 
harms in question deprive victims of a dignified death and seriously damage the 
prospect of survivors for a decent life. Coupled with numbers, the intolerability of 
some kinds of harm explains why the Bystander-Equivalence Thesis does not apply 
to non-responsible attackers in the context of Atrocity Crimes. Unlike Card, though, 
we do not need to go so far as to argue that perpetrators can never be excused for 
their participation in Atrocity Crimes. At least in the case of some child soldiers, this 
is counterintuitive. 203        
Taken together, these two conditions form what we can call the Harm-Numbers 
Thesis. It replaces the Bystander-Equivalence Thesis in situations where intolerable 
harm would be inflicted on a very high number of victims. It denies, in other words, 
that non-responsible attackers who are implicated in Atrocity Crimes are morally 
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equivalent to bystanders. Two points of clarification about the nature of the Harm-
Numbers Thesis are necessary.  
First, in light of what has been said in the preceding section, the Harm-Numbers 
Thesis is constrained by the principles of proportionality and necessity. The killing of 
non-responsible attackers must be the last resort once all other options have been 
exhausted. If combatantsintervening_state can target regular attackers instead, they 
must do so. In fact, in cases involving child soldiers, it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that combatantsintervening_state have relatively demanding duties of due care 
towards their potential targets, that is, they must incur higher risks to themselves 
before they kill children.204      
Second, the Harm-Numbers Thesis raises an interesting point for the ethics of killing 
and saving. Because, for the justice-based perspective on self/other-defence, they 
lack moral agency, non-responsible attackers do not forfeit their right not to be 
attacked.205 In the absence of forfeiture, the Harm-Numbers Thesis should not be 
used to define negative duties out of existence. They are too important in our ethical 
thinking to be cast aside like that. Rather, the Harm-Numbers Thesis provides 
combatantsintervening_state with a normative reason in favour of overriding negative 
duties against harming. Since non-responsible attackers are not liable to attack, 
combatantsintervening_state justifiably infringe their rights. We return to the issue of 
rights infringements again in Chapter V. For now let us try to ascertain whether non-
responsible attackers would be allowed to repel the attack launched by 
combatantsintervening_state.  
                                                           
204 David Rodin pointed out to me that the Harm-Numbers Thesis is problematic because it would 
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205 As we saw in Chapter III, Judith Jarvis Thomson disagrees. Even a non-responsible attacker 
forfeits his right because he threatens the right of someone else. For Thomson, the Harm-Numbers 
Thesis is superfluous.    
142 
 
The answer to the question has to be negative because combatantsintervening_state do 
not pose an unjust threat. They are not liable to attack. Non-responsible attackers 
can thus only be excused for resisting combatantsintervening_state.  
This raises the question whether combatantsintervening_state are allowed to defend 
themselves against non-responsible attackers. The other-defensive conception of 
MHI assumes that they aren’t. Non-responsible attackers do not forfeit their right 
not to be attacked if they use force against combatantsintervening_state. They do not 
suddenly become ‘agents’ who can be liable to attack. Thus 
combatantsintervening_state are only excused for defending themselves against child 
soldiers. Neither of the two parties, then, poses an unjust threat to each other. Their 
use of self-defensive force can only result from an agent-relative excuse to harm each 
other because their lives are threatened.  
Obviously, since potential rescuers do not share this exculpating reason, they are 
neither permitted to intervene nor excused for intervening on behalf of either of the 
two parties. Special relationships, though, may make a difference here. In what 
follows, let us assess this claim by looking at the role of special relationships in rescue 
killings.   
A collective institution like the army establishes special relationships between 
members. Perhaps combatantsintervening_state would be excused for defending their 
comrades who have come under attack from child soldiers. But given that the 
Harms-Numbers Thesis already permits combatantsintervening_state to target non-
responsible attackers, an appeal to special relationships is superfluous. It is possible 
to reply to this argument that one must distinguish between other-defensive force 
aimed at rescuing fellow combatantsintervening_state and other-defensive force aimed 
at rescuing the victims of Atrocity Crimes. Strictly speaking, the Harm-Numbers 
Thesis only permits the latter. In reality, though, the two acts, i.e. the defence of 
fellow combatants and the rescue of victims of Atrocity Crimes, are so closely 
intertwined that it would be difficult to separate them.  
But probably it is possible to apply the special relationship argument to non-
responsible attackers. The result is mixed. First, it would be strange to argue that 
child soldiers stand in a special relationship to their superiors. In general, special 
relationships can have moral weight if (and only if) they fulfil certain preconditions. 
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For instance, they must be non-exploitative, respectful of the rights held by the 
members of an association qua individuals, valued by the members of an association, 
and not detrimental to the rights of non-members of an association. None of these 
conditions are met in the case of child soldiers. Second, because MHI takes place in 
order to halt very grave moral evils, i.e. Atrocity Crimes, special relationships, 
especially those that appeal to shared nationality, are trumped by the necessity to 
prevent the further perpetration of intolerable harms. 
That said, there are some exceptions to this rule. Intuitively, parents have strong 
exculpating reasons for defending their children. But this follows from the special 
nature of the parent-child relationship, rather than any general rule about special 
relationships. Similarly, some village or tribal communities may lead closely 
integrated lives. Arguably, fellow villagers or tribe members may be excused for 
trying to protect tribal children, drafted into a killing unit, from 
combatantsintervening_state. However, while these exceptions are intuitively defensible, 
one should mention that, for practical reasons, parents or villagers should assist 
combatantsintervening_state to eliminate those who irresponsibly (and culpably!) put 
children into the firing line.              
E. Conclusion  
The above proposed a solution to the problem of combatant liability as it pertains to 
perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes. The other-defensive conception of MHI views them 
analogously to culpable attackers who exceed the basic criterion for liability to attack, 
namely, moral responsibility. As a result, many perpetrators are neither permitted nor 
excused for defending themselves against combatantsintervening_state. Often 
perpetrators are culpable for their deeds. As the analytical tool of the Nuremberg 
Defence showed, perpetrators generally do not misperceive the situation. Further, 
they have moral choices not to kill. Duress, it was contended, does not have an 
exculpating function for perpetrators.  
Yet, because they merely activate a forced choice between lives that was initially 
created by someone else, perpetrators who kill under (genuine) duress are morally 
responsible for their actions but not necessarily morally culpable. This means that 
proportionality and necessity criteria apply more strictly in their case. Put simply, it is 
preferable to target culpable perpetrators rather than those who act under duress.  
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Finally, the case of non-responsible attackers, most notably young child combatants, 
constitutes an exception. Because they lack relevant moral agency, non-responsible 
attackers do not forfeit their rights not to be attacked. Nevertheless, the Harm-
Numbers Thesis maintains that it is permissible for combatantsintervening_state to 
override negative duties not to harm them. But because their rights are infringed 
(albeit permissibly), non-responsible attackers are excused for using self-defensive 
force.   
It is useful to put these arguments into a broader perspective. In Chapter III, we 
argued that Atrocity Crimes are not injustices, but grave moral evils. Given the 
finding that many of those who participate in Atrocity Crimes are morally culpable 
for their actions, it would be tempting to conclude that they are evil people. The 
obvious danger is that we will demonise the perpetrators. Doing so would not only 
contradict any humanitarian impulses, but also bring us dangerously close to the 
Manichean thinking rejected in Chapter I. In order to avoid this, it is important to 
stress that even the category of culpable perpetrators is not a homogenous entity of 
‘evildoers’.   
First, as Card contends, evildoers are not necessarily malicious. They may simply be 
careless, lack foresight, bow to social pressures, close their eyes to the obvious, fail to 
critically distance themselves from policies or display overtly deferential attitudes to 
towards authority.206 Arguably, participation in Atrocity Crimes can lead to behaviour 
that is anomalous for many, resulting from the extraordinary circumstances of a 
society in crisis.  
Second and directly related to the preceding point, while culpable attackers are liable 
to moral blame for their conduct, they are not necessarily liable to equal degrees of 
blame.207 Intuitively, as Card observes, the prison guard, who reluctantly tortures his 
victim by inflicting no more harm than necessary, is not as bad as the torturer who 
inflicts gratuitous levels of harm just because he likes it. Needless to say, neither of 
these two points exculpates perpetrators from wrongdoing. But we should be 
cautious not to label all perpetrators, even culpable ones, as inherently evil persons. 
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Having dealt with the moral status of participants in Atrocity Crimes, we must now 
examine the relationship between regular combatantstarget_state and 
combatantsintervening_state. This is the purpose of the final part of this chapter.  
IV 
The Argument from Derivative Liability 
A. The Neo-Classical View and the notion of complicity 
As was pointed out above, it is possible to adopt a hybrid position on the problem of 
combatant liability in the context of MHI. Defenders of the Orthodox View can 
maintain that, while perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes are not moral equals, regular 
combatants summoned to the defence of the target state are. In what follows, we will 
reject the hybrid position. In order to do so, we develop the Argument from 
Derivative Liability. It contends that regular combatantstarget_state who defend their 
state against combatantsintervening_state are complicit in Atrocity Crimes. In the 
language of criminal law, they are derivatively liable for Atrocity Crimes. If this claim 
is sound, it would be a clear indicator that the Neo-Classical View, rather than the 
Orthodox View, governs the relationship between combatantsintervening_state and 
regular combatantstarget_state, giving the former a right to intentionally target the 
latter.  
Discussions of complicity usually involve two elements.208 The conduct element, the 
actus reus, is sometimes referred to as the objective or external element of a crime. It 
describes the act through which an accessory’s (S) is causally related to a wrongdoing 
perpetrated by a principal agent (principal/P). S typically enables P to do x by aiding, 
encouraging or counselling P (or via a combination thereof). However, a supporting 
act in itself is not sufficient to be (indirectly) liable for a crime. As the common law 
tradition assumes, actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not make a person 
guilty unless his/her mind is also guilty). The mens rea criterion, therefore, describes 
the mental element that, in order for a crime to have been committed, must appear in 
conjunction with actus reus. As we shall see, in the case of complicity, the mens rea 
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criterion is fairly demanding because it requires that S is responsible for his actions 
and has knowledge of P’s intentions. In order to explore the relevance of complicity 
for MHI, it is easier to start with actus reus. We can then turn to mens rea.     
B. Resistance to intervention and Actus reus   
If one can consider regular combatantstarget_state complicit with the perpetrators of 
Atrocity Crimes, they are also morally guilty of atrocious mass killing. For the 
Argument from Derivative Liability, they are on a par with those individuals who 
directly carry out the killing. This claim seems striking for three reasons.  
First, regular combatantstarget_state are not involved in mass murder themselves and 
might not even be close to the site where mass murder is taking place.  
Second, regular combatantstarget_state do not cause perpetrators to engage in Atrocity 
Crimes. Regular combatantstarget_state are not, say, threatening to kill or otherwise 
punish potential perpetrators should the latter fail or refuse to comply with their 
orders.  
Third, one can question whether regular combatantstarget_state aid the perpetrators at 
all. Regular combatantstarget_state do not support perpetrators by directly acting 
towards them, e.g. by transporting weapons to the killing site or providing other 
forms of assistance such as food, water, and medical supplies. All regular 
combatantstarget_state are ordered to do is to defend their state against 
combatantsintervening_state. Contrast this with the Gun Case where Sgun gives P a gun 
that P uses to kill V.  Here we encounter a positive act, the handing over of the 
weapon, for which Sgun is clearly responsible and, under certain circumstances, even 
culpable.  
In light of these three arguments, it sounds reasonable to maintain that regular 
combatantstarget_state are only responsible for actions restricted to their encounters 
with combatantsintervening_state. 
The Argument from Derivative Liability negates this type of reasoning. It emphasises 
that, by defending the target state, regular combatantstarget_state are (partly) 
responsible for sustaining a state of affairs in which very serious wrongs are 
committed. Hence they are accountable for and guilty of Atrocity Crimes. From the 
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perspective of the actus reus criterion, there are three points in support of this 
position.209  
First, as the criminal law assumes, it is not required that S causes P to engage in x to 
be considered derivatively liable for x. Consequently, in order to have accomplice 
status, regular combatantstarget_state do not need to cause the perpetrators of 
Atrocity Crimes to act. On the other hand, if it can be shown that P would have 
been, say, killed by S if he did not do x, it is likely that S’s responsibility increases up 
to a point where S himself could become the principal. As we saw above, different 
levels of responsibility have implications for assessments of proportionality. If the 
perpetrators only engage in Atrocity Crimes because their comrades would otherwise 
kill them, combatantsintervening_state should try and minimise harming the former, 
while increasing their attack on the latter.  
Second, an individual does not need to positively act towards a principal in order to 
be the latter’s accessory. It is sufficient that the accessory’s actions place P in a 
position where P can carry out the wrongdoing. If Sbank helps P rob a bank by 
distracting the police, Sbank has the same level of derivate liability as P’s second 
accomplice who hands P the dynamite to break open the safe. By analogy, if, in 
Extermination Policy, Red’s regular combatants successfully repel Blue, perpetrators 
are in a position to continue their attack on Minority Ethnicity. Red’s regular 
combatants are thus on a par with, say, Redtransport who transport weapons to the 
killing site.  
Thirdly and directly related to this point, it is also not required that the accessory is 
present when the wrongdoing is carried out. If Sbank distracts the police three blocks 
away from the bank, his criminal guilt does not diminish. If Red’s regular combatants 
render assistance that shields the perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes, it does not make a 
difference whether they are present or not. The point is that the perpetrators will not 
be able to continue killing if their comrades halt Blue’s advance. The possibility that 
the accessory might not be causally responsibly for the wrongdoing or absent from 
its actual execution does not stand in the way of considering him complicit in it.  
                                                           
209 There is an important condition that must be fulfilled for complicity to obtain. S must help P 
before or during the wrongdoing. If S helps P flee the crime scene after P has shot V, then S is not 
accountable for V’s death. In this case, he is only accountable for helping P escape the police.   
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Although we have overcome these initial obstacles, we must note a further problem. 
An accessory’s contributions to another agent’s design are not always impermissible. 
For example, if the private ownership of firearms is legal, Sgun’s act of giving P the 
gun is not in itself morally wrong. Therefore, one could argue that it is absurd to 
maintain that Sgun should be derivatively liable for V’s murder. But we can say that, 
under these specific circumstances, Sgun is clearly under a duty not to give P the gun. 
Sgun’s liberty to dispose of his property (‘the gun’) as he pleases must be balanced 
against our concern for the rights of the prospective victim.210 If the latter’s rights are 
in danger of being violated, an otherwise permissible act can be wrong.  
Needless to say, this argument has far-reaching implications for just war theory. In 
the case of Atrocity Crimes, it is clear that we must balance the Orthodox View’s 
permission to participate in an unjust war against the rights of the victims of mass 
murder not to be attacked. Even if one supports the Orthodox View, one could 
maintain that it does not apply to MHI for exactly this reason. This point lends 
further support to the Neo-Classical View.  
Since S can only be derivatively liable for a crime, though, if S meets the relevant 
mental conditions set out by mens rea. In the Gun Case, for instance, Sgun is only 
complicit in V’s murder if he knows that P is plotting an attempt on V’s life. This 
leads us towards the two mens rea criteria for complicity. Both are introduced and 
critically examined below.  
C. Resistance to intervention and Mens Rea  
Taking into account, in Gun Case, P’s intention to murder V, Sgun is in breach of a 
duty not to pass on the gun, provided Sgun is free to aid P and knows that P intends 
to kill V. More precisely, the mens rea (guilty mind) criterion for complicity, on which 
much of the Argument from Derivative Liability hinges, requires that: 
1. S intends to do the acts by which he assists P and is aware that these acts aid 
P to engage in wrongdoing.  
2. S must know what P is about to do --- he must know the relevant 
circumstances. This is not to say that S must be fully aware of all facets of P’s 
                                                           
210 Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, pp. 434-435.  
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plans. Sometimes culpable ignorance --- ‘closing one’s eyes to the obvious’, as 
Ashworth puts it,211 can also lead to complicity. 
 
Of course, the question is to what extent these demanding criteria apply to regular 
combatantstarget_state.  
It is easier to begin with the second condition. Is it appropriate to suppose that 
regular combatantstarget_state have reasonable knowledge of Atrocity Crimes? As we 
argued in Part III, soldiers who are ordered to directly participate in mass killing are 
still able to assess whether their victims are defenceless once they have arrived at the 
killing site. But regular combatantstarget_state are not at the killing site. They are 
probably thousands of miles away from it. Moreover, while Sgun may know that P 
has a severe grudge against his brother, regular combatantstarget_state have usually no 
personal knowledge of the orders issued to potential perpetrators by the target state’s 
government. Fortunately, both objections can be dealt with relatively quickly.  
First, in Extermination Policy, Blue’s intervention, which Red’s regular combatants 
are ordered to repel, is a response to an already existing state of affairs. There are 
reasons to be sceptical that even an entirely authoritarian society can completely 
cover up mass killing. For example, in Cambodia, the epitome of an authoritarian 
state, many people had heard of the killing fields through eye witness accounts, 
word-to-mouth, and other more informal channels of communication.212 
Furthermore, Blue, keen to avoid large bloodshed, could try to persuade Red’s 
regular combatants to desert their ranks by informing them about the mass murder, 
e.g. by dropping leaflets over Red’s army barracks. It is unlikely, then, that there will 
be no information about the mass murder available to Red’s regular combatants.  
Second, though Red’s regular combatants may have no knowledge of the orders the 
perpetrators received, they can reasonably be expected to know that their 
government is capable of ordering mass murder.213 If they do not consider this 
possibility, they really do close their eyes to the obvious.  
It is much more difficult, though, to meet the challenge of the involuntary 
accomplice. Consider the case of the Patriotic Soldier, who knows that Atrocity 
                                                           
211 (ibid.), p. 438.   
212 Hinton, Why did they kill?.  
213 See, Estlund, ‘Following Orders’.  
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Crimes are taking place, but, though he is deeply opposed to his state’s policies, 
denies that he intends to aid the mass murderers by resisting 
combatantsintervening_state. Known to be sincere, the Patriotic Soldier, in 
Extermination Policy, genuinely wants to protect Red and its culture from Blue. The 
Patriotic Soldier is an Involuntary Accomplice because, though he is opposed to 
mass murder, the actions necessary to defend his country contribute to its 
continuation.   
But in reply, as we saw above, the theory of complicity does not require that S needs 
to agree or identify with P’s aims in order to help P. It only demands that a) S intends 
to do y and b) is aware that doing y helps P to accomplish x. 214 If Sgun disagrees with 
P’s plan to kill his brother but sells P the gun out of sheer greed, he is still 
derivatively liable for the murder. Likewise, the Patriotic Soldier can be considered 
complicit in Atrocity Crimes, despite the fact that he is opposed to them.  
This leaves us with the case of the innocent accomplice. Innocent accomplice is not 
blameworthy for the aid he renders because he does not fully satisfy the mens rea 
requirements. If, in Extermination Policy, Redconscript is heavily bullied into resisting 
Blue, it would be wrong to consider him as an ‘accomplice’. But if Redconscript knows 
all the facts and is responsible (though not blameworthy) for his actions, he is still 
morally responsible, though not necessarily culpable, for supporting the perpetrators 
of Atrocity Crimes. Redconscript’s support of the mass murderers may be sufficient to 
hold him under a duty not to retaliate when attacked by Blue. Further, in regard to 
the conditions governing the use of force against Redconscript, one can offer an 
argument similar to that in Part III. The necessity and proportionality criteria are 
more stringent in cases involving Redconscript than in a situation where it is certain 
that members of Red (e.g. elite army units) are not merely non-culpably supportive of 
but fully complicit in Atrocity Crimes.  
To conclude, in this part of the chapter, we developed the Argument from 
Derivative Liability in order to prove that regular combatantstarget_state should not be 
considered as moral equals. This is because they, by resisting 
combatantsintervening_state, preserve a ‘killing space’ for perpetrators of Atrocity 
Crimes. The Argument from Derivative Liability, then, challenges the view that the 
                                                           
214 The Patriotic Soldier could claim that he is not aware that his acts aid the perpetrators. But it is 
undeniable that repelling Blue helps the mass murderers. This must be obvious for the Patriotic 
Soldier.    
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activities of regular combatantstarget_state are entirely unrelated to Atrocity Crimes. In 
doing so, it shows that the Neo-Classical View, which opposes the Independence 
Thesis, can also be applied to theories of MHI.  
V 
Conclusion 
The other-defensive conception of MHI endorses the Neo-Classical View of 
combatant liability. We also saw that the problem of combatant liability is more 
complex in the context of MHI than in other types of war. It is necessary to 
distinguish between combatants who are engaged in Atrocity Crimes and ‘regular’ 
combatants summoned to the defence of the target state. One of the assets of the 
Neo-Classical View is that the underlying rationale, the justice-based perspective on 
self/other-defence, assists us in dealing with combatants in both categories. If the 
above argumentation is sound, intervening combatants hold a right to intervene 
against combatants in the target state. The correlative duty of this right is a duty of 
non-resistance. This means that the Independence Thesis, which asserts that JAB is 
independent from JIB, is invalid for the other-defensive conception of MHI. 
Generally, the argumentation of this chapter enables us to reconcile corporate and 
individual levels of analysis.   
Having discussed the problem of combatant liability, we must now turn to the 
problem of non-combatant immunity. Before we can do so, however, let us briefly 
turn to a general criticism that can be levelled at the Neo-Classical View. Before we 
conclude this chapter, let us briefly examine a critical argument that can be levelled 
against the Argument from Derivative Liability in particular and the Neo-Classical 
View in general. 
Military campaigns, defenders of the Independence Thesis could reply, are never 
conducted entirely justly. For a number of reasons, combatantsintervening_state may 
use unjust methods, if only temporarily. Since unjust aggressors are not holders of a 
right to intervene, they do not fall under the scope of the Neo-Classical View. On the 
other hand, as soon as they have ceased to use unjust methods, 
combatantsintervening_state regain their right to intervene. This entails that, for the 
duration of injustice at least, combatantstarget_state gain, if the Neo-Classical View is 
correct, a right to target combatantsintervening_state. For the sake of efficiency, critics 
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could argue that we should retain the Independence Thesis. It is impossible and 
uneconomical to assess every phase, or possibly every act, of a military campaign 
anew. 
Defenders of the Neo-Classical View can reply to this charge as follows. First, the 
Orthodox View faces the very same problem, albeit to a lesser degree. As we saw 
above, combatants who carry out military acts that do not fulfil certain criteria are 
not classifiable as moral equals. Thus, for the Orthodox View, we would still have to 
assess a large number of military acts. The Orthodox View, like the Neo-Classical 
View, cannot ignore the dynamics of a military campaign. 
Second, we can deal with the problem via the proportionality criterion. In order to 
show that combatantsintervening_state lose their right to intervene, injustices need to 
be persistent, that is, the actual campaign must be based on a strategy predicated on 
violations of JIB. However, if injustices occured sporadically, we must balance their 
severity against the overall aim of ending Atrocity Crimes. If the resulting harm is not 
disproportionate to the benefit of halting Atrocity Crimes, we can assume that 
combatantsintervening_state are holders of a right to intervene, notwithstanding the 
occurrence of some injustices.                              
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Chapter V 
The problem of non-combatant immunity and the ethics military 
humanitarian intervention 
 
‘It will be swift, it will be severe, it will be sustained!’  
‘You bomb us!’  
(Exchange between Richard Holbrook and Slobodan Milosevic on the eve of the 
Kosovo war)215  
 
Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group might do to them 
(without violating their rights). 
(Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia)216 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
215 Quoted in: T. Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 227.  
216 Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. ix.  
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I 
The Orthodox View and the innocent  
The preceding chapter offered a critical discussion of the problem of combatant 
liability. This issue, the chapter argued, can only be solved if one explores the 
relationship between JIB and JAB. According to one important approach in just war 
theory, the Orthodox View, JAB and JIB must be considered independently of each 
other. In a nutshell, just wars can be fought unjustly, while unjust ones can be fought 
justly. In the context of MHI, however, Chapter IV contended that the Orthodox 
View must be rejected. As a result, perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes and their 
accessories lack a liberty to repel intervening combatants. But the Orthodox View 
does not only govern the relationship between combatants. It also provides a specific 
outlook on the problem of non-combatant immunity.  
In light of the treatment of the ‘right intention’ criterion in Chapter III, a normatively 
sound solution to the problem of non-combatant immunity is of crucial importance 
for the success of the other-defensive conception of MHI. Wide-spread failure to 
adequately protect non-combatants, then, raises doubts over the humanitarian 
credentials of the intervening state and its combatants.217  
The question, of course, is whether the Orthodox View’s interpretation of JIB 
ensures the adequate protection of non-combatants during MHI. The few theorists 
who address this issue, most prominently Fernando Teson and, in Germany, Wilfried 
Hinsch and Dieter Janssen, conclude that the Orthodox View, or something closely 
resembling it, also applies to MHI.218 But given that the other-defensive conception 
of MHI rejects the Orthodox View’s approach to the problem of combatant liability, 
it would be odd to affirm the Orthodox View in the context of the problem of non-
combatant immunity. As Chapter I made clear, in order to make sense of the 
phenomenon of MHI, we must try to work towards a reflective equilibrium of our 
considered judgements about killing and saving. An affirmation of the Orthodox 
View here would move us further away from reaching equilibrium. Thus, in this 
chapter, we will reject the Orthodox View’s proposed solution to the problem of 
non-combatant immunity.         
                                                           
217 For a longer exploration of this point, see Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention, especially chapter 4.    
218 Teson, ‘The liberal case for Humanitarian Intervention’; W. Hinsch & D. Janssen, Menschenrechte 
Militärisch schützen: Ein Plädoyer für Humanitäre Intervention [The military protection of human rights: the 
case for Humanitarian Intervention] (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2006), pp. 99-112.  
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In order to critically engage with the Orthodox View, we must first gain a better 
overview of its position on non-combatant immunity. Closely following international 
humanitarian law, the Orthodox View rests on four assumptions.219  
1. Non-combatants can be distinguished from combatants in virtue of their 
material innocence, that is to say, they do not pose a lethal threat.  
2. It is permissible to engage in a necessary military act if (and only if) any harm 
inflicted on non-combatants is foreseen but not intended. To wit, military 
acts must be consistent with the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE).   
3. Any harm inflicted by the warring parties should not be excessive to the 
harm prevented. This principle usually also encompasses restrictions on 
certain weapons and a ban on torture and rape as means of war.    
4. Warring parties are allowed to kill non-combatants on the opposing side 
regardless of their cause, provided they observe 2 & 3.  
 
Worrying that the Orthodox View is too permissive, Michael Walzer urges us to add 
a fifth criterion to it.220 
5. Warring parties must ensure that (otherwise permissible) attacks on non-
combatants are kept to a minimum, even at the expense of combatant lives. 
Walzer calls this the Due Care criterion.   
 
Subsequent references to the Orthodox View incorporate Walzer’s revision. In what 
follows, we shall not attend to (4), as we have already rejected the Independence 
Thesis in the preceding chapters. If the combatants of the target state are not even 
permitted to target intervening combatants, they cannot be allowed to inflict any 
harm, intentionally or non-intentionally, on non-combatants in the intervening state. 
In what follows, Part II engages with (1), while Part III examines (2). Part IV looks at 
(3) & (5).    
                                                           
219 For representative examples, see Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars; O. O’Donovan, The Just War Revisited 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); L. May, War Crimes and the Just War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); I. Primoratz, ‘Civilian Immunity in War: its grounds, scope and 
weight’, in: I. Primoratz (ed.), Civilian Immunity in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 
21-41.   
220 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 155-156. 
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II 
Combatants and non-combatants: some doubts about the Orthodox View   
For just war theory, we must draw a line between those who are liable to attack and 
those who are not. In other words, warring parties must adopt a discriminatory 
approach to the use of force during the conduct of hostilities. As Larry May points 
out, any theoretical account of the resulting ‘discrimination criterion’ has a 
conceptual and normative component.221 The former clarifies why someone should 
belong to one group of individuals rather than another, whereas the latter justifies 
certain behaviour towards members of the respective group. For the Orthodox View, 
those who are materially innocent, i.e. non-threatening, are non-combatants 
(conceptual). As such, they enjoy immunity from intentional attack (normative).222 
Although its simplicity is intuitively appealing, the Orthodox View can be rejected 
relatively easily. All one needs to show is that material innocence is not sufficient in 
order to be classifiable as a non-combatant. 
Indeed, there are three reasons for why a simple distinction between those who are 
threatening and those who aren’t is untenable. First, according to the laws of war, 
combatants are usually permitted to attack their adversaries even though the latter do 
not pose a material threat. In the literature on the just war, these types of combatants 
are known as ‘naked soldiers’. They may be injured, resting, or being loaded onto 
trucks.223 Conceptually speaking, naked soldiers do not seem much different from 
non-combatants. Both groups are materially innocent. To be sure, some naked 
soldiers are, arguably, equivalent to potential attackers. For instance, a well-trained 
army unit can be mobilised within minutes, if not seconds. Second, it might be 
impossible to stop a naked soldier once he has returned to fighting. In both cases the 
launch of a pre-emptive strike can be permissible. But notwithstanding these two 
points, the fact that the laws of war consider naked soldiers liable to attack raises 
doubts over the role of causal innocence in establishing non-combatant immunity.224  
                                                           
221 L. May, War Crimes, p. 96. For the view that discriminatory approach to killing in war is merely a 
useful convention to prevent war from turning into mass slaughter, G. Mavrodes, ‘Conventions and 
the Morality of War’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 4/No. 2 (1975), pp. 117-131.    
222 For the clearest statement of this view, see R.K. Fullinwider, ‘War and Innocence’, Philosophy & 
Public Affairs, Vol. 1/No. 5 (1975), pp. 90-97.     
223 Rodin, War and Self-Defence, pp. 127-128.  
224 Larry May argues that additional considerations of humaneness and mercy prohibit the killing of a 
wounded or utterly defenceless soldier. The laws of war, he suggests, should be reformed accordingly. 
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Second, in political society, individuals are organised in complex social institutions 
that confer on them varying degrees of authority over others. The idea that the state 
is a legal system supports this observation. Legal systems are hierarchical and grant 
individuals role-specific powers over others. The Orthodox View, due to its narrow 
emphasis on material non-innocence, overlooks this. It is plainly wrong to suggest 
that politicians guilty of ordering an aggressive war or authorising Atrocity Crimes 
should go unharmed because they are materially innocent. In light of our treatment 
of the proportionality criterion in Chapter IV, it would, in fact, be disproportionate 
not to target them. For example, on the eve of the Kosovo conflict one NATO 
general, rightly, argued that one should ‘aim for the head of the snake first’ by 
directly targeting Milosevic and his political party.225 Although Milosevic and the 
most senior members of his government were not posing material threats, they were 
liable to attack because they had authorised policies that led to Atrocity Crimes. 
According to what we can refer to as the Chain of Command Argument, materially 
non-innocent individuals incur liabilities to attack if they occupy positions of 
authority within the chain of command of the target state.226  
Third, the Orthodox View is put under pressure by the well-known case of 
munitions workers. As Walzer, the major contemporary exponent of the Orthodox 
View, concedes, it is permissible to intentionally target munitions workers, despite 
the fact that, unlike combatants, they are not posing a direct material threat. This is 
so because they contribute more to the war effort than any other group.227 Likewise, 
political theologian Oliver O’Donovan opines that a missile aimed at a group of army 
technicians would not hit a single non-combatant.228 Material innocence, then, cannot 
account for the conceptual difference between combatants and non-combatants. 
Ultimately, in order to establish non-combatant immunity, advocates of the 
Orthodox View must appeal to a different criterion.  
In response to the last criticism, just war theorists have offered two arguments. On 
the one hand, O’Donovan maintains that army doctors and chefs are engaged in 
activities they would also pursue during peacetime. War does not affect the 
                                                                                                                                                               
Intuitively, it is normatively sound to award non-combatant status to those naked soldiers who are 
incapable of posing a threat in the near future; see May, War Crimes, pp. 108-112.  
225 Judah, Kosovo, p. 257.  
226 For some further thoughts on the Chain of Command Argument, see Hinsch & Janssen, 
Menschenrechte militärisch schützen,  p. 106.   
227 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 145-147.   
228 O’Donovan, The Just War Revisited, p. 38.  
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performance of their roles.229 But because munitions workers and technicians do not 
do anything they would not also do during peacetime, this argument fails. A more 
interesting reply involves a distinction between the rendering of military and non-
military assistance. Accordingly, materially innocent individuals incur liabilities to 
attack if (and only if) they render military assistance. Those individuals who do not 
render military assistance remain immune to attack.    
In what follows, let us focus on the distinction between military and non-military 
assistance. In particular, we must assess its relevance in the context of Atrocity 
Crimes. The latter are collectively perpetrated. Perpetrators render support to each 
other, but they also often receive (non-military) support from those who harbour 
sympathies for their aims. As was indicated in earlier chapters, since individuals can 
slip in and out of different roles during intrastate conflicts, it is difficult to draw a 
clear distinction between perpetrators and bystanders. Civilian populations can be 
implicated in the work of perpetrators in a number of ways. Further, while, for the 
Argument from Derivative Liability at least, the rendering of (military) assistance in 
support of an unjust war is likely to be a violation of duties not to support large scale 
wrongdoing, the rendering of assistance in support of grave moral evils like Atrocity 
Crimes is even worse. For this reason alone a rigid distinction between military and 
non-military assistance is dubious.230           
In order to explore this point further, we must return to the Argument from 
Derivative Liability introduced in Chapter IV. Its underlying notion of complicity 
shows that those who do not directly order Atrocity Crimes and are not engaged in 
them incur derivative liabilities to attack if (and only if) they render assistance to 
perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes. To recapitulate, two conditions need to be satisfied 
for someone to be complicit in a wrongdoing. First, the criterion of actus reus 
demands that there is an identifiable act through which the accessory aids, counsels 
or abets the principal actor. Second, the criterion of mens rea sets out the mental 
preconditions necessary to be considered complicit in a crime. It requires that the 
accessory knows something about the principal actor’s plans. Interestingly, for the 
Argument from Derivative Liability, it is irrelevant whether an accessory renders 
                                                           
229 (ibid.), pp. 39-40.   
230 For another critique of the distinction between military and non-military assistance, see C. Fabre, 
‘Guns, Food and Liability to Attack in War’, Ethics, Vol. 120/No. 1 (2009), pp. 36-63.   
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militarily or non-military assistance. The point is that the accessory puts the principal 
perpetrator into a position where he can carry out/participate in Atrocity Crimes.  
A good example of civilian complicity in Atrocity Crimes is provided by the case of 
Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), a semi-private radio station linked to 
Hutu hardliners, whose broadcasts served as a background to the killings during the 
Rwandan genocide.231 RTLM presenters told (potential) perpetrators of mass murder 
to go to a particular village because there ‘weren’t enough dead bodies in the street’. 
Crucially, RTLM’s causal link to mass murder did not only consist in encouraging the 
killers but also in supplying them with (precise) information about the location of 
potential victims (actus reus). From what we know, it is certain that RTLM workers 
were fully conscious of the intentions of their fellow Hutus and were not coerced 
into broadcasting hate speech (mens rea). According to the Argument from Derivative 
Liability, RTLM workers would have been legitimate targets had an intervention 
occurred, notwithstanding the fact that, strictly speaking, they did not render military 
assistance to Hutu extremists.    
It is necessary to stress, though, that the scope of the Argument from Derivative 
Liability does not encompass all forms of ideological agitation. The mere expression 
of offensive opinions does not make someone complicit in resulting Atrocity Crimes. 
Someone who wholeheartedly expresses his support for the regime’s policies, hangs 
the president’s picture on his kitchen wall or attends a mass rally does not necessarily 
provide any causal, material support to mass murderers. Of course, at a more 
abstract level, the person who supports a regime may contribute to the continued 
existence of certain social attitudes that are instrumental to Atrocity Crimes.232 But 
one must not forget that individuals in the target state do not forfeit their rights to 
freedom of expression. As long as they do not provide direct information about the 
whereabouts of victims, offensive views do not fall under the Argument from 
Derivative Liability.  
That said, the status of incitement of (racial) hatred is a more difficult. RTLM 
broadcasts, for instance, customarily referred to Tutsis as ‘cockroaches’ that had to 
                                                           
231 For an account of the role of RTLM in the Rwandan genocide, see D. Li, ‘Echoes of Violence’, in: 
N. Mills & K. Brunner (eds.), The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention (New York: 
Basic Books, 2002), pp. 117-128.  
232 For an interesting exploration of this theme, see L. May, Sharing Responsibility (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1992).   
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be crushed by ‘Hutu Power’. Incitement falls between the rendering of assistance and 
the expression of offensive opinions. On the one hand, it is not quite the same as 
giving precise information on the whereabouts of potential victims. On the other 
hand, unlike those who hold offensive opinions, inciters intend to create an 
atmosphere in which Atrocity Crimes can be perpetrated.  
To solve this problem, we must distinguish between institutionalised and non-
institutionalised ways of inciting hatred. In regard to the former, institutions that are 
specifically charged with creating the necessary ‘background’ for the perpetration of 
Atrocity Crimes should not be immune from attack.  In regard to the latter, the 
incitement of hatred arises from the context of a specific situation. John Stuart Mill’s 
observations on the incitement of hatred provide a useful point of orientation. In On 
Liberty, Mill, one of the staunchest defenders of free speech, contends that an agitator 
whipping up a crowd in front of a corn dealer’s house is not protected by free 
speech.233 By analogy, a local villager who encourages perpetrators to kill his 
neighbour falls under the Argument for Derivative Liability. However, a villager who 
encourages perpetrators hours or days before they move into battle is protected by 
free speech. Here the connection between killing and agitation is not as immediate as 
in the case involving the neighbour.   
Nevertheless, the Argument from Derivative Liability gives rise to a weighty 
problem. In cases where agents of the state are perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes, 
taxation implicates nearly every (adult) member of the target state is, to a greater or 
lesser extent, implicated in the large scale violations of basic rights and natural duties. 
The danger, obviously, is that the Argument from Derivative Liability breaks down 
the (conceptual) distinction between combatants and non-combatants altogether. If it 
did, the idea of just war theory would undoubtedly become redundant. It would fail 
to act as a constraint on the use of force.  
But there are good reasons to exempt taxation from the Argument from Derivative 
Liability. Taxes, even if raised by an illegitimate state for an illegitimate cause, fulfil a 
complex role in society. They are never solely aimed at one particular project. 
Schools, hospitals, courts, emergency services, universities, and law enforcement 
agencies are all financed via taxation. These institutions perform important functions 
without which no societies can exist. Although some social institutions are used to 
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perpetrate Atrocity Crimes, members of a society have legitimate claims to undertake 
steps ensuring their continued social existence.  
Put differently, taxation, even if some of its proceeds go towards illegitimate projects, 
maintains the social vitality of a political community. It would be irreconcilable with 
a commitment to humanitarianism to expect societies, even if some of their policies 
are responsible for grave moral evils, to commit what one may term ‘social suicide’. 
The social death of a community is always an evil, and if just war theorists required 
the target state to cease all of its social and political activities, we would merely 
replace one evil with another. As we saw in Chapter III, the purpose of MHI is to re-
establish decent, law-governed relations between members, not to bring about the 
social death of a society  The problems that interveners confront do not arise from 
the existence of a ‘perpetrator’ society as such, but from some of its policies.234 The 
Argument from Derivative Liability merely maintains that some institutions and 
individuals are more deeply implicated in Atrocity Crimes than others. On this basis, 
it prompts us to re-think the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. It 
does not seek to abolish it.   
That said, the Chain of Command Argument and the Argument from Derivative 
Liability do restrict the scope of non-combatant immunity. The status of a non-
combatant is only held by those who are neither directly responsible for ordering 
Atrocity Crimes nor otherwise complicit in their perpetration. To avoid conceptual 
confusion, the term ‘non-combatant’ is not normatively equivalent to the term 
‘civilian’, though both are often used in the same breath in political discourse. When 
drawing a line between those who are and those who are not liable to attack, both 
arguments urge us to take into account that many who occupy civilian functions can 
share a high degree of (derivative) moral responsibility for Atrocity Crimes. This 
means that the interveners have a right to target these kinds of civilians, who, like 
perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes, are prohibited from using self-defensive force.  
In general, the Argument from Derivative Liability, like the Chain of Command 
Argument, upholds the central claim of (contemporary) just war theory that 
individuals can never be liable to attack for ‘who they are’, but only for ‘what they 
do’. In the difficult circumstances often encountered by interveners, both arguments 
provide a more differentiated picture of ‘what individuals do’ than the Orthodox 
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View. We must now engage with a much graver issue, namely the question whether 
the killing of non-combatants is morally permissible.  
III  
Killing non-combatants in the course of military humanitarian intervention 
A. Anti-interventionism and Double Effect   
In what follows, we examine whether interveners can sometimes be permitted to kill 
non-combatants in the course of MHI. It is hard to overestimate the importance of 
this issue for the ethics of MHI. Considering that MHI is justified as the protection 
of the innocent, it appears contradictory if its pursuit harms or even kills the very 
people in whose name war is being waged. German legal philosopher Reinhardt 
Merkel, an outspoken critic of MHI, thinks that the conduct of MHI will always 
undermine its justification.235 Likewise, in his response to the Kosovo campaign, 
German moral philosopher Rüdiger Bittner argues that it is impermissible for ‘Mr. 
Clinton [to] order Mr. Clark to kill Mrs. Petrovic, although she has nothing to do 
with her government’s policies against ethnic Kosovo Albanians’.236 More generally, 
Alan Gewirth argues that innocent individuals have an absolute right not to be part 
of any homicidal design.237  
On the other hand, those theorists of MHI who have written on the conduct of 
MHI, most notably Fernando Teson, cite DDE as a solution to the problem. As we 
saw in Chapter I, DDE forms an important, though not uncontroversial, part of 
non-consequentialist moral theory. While its defenders do not deny the moral weight 
of consequences, they reject the (act) consequentialist claim that these are the sole 
determinants of rightness or wrongness. Thus, even if two acts led to consequentially 
similar results, this would not automatically mean that they were both equally 
permissible. This is so because DDE holds that the intentions of the agents who are 
about to perform these two acts may make a moral difference. As we saw in the last 
chapter, DDE claims that, if a particular act has good and bad consequences, the 
                                                           
235 R. Merkel, ‘Das Elend der Beschützten: Rechtsethische Grundlagen der Humanitären Intervention’ 
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a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2000), pp. 66-98.  
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237 A. Gewirth, ‘Are there any absolute rights?’, in: J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
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latter must not be intended by the agent but solely foreseen. More precisely, the 
following three criteria decide on the permissibility of a particular act:238  
(1) The basic act is, when considered independently of its evil effect, not wrong or at least 
morally indifferent. This criterion merely rules out that the following two criteria 
are applied to (intrinsically) bad acts that have good and bad side effects.239  
(2) The agent does not intend the evil effect as an end itself or as a means to an end. This 
criterion forms the core of DDE because it demands that the bad effect must 
be solely foreseen. To ascertain that the agent did not intend the bad effect, 
DDE offers us the so-called Counterfactual Test, which asks whether the 
agent would have performed the basic act if the bad effect had not occurred. 
If the answer is positive, the agent did not intend the bad effect. 
(3) The agent has proportionately grave reasons for acting. Proportionality demands that 
the foreseen bad effect is not excessive to the intended good effect. 
Moreover, it requires that, amongst a variety of options that lead to the 
desired good effect, the least harmful is chosen by the agent. (Let us leave the 
problem of proportionality until Part IV).   
 
The importance of DDE for just war theory is illustrated by the famous distinction 
between strategic bombing and terror bombing.  
Terror Bomber: Tim, a bomber pilot, tries to end a war by dropping a bomb on a non-combatant 
settlement, believing that the large number of non-combatant deaths will scare the enemy into 
surrender. 
Strategic Bomber: Tim’s comrade, Seth, seeks to end the war by dropping a bomb on a munitions 
plant that is closely situated to another non-combatant settlement. However, Seth is fully aware that 
the blast resulting from the destruction of the factory will also kill non-combatants from the adjacent 
settlement.  
DDE maintains that Tim acts impermissibly because he intends non-combatant 
deaths. This is confirmed by the Counterfactual Test. Tim fails the test, as his design 
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is pointless without the occurrence of non-combatant deaths. By contrast, Seth 
passes the Counterfactual Test because he would have continued with the attack if 
no civilians had been present. Seth is, therefore, a strategic bomber because he 
merely foresees the harm he inflicts on his victims. 
Before we can examine the distinction between terror and strategic bombing in more 
detail, it is necessary to briefly raise a practical point. It is by no means self-evident 
that strategic bombing, which, by definition, seeks to gain military advantage over the 
enemy by weakening his military strike capacity (bombing military installations, 
governmental buildings etc.), is a suitable strategy for MHI. It is, for our purposes, 
useful to draw attention to a much neglected type of ‘non-terror bombing’. So-called 
relief bombing aims to benefit non-combatants by ending a state of affairs that is 
detrimental to their basic needs in food, shelter, and security:240 
Relief Bomber: Richard wants to end a siege on a city whose population is running out of food 
and is denied the right to leave. To do so, Richard must bomb enemy army units which have encircled 
the city and are blocking supply routes. Because these units are very close to the city, Richard, like 
Seth, will (foreseeably) kill some non-combatants who live in the city..241  
It is noteworthy that, firstly, the occurrence of non-combatant deaths is much more 
problematic for Richard than for Seth. Richard motives are primarily humanitarian, 
yet he knowingly brings about the foreseeable deaths of the very people he initially 
set out to benefit. Second, taking into account that bombing is a risky strategy which 
inevitably endangers non-combatant lives, it requires clarification whether the use of 
air power during MHI should essentially be restricted to relief bombing or may 
include strategic bombing to attain broader objectives. But since this last question 
borders heavily on the problem of proportionality, we better leave it until Part IV. 
In general, because DDE has come under fire from across the philosophical 
spectrum, it remains to be seen whether the distinction between terror- and non-
terror bombing policies is defensible. In Section B, we look at the defensibility (or 
lack thereof) of the conceptual distinction between intended and foreseen effects. In 
order not to overcomplicate the discussion, we will not examine relief bombing in 
this context. It suffices to say that, if terror bombing and strategic bombing turn out 
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to be conceptually indistinguishable, the same will apply to the relationship between 
relief- and terror bombing. In Section C, we are going to examine whether there is a 
normative difference between intentional and non-intentional killings.     
B. Are terror and strategic bombing conceptually separable?  
It is impossible to survey the burgeoning literature on the (conceptual) distinction 
between intended and foreseen effects. Instead, let us discuss two important issues 
that arise in the debate. Both are particularly relevant for theories of MHI. To begin, 
let us turn to Jonathan Bennett’s critique of DDE and Warren Quinn’s response to 
it. As was pointed out above, DDE’s Counterfactual Test judges whether the bad 
effect is solely incidental to or an integral part of an agent’s design. But Jonathan 
Bennett raises doubts about its suitability for this task:   
School Case: Tim tries to end a war by bombing a school building during the day. The death of 
the school children will prompt the enemy government to surrender because it fears that there are 
going to be similar attacks in the near future.  
Bennett argues that Tim’s design only requires that the children appear dead until the 
enemy government has surrendered.242 In fact, Tim might hope that, due to a 
miracle, the children became alive again as soon as his side has won the war. If Tim 
justified his actions in this way, School Case would pass the Counterfactual Test: Tim 
intends that the children appear dead, but solely foresees that they die as a result of 
the bombing. If Bennett is right, nothing is gained from the incorporation of DDE 
to JIB.         
There are two potential replies to Bennet’s critique. The first draws upon Phillipa 
Foot’s influential work on DDE. It argues that, in School Case, the intended and the 
foreseen side-effects are too close together, rendering the dropping of the bomb 
impermissible under DDE.243 But how close is too close? Foot owes us an answer to 
this conceptual question.  
(2) Another reply to Bennett’s claim stresses that the ‘miracle defence’ does not 
work. The possibility of a miracle is remote, whereas the death of the children is 
inevitable. However, this response fails in an important respect. In the Strategic 
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Bomber example, Seth, who, according to DDE, acts permissibly when he bombs 
the munitions plant, also knows that those non-combatants whom he can see from 
his cockpit window seconds before he drops his deadly load will die. Miracles aside, 
both acts lead to the inevitable deaths of non-combatants.  
Given the failure of these two arguments, a better way to reassert the conceptual 
distinction between strategic and terror bombing consists in Warren Quinn’s revision 
of DDE along Kantian lines:244  
(4) The agent is not allowed to involve the victim in his design or somehow benefit from its 
presence during the execution of his design. According to Quinn, involving the 
victim in one’s homicidal design and benefiting from its presence is 
prohibited through the Kantian maxim that we should also treat others as 
ends in themselves (the end-not-means thesis). As Quinn rightly argues, by 
involving the children without their consent, Tim takes up a ‘distinctive 
attitude’ towards them; that is to say, Tim uses the children as ‘strategic 
material’ for his purposes. This is incompatible with the ends-not-means 
thesis.   
Of course, what Quinn proposes is a normative solution to a conceptual problem. 
But nevertheless, his argument is supported by the concept of humanitarianism. The 
point of MHI is to relieve human suffering caused by Atrocity Crimes. It is 
incompatible with the demands of humanitarianism to use individuals, by inflicting 
further suffering on them, in order to accomplish this goal. As we see shall in Section 
C, the halting of Atrocity Crimes justifies the imposition of certain costs on non-
combatants in the target state. But while the goal of, say, halting Atrocity Crimes 
gives rise to a moral permission to non-intentionally harm innocent individuals, it 
does not justify using them. In addition to the Counterfactual Test, then, it must be 
determined whether the agent would have been able to achieve the desired effect 
without the involvement of his victim. From now on all references to DDE 
incorporate Quinn’s Kantian revision. 
But while Quinn’s revision is a step in the right direction, it does not yet rescue the 
conceptual distinction between strategy and terror bombing. Imagine that Seth, who 
happens to be a sadist (sadistic-Seth), flies (strategic) bombing missions because he 
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enjoys killing innocent people.245 Does this mean that he also intends to kill them? One 
response, which roughly follows the rationale of the Chain of Command Argument 
outlined above, stresses that, because sadistic-Seth is the recipient of an order to 
bomb the factory, the way he relates to the attack and its side-effects is irrelevant. 
But, as Frances Kamm objects, the Chain of Command Argument merely shifts the 
problem to another level for the very simple reason that the person who issues the 
order might enjoy killing non-combatants.246 Unless we find someone within the 
chain of command who does not enjoy killing non-combatants, we cannot solve the 
problem. For Kamm, this is why, at least in this context, the Chain of Command 
Argument fails.   
To deal with the case of sadistic-Seth, we must draw a distinction between an agent’s 
intentions and his feelings. From the perspective of action theory, the two can be 
viewed independently from each other.247 Intentions are effective in the sense that they 
involve a ‘special commitment’ to a plan of action through which we seek to purse a 
good that is rationally desired (doing x to end a war), while feelings are affective 
because they are emotional responses to what we plan to do (feeling abhorred 
by/happy about doing x). As a result, intent can be paired with different, even 
conflicting, feelings without undermining the distinction between terror and strategic 
bombing. For example, even if Tim deeply regretted the death of every child he kills 
in School Case, this would not make him a strategic bomber.  Similarly, the fact that 
sadistic-Seth enjoys killing innocent people does not mean that he also intends it. We 
resent sadistic-Seth for how he personally relates to the suffering he inflicts, but this 
does not render his actions impermissible.  
It is doubtful, though, that a true sadist would ever accept any limitations, such as 
DDE, on his actions. Letting sadistic-Seth fly bombing missions is an incalculable 
risk and his superiors would be well advised to review whether he should continue to 
do so. This raises an important general point for the screening and training of 
soldiers. Soldiers taking part in MHI should be trained to a high standard in order to 
prevent the infliction of unnecessary suffering on non-combatants. Chapter VI 
returns to this point. On the other hand, if sadistic-Seth abides by DDE just like a 
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non-sadistic-Seth would, there is no reason for not allowing him to engage in 
strategic bombing. Sadistic-Seth is a bad person, but bad persons are still capable of 
performing morally sound acts.  
Although the above does not exhaust the (conceptual) discussion of DDE, it 
indicates some strategies that can be used in its defence. We must now ask whether it 
matters normatively whether an innocent person is killed intentionally or non-
intentionally.  
C. Double Effect, intervention, and the limits of the ends-not-means thesis  
As was indicated in Chapter I, non-consequentialists defend the normative difference 
between intentional and non-intentional killing via the ends-not-means-thesis.248   
Accordingly, terror bombing is impermissible precisely because it fails to treat non-
combatants as ends, while non-terror bombing is permissible because it does not 
exclusively treat them as means. Uwe Steinhoff objects that this is problematic when 
the victim loses her life as a foreseen side effect, while Bennett dryly remarks that we 
should ‘Tell that to the [non-combatant]!’249 In other words, it is debatable whether 
not treating someone (exclusively) as a means is sufficient to also respecting that 
person as an end.  
Bennett, for instance, suggests that treating someone as an end requires a) not using 
that person as a means only and b) somehow benefiting her. If Bennett is correct, the 
non-intentional killing of a terminally ill cancer patient by administering a lethal dose 
of morphine is compatible with the ends-not-means-thesis. The physician 
administering the morphine benefits the patient by intending to relieve his unbearable 
pain, foreseeing that he will die as a result. Of course, the interveners, especially if 
they engage in relief bombing, are also trying to benefit those in the target state. It is 
possible, therefore, to argue that the conduct of MHI is normatively analogous to the 
morphine relief case.  
But unfortunately, the relationship between DDE and the ethics of MHI is not that 
straightforward. In order to defend the non-intentional killing of non-combatants 
during MHI, we must first attend to some more general concerns about the 
normative soundness of DDE. These concerns are particularly pressing in the 
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context of MHI.  Although neither of the two thinkers is entirely dismissive of DDE, 
Frances Kamm and Philippa Foot think that, at least in some contexts, its results are 
too permissive:250    
Hospital Case: A doctor can save five patients by mixing a special medicine, but the production of 
the medicine is going to set off lethal fumes that will inevitably escape into the hospital’s air 
conditioning system, killing an immobile patient in an adjacent room. 
Car Case: Michael is rushing five extremely sick people to the hospital when he sees Toby lying in 
the middle of the road. Pressed for time, Michael decides against halting the car and runs over Toby.  
Both cases, in principle, satisfy DDE, as neither the immobile patient nor Toby is 
treated as a means to an end. But Foot and Kamm contend that it is impermissible 
for Michael and the doctor to proceed. This is so because negative duties not to 
harm are stronger than positive duties of assistance. This response indicates that the 
innocent are holders of negative rights in rem not to be attacked that ‘trump’ any 
positive rights to assistance. Alternatively, it reinforces Gewirth’s point that the 
innocent have an absolute right not to be made part of any homicidal design.  
But fortunately, it is possible to rescue DDE for the conceptualisation of MHI as an 
other-defensive war. This is because the Domestic Analogy contains an important 
moral considerations that is absent from the Hospital and Car Cases. To find out 
what this moral consideration might be, it is useful to develop what we can call the 
Public Goods Argument.251 It maintains that non-combatants are not morally 
equivalent to mere bystanders, such as Toby or the single patient, because, in their 
role as citizens of a state, they can be expected to bear certain costs associated with the 
maintenance of a sovereign order. In other words, the Public Goods Argument holds 
that the state is allowed to impose costs on its citizens in order to repel or prevent 
threats to sovereign order. As we saw in Chapter III, a sovereign order is necessary 
to realise interdependent human needs in autonomy and security. In order to develop 
the Public Goods Argument, we proceed in three steps.  
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First, the Public Goods Argument assumes that it is legitimate for a state to draft its 
citizens into the army to resist an unjust aggressor. Yet, as Michael Walzer observes, 
the unjust aggressor might not intend to destroy the sovereign order of the victim 
state as such.252 The aggressing state could merely intend to replace, say, the 
government of the victim state with a different one. Not surprisingly, given our 
analysis of the Legalist Paradigm in Chapter II, Walzer thinks that the right to self-
determination accounts for why citizens may be ‘obliged to die for the state’.253 We 
can grant Walzer this point. But since, in the present discussion, we are concerned 
with Atrocity Crimes, we can reply that states can legitimately draft their citizens into 
the army in order to resist a genocidal aggressor.    
Second, the Public Goods Argument raises the problem of mandatory killing 
introduced in Chapter I. It is not necessary to discuss this issue in its entirety here, 
not least because we are going to return to it in Chapter VI. For now let us assume 
that drafting citizens into the army to resist a genocidal aggressor is compatible with 
a concern for autonomy. This is so because, as we saw in Chapter III, the provision 
of certain public goods, most notably the rule of law, is a precondition for the 
exercise of autonomy. Following Rawls’ famous statement that liberty can only be 
infringed for the sake of liberty, the Public Goods Argument holds that autonomy 
can only be infringed for the sake of autonomy.  
Third, the Public Goods Argument contends that, if a state is allowed to expose its 
citizens to the mortal dangers arising from confrontations with a genocidal aggressor, 
it does not seem unreasonable to argue that it is also permitted to endanger their lives 
in other ways. For the Public Goods Argument, the state is permitted to non-
intentionally bring about the deaths of its own citizens if (and only if) doing so is 
necessary to preserve a sovereign order. To defend this claim, consider the following 
thought experiment.  
Car Chase Case: A police car is pursuing Timothy, a suicide bomber, who has packed his car 
with fertiliser-based explosives and aims to blow himself up in the middle of the capital during rush 
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hour. The police officers are chasing Timothy down a busy road when they approach road works.    
If the police officers do not slow down, they will be able to catch Timothy before he reaches his target, 
but, as a side effect, kill some of the workmen and fellow motorists through dangerous driving.  
No doubt these types of suicide attacks can have disastrous consequences for the 
institutions of the state and general public safety, particularly in societies suffering 
from internal political tensions.254 Also, it goes without saying that the policemen 
should do everything in their powers to avoid endangering the other motorists and 
workmen. Moreover, considering Walzer’s insistence on the importance of due care, 
agents of the state who are entrusted with the protection of sovereign institutions 
(e.g. police, army, Special Forces) must accept greater risks for themselves. But, in 
the Car Chase Case, once all options have been exhausted, the Public Goods 
Argument justifies the non-intentional killing of the workers and other drivers in the 
course of averting the attack. Since we are interested in the problem of non-
combatant immunity, let us focus on this aspect of The Public Goods Argument. 
Although it permits the non-intentional killing of non-combatants in the course of 
protecting a sovereign order, it raises two main problems for theorists of MHI.  
First, in the context of MHI, the problem is that the costs for the maintenance of a 
sovereign order are imposed by another state, i.e. the intervening state. For potential 
critics of the Public Goods Argument, it is possible to argue that a foreign state is 
not allowed to non-intentionally harm non-combatants in the target state. In fact, 
they could contend that the Public Goods Argument prompts us to develop a post-
statist conception of MHI, similar to Brock’s theory of MHI discussed in Chapter I. 
But because the idea of a post-statist conception of MHI faces a number of 
problems, let us try to reconcile the Public Goods Argument with the (statist) 
conceptualisation of MHI as other-defence.   
One intuition underlying the critique of the Public Goods Argument is that local 
political institutions somehow represent their members. However, even a state that is 
not a representative of its people can fulfil their collective interest in sovereign 
institutions. A state that has been taken over by a drug cartel, for instance, may 
appeal to the Public Goods Argument in order to prevent genocide.255 Further, 
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because the interest in sovereign institutions is fundamental and universal, it does not 
seem essential that only a local party secures it. Rather, the formulation of any 
localised policies demands, be it a demand for self-determination, representation or 
democracy, will depend on the prior existence of sovereign institutions. Put 
differently, someone, insider or outsider, needs to preserve the peace and facilitate 
the development of civic trust amongst members of post-atrocity societies. Without 
the existence of peace and security more ambitious local political goals will not be 
realisable. We return to this issue in Chapter VII where we discuss the phenomenon 
of humanitarian occupation. For now let us note that the Public Goods Argument is 
compatible with statist conceptions of MHI.      
The second problem for the Public Goods Argument has to do with status of non-
citizens. As the analogy with the military draft suggests, citizens of the target state are 
liable to bear the costs associated with the maintenance of a sovereign order, but the 
victims of Atrocity Crimes are not necessarily citizens of the target state: mass 
murder is often preceded by the withdrawal of citizenship status from future victims, 
and in some case the victims of mass murder might have never had citizenship in the 
first place. There are two ways to deal with this issue.  
The first maintains that it is neither permissible nor excusable to cause the foreseen 
deaths of non-citizens. For example, if Richard had to non-intentionally kill non-
citizens when ending the siege on the city, he would have to abort the attack. If, in 
the Relief Bomber example, Richard was able to bomb the army units in such a way 
that only citizens of the target state were harmed, he should do so.     
Alternatively, the scope of the Public Goods Argument could be extended to cover 
all individuals residing within the territory of the target state. For example, a Turk 
who comes to Germany as a ‘guest-worker’ still has the same interest in the 
sovereign functioning of the German state as a German citizen. Accordingly, 
residency, rather than citizenship, is a more appropriate foundation for the Public 
Goods Argument. Admittedly, this revision weakens the analogy with the military 
draft somewhat, but when proportionality, the theme of Part IV, is brought into play, 
an intermediate position might be attainable. For instance, interveners would be 
allowed to inflict a higher degree of foreseeable harm on citizens of the target state 
than non-citizens. Put simply, the proportionality conditions governing the use of 
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non-intentional force against non-citizens would be even more demanding than in 
the case of citizens. 
Having defended the Public Goods Argument against potential criticisms, let us add 
some clarifying comments. The question is whether the Public Good Argument 
establishes (moral) liability to attack. There are two approaches to this issue. The first 
assumes that non-combatants are liable to attack, whereas the second denies this.     
First, according to the strict interpretation of the Public Goods Argument, non-
combatants qua private individuals hold a claim-right in rem not to be attacked against 
other private individuals. But qua residents of the target state they do not hold such a 
right against intervening combatants.256 However, as we already argued in our 
discussion of child soldiers in Chapter IV, the duty not to kill or otherwise harm the 
innocent/non-combatants should not simply be defined out of existence. Individuals 
are liable to attack because of what they do and not because of their membership in a 
state or nation. For this reason we should reject the strict interpretation of the Public 
Goods Argument.  
Second, the ‘moderate’ interpretation of the Public Goods Argument takes us back 
to the discussion of the Numbers-Harm Thesis in Chapter IV. The moderate version 
of the Public Goods Argument contends that, although individual non-combatants 
are holders of a negative right not to be attacked, intervening combatants are justified 
in not fulfilling its correlative duty. On this view, the Public Goods Argument ‘tips 
the balance’ in favour of a justified infringement of the right not to be attacked. To 
support the moderate interpretation, we may draw a parallel between the Public 
Goods Argument and current legal practice in Western jurisdictions, most notably 
the US legal system. The US constitution considers the confiscation of private 
property by the state in the name of public interest as a rights infringement.257  
Needless to say, because it views the non-intentional killing of non-combatants as a 
rights infringement, the moderate interpretation of the Public Goods Argument has 
important implications for the use of self-defensive force. Unlike perpetrators of 
Atrocities Crimes, the target state’s non-combatants are excused for resisting 
intervening combatants.  
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This, of course, raises the question whether intervening combatants are allowed to 
defend themselves against non-combatants. Again, there are two views on this issue.    
First, as was already indicated in Chapter III, Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that 
those who threaten a right lose their own right not to be attacked.258 While 
Thomson’s position had little relevance to the discussion of combatant liability in 
Chapter IV, it is more interesting in the context of non-combatant immunity. 
Following Thomson’s theory, it is possible to argue that, because Richard, the relief 
bomber, ‘threatens’ the rights of non-combatants in the target state, he forfeits his 
right not to be attacked. It is possible to contend, then, that non-combatants in the 
target state hold a right to self-defence against Richard. To wit, they hold Richard 
under a duty not to defend himself against their counterattack.  
But as Jeff McMahan points out, it is counterintuitive to suppose that posing a 
justified threat leads to the forfeiture of one’s rights.259 In fact, against the background 
of the Atrocity Paradigm, Thomson’s view seems implausible because it blurs the 
distinction between violations of natural duties and the justified infringement of basic 
rights. One reason for why principal perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes and their 
accessories forfeit their rights is that they are engaged in intolerable and inexcusable 
forms of wrongdoing. But the same cannot be said about Richard. His actions, insofar 
as they are constrained by the rules of JIB, are not intolerable. Nor, as the Public 
Goods Argument shows, are they inexcusable. Thomson’s approach overlooks that 
there are different ways to threaten a right. Intuitively, our moral assessment of these 
types of threats differs. 
(2) Instead, it seems, both parties, Richard and his non-combatant victims, are at 
least excused for harming each other in self-defence. While neither of the two parties 
forfeits its right not to be attacked, both have an agent-relative excuse for harming 
each other. In this sense, the present case is analogous to the problem of self/other- 
defence against non-responsible attackers discussed in the preceding chapter. The 
same also applies to the status of third parties and special relationships. Given the 
argumentation of Chapter IV, while an appeal to special relationships does not have 
greater relevance for the actions of intervening combatants who act in defence of 
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Richard, members of a family, tribe or village can be excused for assisting fellow 
members who have come under attack from Richard.       
In sum, the Public Goods Argument leaves intact one of the central claims of this 
thesis, namely that the target state and its combatants are under a duty not to repel 
the interveners. The argument that non-combatants are excused for defending 
themselves against intervening combatants does not undermine the existence of a 
right to intervene. Furthermore, the Public Goods Argument is attractive because, 
unlike the contractualist solutions of the problem of non-combatant immunity 
discussed in Chapter II, it directly stresses the relevance of the concepts of 
sovereignty and citizenship for JIB without taking a theoretical detour via a 
hypothetical procedure.     
Before we turn the problem of proportionality in Part IV, let us note that the Public 
Goods Argument has two interesting implications for our thinking about 
proportionality. First, as was mentioned in Part I, the Orthodox View assumes that 
the non-intentional killing of non-combatants is permissible, regardless of the 
justness of a cause. In the literature on the just war, it is well known that the 
relationship between the Orthodox View’s Independence Thesis and DDE is far 
from harmonious. For DDE, the permission to non-intentionally kill non-
combatants is always subject to proportionality.260 Yet it seems impossible to reach a 
sound assessment of proportionality without recourse to the justness of the 
respective causes. How, in other words, are we to judge whether the negative side 
effect is proportionate to the intended main effect?  
Defenders of the Orthodox View must provide a normatively sound answer to this 
question. If we take the ends-not-means-thesis seriously, we owe the innocent a 
justification for why they are being put in harm’s way. DDE must not be viewed as a 
moral carte blanche for killing the innocent during war. Rather, it needs to be 
embedded within wider considerations of the justice of respective wars. In the 
context of MHI, The Public Goods Argument can provide us with the necessary 
normative background that justifies the imposition of (proportionate) risks on non-
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combatants. Negative duties not to harm the innocent are stringent, but the need to 
secure the public good of a sovereign order means that it is proportionate to 
sometimes infringe them.       
Second, recall the aforementioned objection that it would be immoral for Mr. 
Clinton to order Mr. Clark to kill Mrs. Petrovic. Indeed, such an order would 
constitute nothing but an assassination attempt! But considered within the overall 
context of the intervention, the Public Goods Argument gives interveners the 
permission to impose, say, a 1:10000 risk on Red’s residents of falling victim to a 
non-intentional attack during MHI. The value of proportionality demands that this 
risk is balanced against the risks arising from mass murder. If there was, say, a 1:100 
or even a 1:10 chance of falling victim to Atrocity Crimes, the imposition of the 
1:10000 risk to be non-intentionally killed by intervening combatants seems justified. 
IV  
The problem of proportionality and the conduct of military humanitarian 
intervention 
A. Counting Harm: proportionality, necessity and responsibility  
It is perhaps not surprising that the problem of non-combatant immunity first 
surfaces in the academic literature on MHI after NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, 
which almost exclusively relied on air power. NATO also heavily targeted non-
military infrastructure during the campaign. But notwithstanding the wide-spread 
misgivings about the allegedly disproportionate nature of NATO’s conduct, the 
application of the proportionality is difficult. As one commentator succinctly puts it, 
although everyone agrees that proportionality is an important value, the real 
challenge consists in its correct application.261 Though it will be difficult to give 
precise recommendations in terms of military strategy, this section seeks to draw out 
the implications of proportionality for the conduct of MHI.  
In order to shed light on the issue, let us begin with some reflections on the structure 
of proportionality-based assessments of military acts. Following Larry May, when 
determining whether a specific military act is proportionate, it needs to be assessed 
whether 
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1. there is serious harm that should be prevented; 
2. the harm is likely to occur or, indeed, imminent; 
3. there is another, less problematic way to prevent the harm; 
4. the proposed means cause less harm than is prevented.262     
 
These four points illustrate the close relationship between necessity and 
proportionality. In particular, the second and third criteria demand that alternative 
options need to have been exhausted before the intervening party is permitted to 
engage in a specific military act. If there is an alternative act that achieves similar 
results but causes less harm, it is obligatory for the intervening party to perform it 
instead. By contrast, the first and fourth criteria ask us to identify and balance 
relevant goods and harms against each other. In doing so, they give rise to two 
questions. First, what should be considered as relevant goods and harms? Second, 
how are goods and harms to be balanced?    
In regard to the first question, the relevant goods consist in (1) the protection of 
victims of Atrocity Crimes and (2) the re-establishment of a sovereign order in the 
target state. The list of harms is broader but essentially involves three types of costs: 
(1) loss of life (all parties); (2) other strategic and economic costs to the interveners; 
(3) other costs to individuals in the target state, including a) destruction of private 
property; b) destruction of cultural objects; c) damage to civilian infrastructure. It is 
difficult to answer, though, how these different items should be balanced against 
each other. First, it demands clarification whether interveners are only obliged to 
count the harms for which they are responsible. Second, it must be determined 
whether all relevant harms should be counted equally or differentially. Of course, 
while the second point is, first and foremost, relevant for the question how different 
lives are to be weighed against each other. But it must also be considered to what 
extent lives and, say, economic costs are to be balanced against each other.  
It is easier, however, to begin with the question whether the interveners are only 
obliged to count those harms for which they are responsible. To recapitulate some of 
the arguments from Chapter III, imagine that if the victim threatens the attacker with 
defensive force, the latter is going to vent his frustration on the bystander.263 In 
                                                           
262 (ibid.) p. 205 
263 Hurka, ‘Proportionality in the Morality of War’, pp. 46-47.  
178 
 
defending herself, the victim is allowed to primarily attend to her own interests and 
cannot be expected to sacrifice herself so the bystander is spared. It would be equally 
odd if the victim was considered causally or morally responsible for the bystanders’ 
death. It is, after all, the attacker who decides to harm the bystander. This is not to 
say that the victim should not give the bystander’s interests any weight; for example, 
if the victim had the choice between two (roughly) equally costly options, y1 (the 
victim is saved and the attacker is not able to attack the bystander) and y2 (the victim 
is saved but the attacker is able to attack the bystander), the victim should chose y1. 
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that victims of unjust aggression are obliged 
to ensure that their own use of force is not disproportionate.  
By contrast, as we argued in Chapter III, unlike the victim, the rescuer’s life is not 
threatened by the attacker. Thus the rescuer must carefully assess the impact of his 
other-defensive use of force on the bystander. By analogy, it cannot be the case, 
then, that interveners should only concentrate on the proportionality of those harms 
they are going to cause. When deciding on their strategies intervening parties must 
keep the overall security situation in the target state in mind and assess the impact of 
their actions on it, regardless of whether they are responsible for certain harms or 
not. Strategies that undermine the security of those in the target state are almost 
always disproportionate. It remains a moot point, though, whether interveners 
should give harm for which they are not responsible exactly the same weight as harm 
for which they are responsible. This might be overdemanding. Arguably, interveners 
should be allowed to give those harms for which they are not responsible slightly less 
weight.   
To give an example, Operation Horseshoe was an intense ethnic cleansing campaign 
perpetrated by Serbian paramilitaries against ethnic Kosovo Albanians that peaked 
during NATO’s bombardment of Serbia. It has often been alleged that NATO’s 
action against Serbia sparked off or at least contributed to the intensification of 
Operation Horseshoe. If this was true, NATO’s bombing campaign would have 
been highly disproportionate, regardless the fact that responsibility for Operation 
Horseshoe rested with Milosevic and Serbian (para-) military leaders. However, as 
Alex Bellamy points out, there are indicators that Operation Horseshoe could have 
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started up to a week prior to the bombings.264 Now, if that was the case, NATO’s 
bombing campaign might have been disproportionate because it was ineffective. 
Those defending NATO’s action could argue that NATO’s leadership could not 
have known in advance whether the strategy was going to work. But a commitment 
to proportionality demands that regular reviews of one’s strategy and its effectiveness 
are undertaken. In any case, it would have been wrong for NATO not to take into 
account the possible effects of its actions on the security situation in Kosovo.  
Note that the above discussion relied on implicit value judgments about how to 
weigh lives against each other. We assumed that interveners should primarily take 
into account the harm that they or another party is going to inflict on non-
combatants in the target state. But, in reality, the application of the proportionality 
criterion to military conflict is much more complex. Part B discusses how different 
lives should be weighed.   
B. Weighing lives and choosing tactics          
Any treatment of proportionality must include an account of how lives are to be 
balanced against each other. This can be done in two ways. First, most of the 
literature on just war theory concentrates on how one should balance harm between 
different categories of individuals. Let us call this kind of reasoning inter-
proportionality. Second, given the arguments in the previous chapter, the Neo-
Classical View requires that we balance the lives of individuals who fall into the same 
category against each other. Let us call this intra-proportionality. One of the 
Orthodox View’s shortcomings is that it offers a rather monolithic account of 
different categories, especially with regard to combatants. This is so because the 
Orthodox View mostly relies on judgements about inter-proportionality. In what 
follows, we will readjust the balance between intra- and inter-proportionality 
assessments somewhat, thereby lending further support to the Neo-Classical View. 
The idea of intra-proportionality stresses that, in order to make sound judgements 
about proportionality, we must take into account an agent’s moral responsibility and 
culpability for a forced choice between lives. For instance, as was observed in 
Chapter IV, it is permissible to inflict a higher degree of harm on culpable 
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perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes than on those perpetrators who act under duress. 
Similarly, the Chain of Command Argument contends that it may be preferable to 
attack the political leadership of the target state rather than young conscripts. The 
general rule is that judgements of proportionality become more permissive when an 
agent has a high degree of moral agency. On the other hand, if the moral agency of 
the potential target is severely restrained, criteria of proportionality become more 
restrictive.    
Now, some just war theorists hold that a (just) party is allowed to bring about almost 
unlimited numbers of enemy combatant casualties in the pursuit of its cause.265 In 
conjunction with the Neo-Classical View, the idea of intra-proportionality challenges 
this type of reasoning by maintaining that we must distinguish between different 
types of enemy combatants. For instance, it is not proportionate to kill any number 
of young and inexperienced conscripts when a swift strike against their culpable 
commanders would bring the war to a close.   
To be fair, the argument that it is permissible to bring about any number of enemy 
casualties is usually made in the context of inter-proportionality assessments between 
one’s own combatants and enemy combatants. While an intervening state cannot 
expect to eradicate all risks for its troops, the number of enemy combatants its 
soldiers are allowed to kill will be fairly high. First, as Chapter IV showed, many 
perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes are culpable for their acts. There is no limitation on 
the number of culpable attackers one may kill in self- or other-defence. Second, it is, 
one should stress, the responsibility of the leadership of the target state not to waste 
the lives of its soldiers through unjust resistance.266  
A graver challenge is posed by child soldiers and other types of non-responsible 
attackers. But although intervening soldiers should accept slightly greater risks when 
confronting non-responsible attackers, the problem should be dealt with via the idea 
of intra-proportionality. Killing a non-responsible attacker is a last resort once killing 
his commander(s) has failed.  
Having focused on proportionality assessments amongst combatants, the more 
interesting aspect of the debate about proportionality concerns the status of non-
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combatants in the target state. We must ask how to balance the lives of non-
combatants against each other (intra-proportionality) and against those of the 
intervening soldiers (inter-proportionality).  
Starting with intra-proportionality, as the Public Goods Argument’s analogy with the 
military draft indicates, it is permissible for intervening combatants to inflict a slightly 
higher degree of harm on non-combatants_citizens than non-combatants_non-citizens. 
Although it is difficult to offer a precise ratio according to which citizens and non-
citizens should be balanced against each other, the demands of proportionality are 
stricter in the case of non-combatants_non-citizens. 
Second, the idea of intra-proportionality has ramifications for what we can refer to as 
‘contextual’ and ‘background’ assessments of proportionality. Suppose that Richard’s 
attack on the army units would end the siege but bring about the foreseeable deaths 
of fifty non-combatants in the city (call this Rescue Bomber I). Considering that 
thousands of people in the city would be saved from starvation, foreseeably causing 
the fifty non-combatants deaths in the city is proportionate in that context 
(contextual proportionality). But now suppose that, in a slightly different scenario, 
Richard could use more powerful bombs and destroy almost all of the army units 
around the city (Rescue Bombing II). This meant that the target state would be 
significantly weakened in carrying out its campaign of Atrocity Crimes. However, in 
Rescue Bombing II, as a side effect of foreseeable side of Richard’s actions, two 
hundred non-combatants in the city are going to die.  
Within the context of the situation (‘the siege’) it may seem excessive if Richard, by 
embarking on Rescue Bombing II, brings about four times more non-combatants 
casualties than in Rescue Bombing I (contextual proportionality). But when viewed 
against the background of the intervention as a whole, Rescue Bombing II could be 
proportionate (background proportionality). Acts that seem disproportionate in a 
specific context, then, can still be proportionate when placed within the overall 
context of the campaign. Consequently, assessments of intra-proportionality (not to 
mention inter-proportionality) require that the death of the higher number of non-
combatants in Rescue Bombing II should be balanced against the number of 
potential non-combatant deaths that may follow from a continuation of the 
campaign. Since background proportionality relies on estimates about the number of 
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potential victims, the lives of those non-combatants who are (definitely) going to die in 
Rescue Bombing II should be given slightly more weight. 
One of the most difficult and controversial issues for theories of MHI involves inter-
proportionality assessments between the lives of intervening soldiers and non-
combatants in the target state. Walzer’s criterion of ‘due care’ demands that 
combatants incur greater risks, but it is difficult to put any precise numbers on the 
ratio at which non-combatant and combatant lives should be weighed. For example, 
Hurka suggests a 1:1 ratio with regard to self-defensive wars, but this will almost 
certainly be subject to dispute.267 Intervening governments are confronted with the 
following problem. On the one hand, the intervening government is under a special 
duty to protect its soldiers from harm. For instance, it has been said numerous times 
that this was the reason for why NATO opted for a bombing strategy in the Kosovo 
war, though, as we shall see below, this was not the only consideration.268 On the 
other hand, since non-combatants in the target state are in an extremely vulnerable 
position, they also deserve protection.  
It is difficult to see how these two impulses can be neatly reconciled. Perhaps we can 
solve the problem by reflecting on the broader strategies that interveners should use. 
First, as we will see in more detail in Chapter VI, intervening states should not rely 
on conscripts, but rather use professional soldiers with experience. Second, the value 
of proportionality demands that intervening states do everything to prevent an 
escalation of the conflict. This is in the interest of all parties, for any escalation will 
not only unnecessarily endanger the lives of soldiers but also those of non-
combatants. This was also one of the considerations behind the bombing strategy in 
Kosovo.269 The early deployment of ground troops could have led to an escalation of 
the conflict, including a possible intervention by Russia, where non-combatants 
would have been caught between the two fronts, not to mention a high death toll 
amongst the intervening troops.  
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This leads us back to the earlier debate about strategic and relief bombing. The 
former is probably best understood as a response to a specific situation (e.g. a siege), 
whereas the latter, as its name suggests, seeks to accomplish broader aims within the 
conflict as a whole. In addition to relief bombing, it can be proportionate for 
interveners to adopt a policy of strategic bombing. The latter potentially protects the 
lives of the intervening soldiers and may prevent the escalation of conflict that could 
result in a far higher non-combatant death toll. In this respect, NATO’s campaign in 
Kosovo could be considered as proportionate.  
This is not to say, though, that ground troops should never be used. To the contrary, 
they will play an important role at some stage of the intervention because, once air 
supremacy has been established,  there are some goals, such as the provision of basic 
security for victims of Atrocity Crimes, the return of refugees, and the separation of 
hostile ethnic groups, that cannot be accomplished via air power. A prolonged 
presence of ground troops might, therefore, be important and necessary if the 
renewed outbreak of Atrocity Crimes (possibly for revenge) is to be prevented.  
If this sound, there is a strong case for gaining air supremacy before deploying 
ground troops in order to minimise the risk for foot soldiers to come under attack. 
Ideally, this would entail the adoption of the ‘head-of-the-snake-first’ approach 
mentioned in Part II. Moreover, once the situation on the ground has been made 
more secure, ground troops would be enabled to devote greater resources into the 
provision of humanitarian assistance to those in need. Of course, it is naïve to 
suggest that air supremacy can eradicate all risks for ground troops. Indeed, 
intervening states cannot expect to keep the number of their own casualties to zero, 
for this would mean that all costs would have to be borne by those who are the most 
vulnerable. This cannot be right. That said, intervening states are under a duty to 
minimise the risks for their own soldiers and a campaign of strategic bombing, at 
least in the initial phase of the intervention, may play an important part in doing so.     
Let us briefly return to NATO’s apparent inability to stop Operation Horseshoe. To 
assess whether the bombing of Serbia was proportionate, we would have to compare 
its effects with the possible consequences of a ground invasion. If the latter would 
have been far less costly in terms of lives and more effective in stopping the ethnic 
cleansing, the bombing would have been disproportionate. Still, the problem remains 
that more intervening soldiers would have died in a ground invasion than during the 
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bombing. Perhaps a middle position is possible. NATO should have gained air 
supremacy first and then dispatched some of its ground troops. This was discussed 
by Prime Minster Blair and President Clinton towards the end of the campaign. 
Fortunately Milosevic suddenly and unexpectedly surrendered before the issue could 
have been taken further.270 At the time of writing, however, NATO still has a strong 
ground presence in Kosovo, which was dispatched after the surrender.   
Although it may raise an eyebrow or two, considerations of (inter-) proportionality 
can sometimes be favourable towards the use of strategic bombing in order prevent 
an escalation of the conflict and minimise risks to intervening soldiers, provided the 
strategy acts as a precursor to the deployment of ground troops in order to address 
some of the wider humanitarian problems. But note that NATO’s intervention 
campaign was also controversial because of its heavy bombardment of Serbia’s 
(civilian) infrastructure. Part C tackles this problem.     
C. Property and Infrastructural Damage  
The last issue we face is how to weigh lives against harms that arise from the 
destruction of private property or cultural objects. Both are important. Private 
property may be essential to the realisation of a conception of the good life, while 
certain cultural objects, such as churches, monuments or other historic buildings, 
often symbolise what communities value in their collective existence.271 While it 
would be wrong for interveners not to take this into account, the protection of 
property and cultural objects must always be subordinate to the protection of life, 
either of non-combatants in the target state or intervening soldiers.  
To illustrate the point, imagine that Sergei, a sniper, is hiding in a church tower in 
order to fire at a long stream of refugees passing by. Roger could fire a missile into 
the church, thereby disabling Sergei from continuing his attack. The fact that the 
church is an important cultural object is no reason not to fire the missile. The same 
would hold if the intervening soldiers themselves were under attack.       
However, a much graver problem arises when civilian infrastructure is implicated in 
the perpetration of Atrocity Crimes. Suppose that the interveners would have to 
destroy the main road that is simultaneously used to transport food to the capital and 
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deport victims to extermination camps by truck. According to contemporary just war 
terminology, the main road is a ‘dual infrastructure target’, as it serves civilian and 
military purposes. Its destruction would be an important and seemingly 
proportionate step to end Atrocity Crimes, but since food supplies are disrupted, 
would cause misery to non-combatants in the capital. Although the issue has hardly 
received any attention in the literature, there are three possible solutions to the 
problem of dual infrastructure targets. 
The first urges us to distinguish between dispensable and indispensable 
infrastructure. But any distinction along these lines is arbitrary. For example, not 
being able to use the phone for a month might be annoying because Amy will not be 
able to talk to my friends (dispensable). On the other hand, if Ben suffers a heart 
attack and has to call an ambulance, a phone does not seem that dispensable 
anymore. Moreover, indispensable infrastructure, such as hospitals, will often depend 
on what may count as dispensable infrastructure (roads). If this is sound, the first 
solution must be rejected.   
The second approach, which is formulated by Henry Shue, appeals to DDE. It is 
permissible, writes Shue, to destroy dual infrastructure targets if (and only if) the 
agent intends to destroy its military component, foreseeing the destruction of its 
non-military component.272 But this argument rests on the misapplication of DDE. If 
Smith destroys a power plant, he intends to destroy it as an object with a single 
function (generating electricity) that just happens to be used in different ways. It is 
hard to see how one can normatively and conceptually distinguish between the 
removal of a resource from perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes and the non-intentional 
infliction of harm on non-combatants whose homes are connected to the power 
station. In this way, the destruction of the power plant differs from the destruction 
of the weapons factory in the strategic bombing example mentioned earlier. 
Destroying the function of the weapons factory (producing weapons) is entirely 
unrelated to the (foreseen) harm caused to non-combatants in the nearby settlement. 
For this reason it is not clear that DDE can be applied to dual infrastructure targets.    
This leaves us with the third approach, which appeals to the concept of a rights 
infringement. Non-combatants do not forfeit their subsistence rights and, therefore, 
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continue to hold other parties under a duty not to deprive them of their means of 
subsistence. If military necessity dictates that these (correlative) duties must be 
overridden, this does not mean that they miraculously disappear. The intervening 
party acquires some positive duties of assistance to help those whose rights are being 
infringed. Needless to say, these duties of assistance cannot be too demanding. 
Interveners cannot be expected to divert enormous resources into providing non-
combatants with services. This would be disproportionate and impractical because it 
is bound to undermine the actual aims of the intervention.  
Fortunately there are two ways to deal with the issue of costs. First, interveners are 
only under a duty to provide some goods that are of high importance (food, 
medication, tents), which can be delivered via aircraft in the initial phase of 
intervention. Depending on the situation, they may also have to dispatch small 
numbers of ground troops to assist with the distribution of goods. Second, especially 
in cases where the dispatch of ground troops is either not possible or severely 
restricted, interveners should cooperate closely with humanitarian organisations. 
Unlike international humanitarian law, contemporary just war theory does not pay 
much attention to humanitarian organisations. The other-defensive conception of 
MHI assumes that interveners are under a positive duty to offer some logistical 
assistance to humanitarian organisations (e.g. airlifting doctors to a particular area) 
and protect them from attack. Interveners will also be under a strong negative duty 
to avoid tactics that may undermine the operational capacity of humanitarian 
organisations in the target state.  
Of course, for these considerations to be relevant it must be shown that a certain 
aspect of the infrastructure can be identified as a dual-infrastructure target, serving 
civilian as well as military purposes. To use a real life example, there are doubts that 
this was the case with all the infrastructural targets (factories and airports) that 
NATO attacked in Serbia during the Kosovo campaign. Rather, it seems that 
NATO’s bombing campaign was designed to increase the pressure on Milosevic to 
surrender or possibly stir up unrest amongst the Serbs to dispose of their 
government.273 This does not seem to fall within the area of legitimate infrastructure-
targeting and NATO’s response might have well been disproportionate here. 
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In sum, the proposed solution to the problem of dual infrastructure targets 
constitutes an important departure from how JIB-specific moral duties have 
traditionally been conceived. As Gary J. Bass points out, just war theory usually 
stresses the importance of negative duties, i.e. the duty not to torture prisoners of 
war, the duty not to use intentional force against non-combatants, the duty not to use 
banned weapons etc.274 However, the above arguments indicates that, at least in the 
context of MHI, interveners also acquire positive duties of assistance towards non-
combatants in the target state. From a humanitarian perspective, it would do an 
awful lot of good to extend the argument beyond MHI and, more specifically, the 
issue of dual infrastructure targets. Surely, in any type of war, the innocent would 
benefit from humanitarian assistance. Though warring parties might have few 
resources to spare, providing some logistical assistance to humanitarian organisations 
could potentially make an enormous difference. JIB should be revised accordingly.          
V 
Conclusion  
This chapter sought to delineate principles for the conduct of MHI by critically 
engaging with the Orthodox View. It rejected the latter for three reasons. First, the 
Orthodox View cannot account for the conceptual distinction between combatants 
and non-combatants. A better foundation is provided by the Neo-Classical View 
which maintains that moral responsibility, rather than material responsibility, should 
determine who counts as a non-combatant. The resulting Chain of Command 
Argument, together with the Argument from Derivative Liability, broadens the scope 
of the category of combatants, while restricting the category of non-combatants.   
Second, the chapter presented an argument in favour of the infliction of foreseeable 
harms on non-combatants during MHI. Contrary to the Orthodox View, it showed 
that the non-intentional killing of non-combatants cannot be justified independently 
of the just cause criterion. Appealing to the Public Goods Argument, the chapter 
defended the moral permission to non-intentionally kill non-combatants. But it also 
contended that the latter are excused for defending themselves.  
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Lastly, the chapter provided a critical ‘neo-classical’ perspective on the problem of 
proportionality. It offered a more differentiated picture of inter- and intra-
proportionality assessments than the Orthodox View. In order to determine whether 
a particular act is excessive, interveners must take into account different levels of 
moral responsibility. Yet, controversially, the chapter argued that interveners are 
allowed to use strategic bombing as part of their strategy. But contrary to the almost 
exclusive emphasis on negative duties in JIB, the interveners have positive duties to 
assist humanitarian organisations and/or deliver some basic humanitarian aid 
themselves during such a bombing campaign.  
Somewhat paradoxically, one can describe the arguments as relaxing and restricting 
some of JIB’s central assumptions. On the one hand, the chapter relaxes the narrow 
conceptual distinction between combatants and non-combatants. On the other hand, 
from a normative perspective, it restricts what can be permissibly done to non-
combatants during a military campaign. If anything, this illustrates the complexity of 
JIB.   
Having offered a philosophical treatment of what should count as ‘just conduct’ in 
MHI, we have, in conjunction with the arguments from the preceding two chapters, 
established the permissibility of MHI. We must find out whether, as R2P assumes, 
MHI is also obligatory. That is the task of the next chapter.   
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Chapter VI 
Remedial responsibility for Atrocity Crimes 
 
It is morally unjustifiable and politically indefensible that members of the armed forces 
should be killed to prevent Somalis from killing each other.  
(Samuel P. Huntingdon on the US intervention in Somalia)275  
 
As citizens we must prevent wrong-doing since the world we all share, wrong-doer, 
wrong-sufferer and spectator, is at stake.  
(Hannah Arendt).276 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
275 M. Smith, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: An overview of the ethical issues’, Ethics and International 
Affairs, Vol. 12/Issue 1 (1998), pp. 63-79; at p. 63.  
276 H. Arendt; quoted in: L. May, Sharing responsibility, p. xi. 
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I 
The right to be rescued 
Previous chapters have largely been concerned with the assignment of what David 
Miller calls outcome responsibility for Atrocity Crimes and its implications for 
establishing liability to attack.277 This chapter, on the other hand, is interested in what 
Miller calls ‘remedial responsibility’. In other words, its purpose is to inquire who is 
responsible for halting mass killing via military force. As was stressed in preceding 
chapters, the other-defensive conception of MHI can be seen as a philosophical 
attempt to make sense of R2P. The latter, obviously, emphasises that MHI is not 
only morally permissible, but also obligatory. Further, as was observed in Chapter I, 
one important task for political philosophers is to specify our duties towards those 
threatened by Atrocity Crimes.    
Since the other-defensive conception of MHI is statist in orientation, the chapter 
argues that states are bearers of remedial responsibilities for Atrocity Crimes.278 
Continuing our search for reflective equilibrium, it draws an analogy between the 
duty to intervene in international society and what Cecile Fabre calls mandatory 
rescue killings in domestic society.279 Put simply, just as individuals are under an 
obligation to kill an attacker on behalf of a victim, states are obliged to declare an 
other-defensive war to aid non-citizens threatened by Atrocity Crimes. In a nutshell, 
Fabre’s argument in defence of (domestic) mandatory rescue killings has a fourfold 
structure, encompassing what we can call the Assistance Condition, Resource-Service 
Condition, Use of Force Condition, and Violation Conclusion. Each of these 
conditions is qualified by what we can call the Autonomy Constraint:  
                                                           
277 Miller, National responsibility and global justice , chapter IV.     
278 The duty to intervene, Kok-Chor Tan opines, should be assigned to a specific global body, i.e. 
something approximating Gillian Brock’s Vital Interest Protection Organisation discussed in Chapter 
II. Because the conception of MHI as an other-defensive war is critical of the enforcement conception 
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& T. Nardin (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention, NOMOS VOL 47 (New York: New York University 
Press, pp. 286-289. For two recent philosophical defences of the duty to intervene, see A. Buchanan, 
‘The internal legitimacy of humanitarian intervention’, Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 7/Issue 1 
(1999), pp. 71-87; reprinted in A. Buchanan, Human rights, legitimacy and the use of force (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), pp. 201-217 & R. Vernon, Cosmopolitan Regard: Political membership and global 
justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chapter 5; J Davidovic, ‘Are Humanitarian 
Military Interventions Obligatory?’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 25/No.2 (2008), pp.134-144. 
279 C. Fabre, ‘Mandatory rescue killings’, Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 15/Issue 4 (2007), pp. 363-
384.  
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1. The Assistance Condition: Individuals in possession of relevant resources owe 
positive duties of (non-lethal) assistance to the needy, provided the rendering 
of aid does not deprive them of the opportunity for a minimally decent life 
(Autonomy Constraint). In Hohfeldian terms, needy individuals hold a claim 
to life-saving resources against individuals in a position to help, subject to the 
Autonomy Constraint.      
2. The Resource-Service Condition: If 1) obtains, individuals in possession of 
relevant personal capacities are obliged to render personal services to the 
needy, provided that doing so does not deprive them of the opportunity for a 
minimally decent life. In Hohfeldian terms, the needy hold a claim to 
personal services against those with the personal capacity to help, subject to 
the Autonomy Constraint.         
3. The Use of Force Condition: If 1) and 2) obtain, individuals are under a positive 
duty to render ‘lethal assistance’ to defenceless victims of an attacker by 
killing the latter (subject to necessity and proportionality), provided that 
doing so does not deprive them of the opportunity for a minimally decent 
life. In Hohfeldian terms, victims hold a claim to be defended against an 
attacker against potential rescuers, subject to the Autonomy Constraint.       
4. The Rights Violation Argument: If 1), 2), and 3) obtain, failures to kill the 
attacker amount to a violation of V’s right to be rescued, subject to the 
Autonomy Constraint.        
This chapter applies this mode of reasoning to MHI. It does not, however, provide a 
detailed defence of the Assistance Condition. In addition to considerations of space, 
it has now been well established by participants in the global justice debate that the 
well-off are under a duty to assist the needy, regardless of where they reside. It is 
open to dispute how extensive these obligations are. But generally, it is uncontested 
that absolute deprivation warrants assistance.  
One of the most interesting aspects of Fabre’s argument is that the victim is the 
holder of a right to be rescued against a potential third party. The other-defensive 
conception of MHI follows this claim by arguing that those threatened by Atrocity 
Crimes also have a right to be rescued.280 Before we can outline a defence of remedial 
                                                           
280 As we saw in Chapter II, Michael Walzer maintains that MHI is mandatory because domestic 
conflicts undermine the security of the international community. This argument is not only empirically 
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responsibility for Atrocity Crimes, let us first note a number of preliminary points 
about the right to be rescued.  
First, based on our earlier discussion of basic rights and natural duties, individuals 
threatened by Atrocity Crimes have strong interests not to be subjected to intolerable 
harm. Following the interest theory of rights, these interests are sufficiently weighty 
to hold potential rescuers under a duty to intervene. But for the other-defensive 
conception of MHI, our individual interests not to be subjected to intolerable harm 
do not exhaust the justification of the right to be rescued. As Chapter III argued, the 
liberal legalist view that sovereignty is an enabling condition reflects that those in the 
target state have collective interests in sovereign institutions. Thus, while the right to 
be rescued can be understood as an individual right held by individual victims of 
Atrocity Crimes against potential interveners, it is also a collective right held by the 
residents of the target state against third parties capable of stabilising the target state. 
Second, unlike the collective right to be rescued, the notion of an individual right to 
be rescued from Atrocity Crimes raises an important problem. No matter how 
quickly and carefully potential interveners respond to Atrocity Crimes, it will never 
be possible to rescue every single victim. Suppose Blue has the choice of rescuing 
victimsvillage and victimstown. Because it is easier for Blue to reach the village via 
helicopter, it opts in favour of rescuing victimsvillage. The question is whether 
victimstown’s rights to be rescued have been violated by Blue’s actions. This is not the 
case because it is a commonplace that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. While individual victims 
of Atrocity Crimes have rights to be rescued, the intervening state is not under a duty 
to rescue any particular individual. Unless specific victims have entered into ‘rescue 
contracts’ with specific rescuers, rescuers are only obliged to rescue as many victims 
as they ‘can’ rescue.  
Third, in the case of domestic mandatory rescue killings, the Autonomy Constraint 
limits the costs potential rescuers are morally required to incur when assisting others. 
Since the other-defensive conception of MHI supposes that states are duty bearers, it 
is necessary to clarify how the Autonomy Constraint must be understood in the 
context of MHI. Following our discussion of proportionality in Chapter III, potential 
intervening states are not obliged to intervene if MHI made it impossible for the 
                                                                                                                                                               
intervening state. If the crisis in the target state led to the destabilisation of neighbouring states, the 
latter are indeed obliged to protect their citizens. But we are not going to pursue this point further 
here.  
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state to maintain its own sovereign domestic order. As we said in Chapter III, the 
duty to protect rights abroad must not come at the expense of protecting them at 
home.   
With these three preliminary comments out of the way, we need to tackle four 
further issues. First, it needs to be shown how far states can be bearers of rights. 
Second, in addition to the interest theory of rights, we must offer a more precise 
account of the justification of the duty to intervene. Third, we need to engage with 
the problem of mandatory killing introduced in Chapter I. This is so because states 
cannot discharge their duties without the assistance of individuals.    
Part II starts by offering a general examination of whether it is possible to assign 
duties of assistance to states. Part III then examines the link between the Assistance 
and Use of Force Conditions by developing the Egalitarian Argument, while Part IV 
develops the Argument from Shared Outcome Responsibility. Part V turns to the 
problem of mandatory killing identified in Chapter I.  
II 
Meeting claims of assistance together 
In this part of the chapter, let us discuss how far it is desirable and possible to assign 
duties of assistance to states. According to David Miller, for instance, states should 
not be the prime bearers of remedial responsibility. His first concern is that the 
assignment of remedial responsibility to states neglects the status and responsibilities 
of non-state actors in politics.281 Moreover, if (remedial) responsibility rests with 
states, the costs of state action cannot be distributed amongst individuals. The 
solution to these two problems, Miller argues, is to assign remedial responsibilities to 
nations, independently of states. This is possible because fellow nationals a) 
contribute to collective activities via a shared mindset and b) benefit from shared 
national practices. Insofar as states enter into the debate, they are ‘secondary’ bearers 
of remedial responsibility, as they exercise power on behalf of nations. 
The other-defensive conception of MHI also treats states as secondary rather than 
‘primary’, bearers of remedial responsibility. First, the Domestic Analogy maintains 
that states do not hold any rights independently of those under their rule. As was 
                                                           
281 Miller, National responsibility and global justice.   
194 
 
argued in Chapter III, MHI is nothing more than the coordinated mass exercise of 
rights to engage in other-defence. Second and directly related to the preceding point, 
natural duties usually govern relations between individuals, regardless of communal 
affiliation. Crucially natural duties do not merely include duties not to harm; they also 
include duties to render humanitarian assistance to the needy. For these two reasons 
it is logical that any account of the state-held duty to intervene is founded upon 
individual duties.        
Interestingly, as Christopher Kutz observes, obligations of assistance (or natural 
justice), especially if they are owed to the distant needy, must be met together if they are 
to be met at all.282 This reflects our use of language, as the (distant) needy usually 
make claims on a ‘rescuer group’, rather than any individual rescuer. Indeed, there is 
little individual rescuers can do to halt Atrocity Crimes without assistance from 
others. As a result, individual duties of assistance do not simply lead to a vertical 
relationship between rescuers and the needy. Instead, individuals owe some duties 
towards those with whom they are engaged in a rescue operation. That is, some 
duties are owed horizontally between members of the collective charged with remedial 
responsibility. Vertical relationships, by contrast, obtain between the rescuer group 
and the needy. 
If Kutz is right, the relations between members of the rescuer group are important 
for the assignment of remedial responsibility. Groups can only be identified as moral 
agents bearing remedial responsibility if, in addition to holding resources in common 
that make the rescue of the needy possible, their individual members share a 
common life. In this light, Miller’s invocation of nationalism seems sensible. But 
whatever one may think about the enthusiasm for nationalism amongst some liberal 
philosophers, liberal nationalists are generally too optimistic about the congruence 
between nations and potential intervening states. On the one hand, considering the 
case of Germany after World War II, states can divide nations.283 On the other hand, 
many alleged ‘nation states’ are, in fact, home to different nations.  
Liberal legalism may act as a normatively more attractive alternative to nationalism. 
Liberal legalists maintain that being subject to the coercive institutions of the law 
puts members of a legal system into special relationships with each other. Unlike 
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liberal nationalism, liberal legalism rests on the recognition that, as was observed in 
Chapter III, individuals have interdependent needs, especially with regard to 
autonomy and physical security. Liberal legalists, then, do not need to invoke claims 
about the (alleged) importance of national identity. Neither do they need to maintain 
that rescue obligations should only be assigned to nation states.  
Furthermore, unlike liberal nationalism, the idea of a legal or political community of 
citizens united by the law can assist us in tackling four issues that arise in the context 
of collective rescue projects.  
First, since our role in a collective rescue operation depends on what others do, the 
law provides a solution to the problem of coordination. If we tried to discharge our 
natural duties independently of each other, no one would get rescued.  
Second, our submission to the law overcomes what Kutz calls the problem of 
marginal contributions.284 Simply put, we must, as considerations of fairness surely 
demand, do ‘our bit’ in a successful rescue operation. By submitting themselves to 
the law, citizens enter into relations of reciprocity.285 Those who submit to the law 
can expect others to do the same. Compliance with the law, in fact, is the most basic 
burden and benefit of citizenship. The coercive function of the law, then, ensures 
that we make our full contribution to the rescue operation.  
Third, the law enables us to form collective intentions, which are necessary for the 
ascription of collective agency and responsibility to groups. In brief, Kutz’s model 
rests on what he calls participatory intentions, which are aimed at the fulfilment of a 
common goal.286 These intentions account for some of our individual actions that 
would be incomprehensible without reference to a collective project. In the case of 
rescue operations, Kutz points out that our participatory intentions stem from the 
(individual) realisation that we hold resources in common to which those in need 
have a reasonable claim. If intentions within the rescuer group sufficiently overlap, 
they give rise to collective intentions.  
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Thomas Nagel’s argument that citizens occupy a dual role within the legal system of 
the state reinforces the idea of a community with shared intentions. On the one 
hand, they are subjects to the law, which they are required to obey for reasons of 
reciprocity. On the other hand, for Nagel, they are also the authors of the law 
because political power is exercised in their name.287 Wars are usually not only 
declared in the name of the state only but with reference to the people. Indeed, 
citizens feel what Joel Feinberg calls ‘vicarious pride and shame’ when political power 
is exercised, for better or worse, in their name.288 Citizens identify with their group not 
only via the benefits and security it provides them with, but also in terms of the 
common projects they pursue, which may be reaffirmed or thwarted by the way in 
which political power is exercised.289 
Fourth, Nagel’s thoughts on the author/subject dualism also indicate on what basis 
the benefits and burdens of state action can be distributed amongst citizens. First, 
considerations of fairness and reciprocity demand that citizens contribute their fair 
share to common projects. If the law, as was argued above, helps us to shape our 
collective intentions, then we share in these projects and can be expected to bear 
some of their costs. Secondly, because political power originates within the 
interdependent needs of citizens and is exercised in their name, the latter must bear 
some of the costs arising from state action. Of course, this may not apply to all costs 
communities and states may incur. As we shall see in Part IV, Feinberg acknowledges 
that some costs assigned to (political/legal) communities are not distributable 
amongst individual group members. But citizens must at least bear some of the costs 
of state action.  
Before we return to the duty to intervene in more detail, let us quickly take stock. We 
began our analysis by noting Miller’s point that it is undesirable to assign duties 
directly to states. The rationale of the Domestic Analogy and the idea of natural 
duties both indicate that the duties of states are derived from the duties of those 
under their rule. Thus, any account of remedial responsibility for Atrocity Crimes is 
ultimately based on individual duties to assist the needy. Yet, following Kutz’s work, 
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rescue operations, though based on individual duties of assistance, are always 
collective undertakings. First and foremost, they require that individuals coordinate 
their actions and contribute their fair share of resources. Furthermore, in order to be 
able to act, groups of rescuers must be able to form collective intentions.  
To solve the issues identified by Kutz, we appealed to the liberal legalist idea that the 
operation of the law establishes special relations amongst members of a state. The 
law enables us to coordinate our actions and, through its coercive function, ensures 
that individuals contribute their fair share to a rescue operation. As we orient our 
behaviour to the law, the latter also enables us to form collective intentions. As a 
result, while the state’s duty to intervene is derived from individual duties to offer 
assistance to the needy, the institutions of the legal system make the discharge of 
these individual duties possible in the first place. Finally, since states act on behalf of 
their citizens, costs accruing from state action can be distributed amongst them, 
subject to further restrictions.  
Bearing these points in mind, let us assume that duties to intervene can and should 
be assigned to states. We can now provide two justifications of the duty to intervene.  
III  
The Egalitarian Argument for mandatory intervention 
In order to clarify the normative basis of the duty to intervene, let us return to 
Fabre’s argument in favour of mandatory rescue killings. It contends that if one 
accepts the Assistance Condition, one must also accept the Use of Force Condition. 
In what follows, let us try to render this link more precise via what we can call the 
Egalitarian Argument. It demands that individuals should not be worse off through 
no fault of their own. To illustrate how the Egalitarian Argument works, let us use 
the following thought experiment.   
Break a Leg: Jen stumbles into a shadowy alleyway and breaks her leg. Minutes later, however, 
Amy is dragged into the same alleyway by a murderous mugger. Fortunately Richard is at the scene 
and could rescue both. However, while Richard can simply carry Jen to his nearby car to drive her to 
the hospital, he would have to use other-defensive force against the murderous mugger in order to 
rescue Amy. Richard is a retired policeman who has been trained how to shoot. He has a gun in his 
car.     
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Jen is lucky that she only broke her leg, whereas Amy is worse off, in absolute terms, 
because she faces a threat to her life. If we separated the Assistance Condition from 
the Use of Force Condition, Richard would only be obliged to assist Jen but not Amy. 
In other words, Jen holds a right against Richard to be carried to his car, whereas 
Amy lacks a right to be rescued because Richard would have to use force on her 
behalf.  
For the sake of the argument, let us assume that the rendering of lethal assistance 
does not undermine Richard’s own prospect for a minimally decent life. If so, any 
separation between the Assistance Condition and Use of Force Condition would be 
arbitrary, if not absurd. It implies that those who face grave threats to their life are 
not entitled to receive necessary assistance, while those with relatively minor 
inconveniences are entitled to help. In fact, Richard’s refusal to use other-defensive 
force on behalf of Amy reinforces her sense of victimhood. This is so because Amy 
is worse off precisely because of the nature of the threat she faces. In order to avoid this, 
a commitment to the Assistance Condition must entail the acceptance of the Use of 
Force Condition. Accordingly, Amy holds a moral right against Richard to be 
rescued.   
By analogy, imagine Orange experiences an earthquake and citizens of Violet are 
under a duty to assist members of Orange. Just as Richard has a gun in his car, Violet 
has an extremely experienced army. In this case, it does not seem unreasonable to 
hold that Violet is obliged to dispatch its troops so they can render humanitarian aid. 
Orange’s citizens have a right to receive aid. But now suppose that Red perpetrates 
Atrocity Crimes against its members. If we separate the Assistance Condition from 
the Use of Force Condition, sufferers of an earthquake are entitled to aid, whereas 
victims of Atrocity Crimes aren’t. Again, members of Red are worse off for entirely 
arbitrary reasons. To avoid such a skewed view of morality, military intervention 
must be obligatory.   
Interestingly, compared to Break a Leg, the case for making the declaration of an 
other-defensive war mandatory is strengthened by Claudia Card’s Atrocity Paradigm. 
As we saw in Chapter III, Atrocity Crimes are morally distinctive not only because 
they cause large-scale suffering. Rather, unlike a single murderous mugger or natural 
disasters, Atrocity Crimes are distinctive moral evils. This is one of the reasons for 
why combating evils enjoys some priority over realising justice. Now, if, according to 
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many egalitarians, the realisation of justice already demands that we assist the needy, 
the case for positive assistance is much stronger when it comes to combating evils. If 
this is sound, Fabre’s link between the Assistance and the Use of Force Conditions is 
defensible, especially in the context of MHI.  
However, the egalitarian intuition that individuals should not be worse off through 
no fault of their own has been accused of leading to morally perverse results.290 To 
explain, we supposed that, compared to Orange, members of Red are worse off 
through no fault of their own. Yet, as we saw in Chapter III, Card’s conception of 
evil and Atrocity Crimes stresses the central role of human agency. For instance, 
mass killings can arise from provocations, which lead to a cycle of violence. Hence it 
may be argued that, in the case of Atrocity Crimes, the appeal to egalitarianism 
undermines, rather than reinforces, the link between the Assistance and Use of Force 
Conditions. As a result, while members of Orange remain entitled to assistance 
because an earthquake is truly beyond their control, members of Red forfeit their 
right to be rescued because they are (outcome) responsible for their predicament.  
There are two solutions to this problem. First, even if we hold groups collectively 
responsible for (ethnic) violence, it is by no means the case that all group members 
engage in killing and provocation. There are always large numbers of innocent 
individuals who get caught up in the crossfire. It would be cruel to refuse them our 
assistance, not least because, from the perspective of egalitarianism, individuals do 
not have control over their place of birth. If groups fail to protect the interdependent 
needs of their members, the plight of individuals is all that matters for the duty to 
intervene.291 Even if uninvolved group members must bear some of the costs of 
Atrocity Crimes, e.g. they could be taxed to pay reparations to members of the 
enemy collective, this does not mean that they ‘forfeit’ their right to be rescued. 
Thus, the Egalitarian Argument underlines the importance of a duty to intervene. 
Anything else constitutes a gross misapplication of the concept of collective 
responsibility. 
Second, the egalitarian logic is constrained by a baseline commitment to 
humanitarianism. As Card makes clear, even though evil presupposes agency, there 
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are brutal and degrading acts that not even the worst evildoers should suffer.292 Some 
opponents of the death penalty, for instance, do not maintain that murderers should 
not be punished for their crimes. Instead, they contend that the death penalty is a 
cruel and degrading form of punishment. Likewise, no human being, even if culpably 
responsible for horrific wrongs, can ever be liable to being hacked to death, raped, or 
arbitrarily and indefinitely detained. As has been stressed throughout the thesis, in 
order to avoid Manichean thinking, we must recognise that perpetrators can become 
victims and vice versa. For humanitarian reasons, it is obligatory to protect someone 
who participated in Atrocity Crimes in the past from an angry mob that wants to 
exact bloody revenge. Insofar as individuals are not immediately engaged in unjust 
aggression, they are entitled to protection in case they become victims of Atrocity 
Crimes.   
The egalitarian claim that individuals should not be worse off through no fault of 
their own provides a powerful defence of the duty to intervene. It also indicates how 
advocates of MHI can respond to those who resist the idea of a duty to intervene in 
conflicts where groups inflict violence on each other. Group membership, for 
egalitarians, is arbitrary from a moral point of view. The rendering of assistance 
becomes obligatory if communities fail to meet the basic interdependent needs of 
their members.  
Undoubtedly the Egalitarian Argument is restricted by the Autonomy Constraint. If, 
in Break a Leg, Richard was not a trained police office in possession of a gun, we 
may question whether he was obliged to use other-defensive force on Amy’s behalf. 
In particular, we would have to show that ordinary members of society would have 
to undergo special firearms training so they can carry out rescue killings. We return 
to this point further below. By analogy, as we noted at the beginning of the chapter, 
the protection of rights abroad must not come at the expense of basic rights at 
home. In order to prevent the dissolution of civic relations, individual citizens in the 
target state must remain subjects of the law. If Violet was not able to uphold the rule 
of law within its own jurisdiction, Violet cannot be under a duty to declare an other-
defensive war. 
The Egalitarian Argument for Mandatory Killing implicitly introduces a further 
consideration into the debate. In order to be effective, remedial responsibility needs 
                                                           
292 Card, The Atrocity Paradigm, p 13.  
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to be distributed amongst potential rescuers. According to the Egalitarian Argument, 
one important criterion for the assignment of a duty to intervene is the capacity to 
sustain a military campaign without compromising the protection of basic rights at 
home or relinquishing state independence. But while capacity is clearly necessary for 
the assignment of duties to intervene to states, it is not clear whether it is also 
sufficient. Bearing in mind the nature of Atrocity Crimes, there are good reasons to 
also consider ‘capacity’ as sufficient. Because Atrocity Crimes represent what is 
morally intolerable, those who can intervene are obliged to do so. If this is sound, 
victims of Atrocity Crimes hold a right to be rescued against powerful states capable 
of carrying out military intervention.       
But the criterion of capacity does not exhaust the spectrum of considerations for the 
assignment of remedial responsibility for Atrocity Crimes. Indeed, the flaw of the 
Egalitarian Argument is that it does not pay attention to the wider context in which 
Atrocity Crimes take place. This is understandable because Atrocity Crimes are 
always (moral) emergencies that require a swift response. But failure to attend to the 
broader context does expose the duty to intervene to the popular criticism that ‘their’ 
problems are not ‘ours’. By developing the Argument from Shared Outcome 
Responsibility, Part IV seeks to challenge this view. 
IV 
The Argument from Shared Outcome Responsibility  
A. The nature of the contribution  
One popular misconception of our times is that mass killing takes place as an isolated 
phenomenon. This myth has the comforting function of absolving outsiders from 
any (outcome) responsibility for Atrocity Crimes. Indeed, it seems scandalous that 
we should be obliged to sacrifice ‘our’ resources for rectifying ‘their’ mess. Although 
the Egalitarian Argument already rejects this kind of reasoning, this section shows 
that it is also empirically mistaken. Neither do societies suddenly ‘go mad’, nor can 
mass killing be divorced from wider dynamics of international society. Atrocity 
Crimes occurs for a variety of reasons, some of which may be internal to a society, 
whereas others are external. To illustrate the point, there are four prominent cases in 
which external actors have impacted on locally perpetrated Atrocity Crimes. 
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1. Ben Kiernan and David Chandler argue that the heavy bombardment of 
Cambodia by the US Air Force during the Vietnam War drove the 
Cambodian peasant population into the arms of the Khmer Rouge.293 During 
its subsequent reign the Khmer Rouge was responsible for up to two million 
Cambodian deaths.   
2. In the aftermath of World War I, the League of Nations gave Belgium the 
western provinces of German East Africa. In Rwanda, Belgian rulers 
disrupted the old structure of kingship central to political life, introduced 
money, put in place a system of forced labour, and reinforced the division 
between the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority. In 1994, Hutus reacted 
against the powerful Tutsis minority, sparking retaliatory attacks. Within one 
hundred days up to one million people were killed.294  
3. Susan Woodward points out that the infamous ‘economic shock therapies’ 
prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ex-members of the 
communist bloc after the fall of the Iron Curtain led to radically altered 
political arrangements in ex-Yugoslavia.295 As the federal government, which 
was supportive of the policies, lost its legitimacy in the eyes of many of its 
subjects, nationalist leaders, most notably Slobodan Milosevic, rose to 
prominence and gained power. As a response to economic crisis and 
secessionist movements, the rise of radical (Serb) ethnic nationalism led to 
various civil wars. In Bosnia, mass rape was used as a weapon against Muslim 
Bosnian women, while Bosnian men were involuntarily detained in large-scale 
camps where they were starved and assaulted.296 The massacre of Srebrenica 
was the worst atrocity on European soil since World War II. In Kosovo, it is 
estimated that up to 800000 Albanians were ethnically cleansed by Serbian 
forces.       
                                                           
293 B. Kiernan, How Pol Pot came to power: colonialism, nationalism and communism in Cambodia 1930-1975, 2nd 
ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004) & D.P. Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 4th ed. 
(Boulder/Col: Westview Press, 2008). 
294 L. Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide, revised edition (London: Verso, 2006). 
295 S.L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington D.C: Brookings 
Institution, 1995). Economic shock therapy includes the sudden privatization of state owned 
industries, the immediate liberalization of trade, and the release of pricing and currency controls. 
Shock therapy is strongly criticized by Joseph Stiglitz, see his Globalization and its Discontents (London: 
Penguin Books, 2003). For a useful account of the civil wars in ex-Yugoslavia, see J. Gow, The Serbian 
project and its adversaries.    
296 For a philosophical discussion of the strategy of enforced impregnation during civil conflict, see 
Card, Confronting Evils, chapter 10.   
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4. Anne Orford points out that Western governments and international 
institutions (the IMF and World Bank), industry and arms manufacturers 
supported the oppression of the East Timorese at the hands of the 
Indonesian military.297 East Timor’s attempt to gain independence at the turn 
of the Millennium was met with bloody looting and pillaging by Indonesian 
militias.    
To respond to cases like these, let us develop the Argument from Shared Outcome 
Responsibility. In brief, the Argument from Shared Outcome Responsibility 
connects outcome responsibility with remedial responsibility by contending that 
states and the political communities under their rule incur special duties of assistance 
if foreign policies carried out in their name causally contributed to Atrocity Crimes.  
To begin, let us use the above examples as a guide in order to make six preliminary 
observations about the nature of causal contributions to Atrocity Crimes. First, the 
relevant causal contributions to Atrocity Crimes are the outcome of state action. 
Only states are able to order bombings or administer colonial territories.298 At first 
sight, this seems to pose a problem because it reverses the relationship between 
community and state. In Part II, we argued that statist duties are reducible to 
obligations of citizens. But since, in the above cases, state action is central to an 
assessment of (shared) outcome responsibility, the Argument from Shared Outcome 
Responsibility casts doubt over the Domestic Analogy. Indeed, it seems that states 
qua states incur duties of assistance. This might mean that these duties cannot be 
distributed amongst their citizens.  
But this reversal is not entirely unjustified. We emphasised that states perform 
important functions for (political) communities via the enforcement of the law.        
If we recall Nagel’s argument about representation, members of a state are liable to 
bear some of the costs arising from state action, though it remains to be seen to what 
extent these can be distributed amongst individual citizens. Moreover, as was noted 
in Chapter I, because states are defined as animated legal systems, they depend on the 
resources citizens offer them. Arguably, this is the strongest link between state and 
                                                           
297 A. Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human rights and the use of force (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), chapter I.   
298 On the different types of colonial administrations, see L. Ypi, R.E. Goodin & C. Barry, ‘Associative 
Duties, Global Justice and the Colonies’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 37/No. 2 (2009), pp. 103-
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citizen, even in the absence of democratic institutions. Lastly, political communities 
must be held collectively responsible for state action because foreign policies are 
usually undertaken in the name of citizen. Amongst other things, a sound foreign 
policy aims to preserve the internal governing functions of a state by securing its 
standing in the international realm.  
Second, as the cases of ex-Yugoslavia and Indonesia indicate, some causal 
contributions point to the involvement of international institutions. The status of 
international institutions is contested. In particular, it is not clear that they can have 
the necessary agency to act. Because the chapter cannot offer a detailed discussion of 
these issues here, we should proceed on the following assumption.299 International 
institutions exist so states can pursue their national interests in less harmful ways 
than in a purely unregulated international realm. Thus, even if certain policies are 
recommended in the name of an institution, shared outcome responsibility should be 
assigned to individual member states rather than the institution itself.  
Third, foreign states are not solely causally responsible for the local perpetration of 
Atrocity Crimes. They play some role in the causal chain that caused these horrific 
crimes, but, unlike local actors, the foreign states in the above examples neither 
ordered Atrocity Crimes nor participated in them. Consequently, one question is 
what weight one should attach to different causal contributions.  
In this respect, it is noteworthy that, although outcome responsibility for Atrocity 
Crimes does not rest with a single agent, it must not be equated with complicity. 
Complicity is usually a sufficient condition for shared outcome responsibility, but the 
reverse does not hold. Imagine that George gives Chris a gun, knowing that the latter 
will use it to kill Kate, while Gavin loses his gun and Carl uses it to kill Carol. George 
is derivatively liable for Kate’s murder because he fulfils the actus reus and mens rea 
conditions introduced in Chapter IV. Gavin, by contrast, is neither complicit in 
Carol’s murder nor necessarily morally blameworthy for the loss of his gun, as it 
could have occurred non-negligently. But nevertheless, it is his gun that is being used 
to perpetrate a crime, and, intuitively Gavin has stronger obligations to engage in a 
rescue killing on behalf of Carol than an uninvolved party. In any case, we must bear 
in mind that shared outcome responsibility can come about through an unfortunate 
                                                           
299 For a wide-ranging exploration of these issues, see the essays collected in T. Erskine (ed). Can 
institutions have responsibilities: collective moral agency and international relations (London: Palgrave, 2003). 
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entanglement of different strands of actions. The Argument from Shared Outcome 
Responsibility, then, does not require that a foreign state abets or aids the 
perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes.   
Fourth, the above examples have different temporal dimensions because state action 
occurred at different points in history. The US bombing of Cambodia and the 
prescription of economic shock therapies had contemporary effects on their 
respective countries. But German engagement in Rwanda preceded the genocide by 
exactly seventy-six years, whereas Belgium released the country into independence 
thirty-two years before mass killing occurred. Anyone familiar with the discussion of 
historical injustice in contemporary political philosophy will know that the 
establishment of a normative and causal relationship between past and present is 
highly problematic. It must be clarified, then, to what extent past and present actions 
are part of the same causal chain.  
Fifth, causal contributions can involve moral wrongs, rights violations, or even moral 
evils. Colonialism is a rights violation because it fails to respect the collective claim of 
members of the colony to be recognised as a self-determining entity.300 From a 
historical and moral perspective, the American bombing campaign of Cambodia is 
more complex. Initially, the Cambodian head of state, King Sihanouk, had tried to 
remain neutral in the Vietnam conflict. Even the non-intentional infliction of harms 
on neutral countries is impermissible because it violates stringent negative duties 
against harming. Yet, as is well known, Sihanouk’s actual policies were far from 
neutral. In 1965, he allowed North Vietnamese forces to set up bases in Cambodia 
and later tried to counterbalance this policy by allowing South Vietnam and the US 
to pursue the Vietcong within Cambodian territory. But even if we assume that 
bombing was permissible, the conduct of the campaign may still be classifiable as (at 
least) a moral wrong because of doubts over its proportionality. Figures on deaths 
may vary but up to 200000 Cambodians were internally displaced by the bombing 
campaign.301 
                                                           
300 This is not entirely correct because colonial powers, in theory, accepted that colonial subjects were 
holders of a group right to collective self-determination. Yet they argued that indigenous populations 
were incapable of exercising it. The burden of proof, though, rests with the colonial power. Given that 
they had existed for hundreds or thousands of years, the view that colonial cultures were ‘lesser 
civilisations’ incapable of governing themselves fails to withstand critical scrutiny.  
301 For a more detailed account, see the works by Chandler and Kiernan cited above. 
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Sixth, causal contributions can also involve permissible or morally neutral actions. 
For instance, to show that the IMF acted wrongly in ex-Yugoslavia, it must be 
proven that it was under a duty not to recommend ‘shock therapies’. Again, this is a 
complex question, and we can only offer some brief observations on it here. On the 
one hand, one must distinguish between recommendation and implementation. Local 
governments are usually responsible for implementing the recommendations of the 
IMF, though they are liable to sanctions if they fail to do so. Further, the prescription 
of shock therapy may have occurred in good faith because some of its measures had 
been successfully applied in West Germany after World War II.302 Perhaps reformers 
in the early 1990s had reasonable expectations that the same policies could also work 
in different contexts. If this was the case, it is hard to see how their 
recommendations violated negative duties against harming. But given their disastrous 
results, the recommendation of the same economic policies nowadays may be 
negligent.   
If the above is sound, the Argument from Shared Outcome Responsibility must 
accomplish the following. Firstly and more generally, since outcome responsibility is 
shared between different actors, it must clarify whether mere involvement in the 
causal chain is a necessary and sufficient condition for the assignment of the duty to 
intervene to any particular outside actors. Second, it must show that those who 
contributed to Atrocity Crimes via contemporary rights violations or otherwise 
morally wrong acts incur duties to intervene. Third and directly related to the 
preceding point, it must also account for past wrongs in this respect. Fourth, it must 
discuss whether those states that acted permissibly towards the target state become 
remedially responsible for Atrocity Crimes. The next section tries to provide answers 
to these challenges. 
B. Wrongs, non-wrongs and duties of assistance 
We are now in a position to develop the Argument from Shared Outcome 
Responsibility. To do so, let us discusses the following three cases: a) present causal 
contributions as moral wrongs, b) past causal contributions as moral wrongs, c) 
present contributions as moral non-wrongs. For reasons that will become apparent 
                                                           
302 Ludwig Erhardt, who became Minister for the Economy in Konrad Adenauer’s conservative 
government and later succeeded Adenauer as chancellor of West Germany, was instrumental here. 
Initially, he recommended the abolition of pricing controls to kick start the West German economy, 
despite worries by the Allied Forces.    
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shortly, we do not need to attend to past causal contributions that result from moral 
non-wrongs.  
Causal contributions as wrongs [present]: Let us now assess whether political 
communities and their states incur duties of assistance in cases where they actively 
inflict harm on those who are subsequently threatened by Atrocity Crimes. Two 
arguments suggest that they do.  
First, acts that involve moral wrongs, rights violations and evils weaken the ability of 
their victims to defend themselves against even greater threats. Because basic rights 
protect vital human interests, their violation goes hand in hand with a loss of power 
for the right holder. This is one of the reasons for why we typically speak of the need 
to ‘empower’ victims of crime. Cambodian peasants who have just been bombed out 
by the US Air Force will find it difficult to resist heavily armed Khmer Rouge 
guerrillas. To use an equally pressing example, women who have been forcibly 
expelled from their village during (alleged) counterterrorism operations are left in a 
seriously weakened position where they become particularly vulnerable to male 
violence.  
Second, the concept of a rights violation suggests that a foreign state did not comply 
with negative duties not to harm those in the target state. Put differently, the outside 
party was under stringent duties not to become part of the causal chain that led to 
Atrocity Crimes. Obviously, given our arguments about the nature of complicity in 
Chapter IV, this is true when an outside agent aids or abets a local party. But the 
argument also applies in situations where an outside party pursues its own interests 
without aiding a principal actor. Intuitively, if the outside party was under a stringent 
duty not to become involved, the magnitude or decisiveness of the contributing act 
becomes less relevant. If the Khmer Rouge had come to power without the bombing 
campaign, America would have still incurred remedial responsibilities for its wrongful 
involvement in internal Cambodian affairs.  
In light of these two arguments, there are good reasons to assume that wrongful 
causal contributions are sufficient conditions for the assignment of remedial 
responsibilities for Atrocity Crimes.  
If this is sound, contemporary wrongful involvement in the causal chain that led to 
mass killings amounts to the paradigmatic case for the Argument from Shared 
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Outcome Responsibility. We must now find out whether the same holds for past 
wrongs. 
Causal contributions as wrongs [past]: As should be apparent, past wrongs are not always 
clearly relatable to present Atrocity Crimes in the way contemporary events are. It is 
difficult to pick out relevant causal contributions because, through the ages, we are 
faced with myriad of interactions between societies, cultures and states, some of 
which involve wrongs, while some are non-wrongs. Wrongs are at least more easily 
identifiable than non-wrongs, and it would be futile to try and base the duty to 
intervene on the latter. The Argument from Shared Outcome Responsibility focuses 
on one particular wrong, namely colonialism. Not only is the historical dimension of 
colonialism well known, but many ex-colonial powers are, even in the present day 
and age, powerful states that potentially have the capacity to intervene without 
compromising their governing capacities. Let us explore, then, what is morally 
distinctive about colonialism and why it triggers contemporary duties to intervene. 
Unlike other types of rights violations, the distinctive feature of colonialism is that it 
brings its victims under the legal system of another state. In doing so, colonisers and 
colonised enter into a special relationship with each other. To be sure, colonial 
subjects do not have the same equal standing before the law that citizens of the 
colonial power typically enjoy. But this does not change the fact that both groups are 
subject to the same coercively imposed set of legal rules.303 If, as liberal legalism 
assumes, members of a legal system stand in a special relationship to each other, this 
relationship must also include members of the colony. Of course, since colonial 
subjects are not (strong) authors of the law, they are not bound by obligations of 
reciprocity and retain a moral right to withdraw from the association on unilateral 
terms. But nevertheless, some duties must apply between citizens and colonial 
subjects, at least as long as they share the common bond of the law. 
Now, the problem is that, in the contemporary world, colonies have separated from 
their colonial powers. But there are two solutions to this problem. First, one can 
continue to share duties resulting from a common project even if one’s legal standing 
has changed. For instance, after divorce ex-spouses often retain some legal 
obligations towards each other, which are not, strictly speaking, reducible to duties of 
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reparation.304 By analogy, since colonies have contributed to the wealth and standing 
of the colonial power, ex-coloniser and ex-colonised continue to owe each other 
‘robust duties of distributive justice’. Hence it is also sound to assume that duties to 
intervene are also owed in times of humanitarian crisis.  
Second and directly related to the preceding point, colonial powers incur duties to 
intervene because they shaped the political system of the colony at crucial points in 
history. Often the way in which political power is exercised after independence is 
attributable to the methods through which it was exercised during colonial reign. 
Once set on certain course of institutional development, it is very difficult for 
decision-makers to change a political system.305 In Rwanda, the Belgian colonists 
reinforced the distinction between the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority by using 
members of the latter as colonial administrators, thereby laying one of the 
foundations of the Rwandan genocide. Local actors were not able to address the 
resulting imbalance in power between the two ethnic groups after Belgian rule had 
ended. Moreover, decolonialisation processes often reinforced the economic 
dependency of the ex-colony. Since there is an asymmetry of power between the 
colonial power and colony, the former can dictate the terms of divorce.306        
If the above observations about the moral distinctiveness of colonial rule are correct, 
it is difficult not to consider colonialism as another paradigmatic case for the 
Argument from Shared Outcome Responsibility. Although colonialism constitutes a 
past wrong, it moral legacy extends into the present. Colonial powers retain important 
duties of assistance towards their ex-colonies, not least because they shaped their 
institutions at crucial points in history. As a result, ex-colonial powers also incur 
duties to intervene if the institutions they helped put in place fail to preserve the 
peace. The special relationship between (ex-) colonisers and (ex-) colonised is a 
sufficient ground for remedial responsibility for Atrocity Crimes.   
Causal contributions as non-wrongs: Having looked at wrongful causal contributions to 
Atrocity Crimes, we must now turn to non-wrongful contributions. For reasons 
outlined above, the Argument from Shared Outcome Responsibility focuses on 
contemporary non-wrongful interactions that led to Atrocity Crimes. Suppose that Blue 
non-negligently renders economic assistance to agrarian Red, helping the latter to 
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modernise and industrialise its economy. However, in combination with unforeseen 
bad harvests, the industrialisation strategy leads to serious food shortages, which 
result in tensions between two ethnic groups. Although Blue acted permissibly, there 
is at least one argument for why it incurs duties towards Red.  
Whenever we act non-negligently in the social world around us, we are forced to take 
certain risks. Some of these are minute. For instance the risk that one turns into a 
human missile by going for a walk on a windy day is extremely small. But arguably, 
there are many risks that are greater, even if reasonable care has been taken. 
Participation in traffic, for instance, always creates risks for others. Even if Michael 
drove a reasonably well-maintained car, an unforeseen failure of his breaks could 
create a threat for others. Even though, in a freak accident, he is not morally culpable 
for the threat he poses, Michael is still outcome responsible for resulting harms. On 
this basis, he incurs duties to assist those whom he has harmed. Suppose Michael hits 
a pedestrian. Under the circumstances, Michael, rather than an uninvolved third 
party, should take her to the hospital, provided that doing so is not unreasonably 
risky due to the state of his car.   
By analogy, policies always entail risks that need to be balanced. In politics, 
uncontroversial and non-risky solutions to a problem are rare. Policy making always 
rests on selecting amongst different options, some of which may, with hindsight, 
turn out to be wrong. What differentiates most of our ordinary, everyday risks from 
policy making, however, is the magnitude of their respective repercussions. The 
choice of nuclear power as an energy policy, for instance, has potentially more wide-
spread and dangerous effects than driving a reasonably well maintained car. Because 
of the scale of harms created by non-negligently applied polices, responsible actors 
incur duties of assistance to those adversely affected. In case of a radioactive leak, for 
example, we can expect those who create the energy policy to assist with the cleanup 
costs. Suppose one of Yellow’s nuclear reactors leaks and nuclear material enters into 
a river that flows through Violet. It is not unreasonable to argue that Yellow incurs 
duties to assist Violet. 
The question remains whether non-negligent outcome responsibility gives rise to 
duties to intervene. On the one hand, unlike in the case of a nuclear policy, outcome 
responsibility for Atrocity Crimes is shared. Further, unlike in cases where shared 
outcome responsibility arises from a moral wrong, a non-negligent foreign policy did 
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not violate negative duties not to get involved with the target state. It seems, then, 
that non-negligent outcome responsibility is necessary but not sufficient to justify 
duties to kill. Roughly, when considering causal contributions that involve non-
wrongs, it depends on the magnitude of the contribution whether the duty to assist 
translates into a duty to intervene militarily. If non-negligent external factors play a 
fundamental role in the development of Atrocity Crimes, those responsible for them 
incur a duty to intervene.  
C. Conclusion 
This part of the chapter tried to dispel the myth that mass killing takes places for 
purely indigenous reasons. As we saw above, foreign states often have an impact on 
events in the target state, albeit in different ways and at different times in history. The 
Argument from Shared Outcome Responsibility contends that causal contributions 
to Atrocity Crimes are sufficient to trigger duties to intervene in two paradigmatic 
cases. First, if present causal contributions amount to moral wrongs, states incur 
duties to defend those whom they have previously harmed against a new aggressor. 
Second, since colonial powers incur special responsibilities towards ex-colonies, they 
are remedially responsible for intervening in their internal affairs to halt Atrocity 
Crimes. However, the case of those states whose contribution to Atrocity Crimes 
was the outcome of a morally permissible course of action is less straightforward. 
The states in question incur duties of assistance, but whether the latter give to duties 
to intervene militarily depends on the magnitude of the contribution.  
Having outlined two arguments in defence of the duty to intervene, we can now turn 
to the final question, namely, whether the duty to intervene can be distributed 
amongst individual members of potential intervening states.  
V 
The problem of mandatory killing  
As we saw in Chapter I, military campaigns contain individual and collective levels of 
analysis. While it is true that rescue operations originate with the duties of citizens, it 
is not necessarily the case that individuals are obliged to participate in a military 
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campaign. To illustrate the point, let us draw on a thought experiment by Joel 
Feinberg: 307   
Train Robbery: A train is stopped by a band of robbers. The robbers enter one of the carriages to 
steal money from the passengers. The passengers qua group are capable of overpowering the robbers, 
but this would entail that one or two of them die in the scuffle.  
According to Feinberg, since the (potential) sacrifice of one’s life for the sake of the 
group is a heroic act, participation in the scuffle is supererogatory. It would be odd if 
morality required us to become heroes. According to Feinberg’s view, we can criticise 
the group for not producing a hero, but individuals are exempt from blame for not 
confronting the robbers. Of course, Train Robbery differs from a mandatory rescue 
killing, since the threat is faced by the train passengers themselves. But the rationale 
of Feinberg’s argument can be extended to cases where members of one group are 
asked to kill on behalf of members of another. More precisely, while it can be argued 
that potential intervening states are under a duty to intervene, individual members of 
these states are not under a duty to kill on behalf of non-citizens. Let us look at the 
issue from the perceptive of the Egalitarian Argument and the Argument from 
Shared Outcome Responsibility.  
Beginning with the former, the Egalitarian Argument stresses the capacity of 
potential intervening states to pursue a military campaign. However, the corporate 
capacity to intervene is not sufficient to prove that the duty to intervene can be 
distributed amongst individual citizens. To do so, the Egalitarian Argument would 
have to show that its very own Autonomy Constraint is compatible with the 
obligation to fight in an other-defensive war. To recapitulate, the Autonomy 
Constraint demands that mandatory killing must not undermine the rescuer’s ability 
to autonomously choose a conception of the good life. Even if we grant Fabre’s 
point that killing a culpable attacker on behalf of a victim does not hinder our pursuit 
of the good life, this does not mean that a mandatory rescue killing is entirely 
analogous to participation in an other-defensive war.308  
First, while many participants in Atrocity Crimes are culpably responsible for unjust 
aggression, soldiers of the intervening state would also have to kill non-culpable 
individuals. On the one hand, as Chapter IV indicated, they may have to kill child 
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soldiers during MHI. Further, given the arguments of Chapter V, they will also inflict 
considerable harms on non-combatants during a strategic bombing campaign. In her 
treatment of mandatory rescue killings, Fabre does not discuss the killing of innocent 
individuals and its impact on our capacity to pursue a good life. But it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the killing of an innocent person weighs 
(psychologically) more heavily than the killing of a (morally responsible) attacker. 
Thus potential rescuers can reasonably reject claims to render lethal assistance in case 
an innocent person would be harmed.    
Second, domestic rescuers are not obliged to risk life and limb during a rescue killing. 
To be sure, if Chapter V is correct, states should minimise the risks to their soldiers 
during the conduct of MHI. But even this does not mean that participation in an 
other-defensive war becomes obligatory. For instance, if the intervening state 
pursues a strategic bombing campaign, it needs to rely on highly trained fighter 
pilots. Yet it cannot be obligatory for ordinary citizens to undergo extensive training 
that enables them to operate jet fighters during an other-defensive war.309 Taxation is 
compatible with the Autonomy Constraint because it respects freedom of 
occupation. This is because it leaves individuals a choice over how they earn a living. 
But highly specialised military training limits our capacity to choose a conception of 
the good considerably.  
The Egalitarian Argument, then, gives rise to a situation that resembles Feinberg’s 
train robbery example. While political communities and states are under a duty to 
intervene, the latter cannot be distributed amongst citizens of the intervening state.  
One potential reply is that, from within the logical of Egalitarian Argument, this 
conclusion is untenable. The duty to intervene will be assigned to fairly powerful 
states with large standing armies. The latter will also include highly trained military 
personnel. But there are reasons to be reluctant to argue that the professional 
soldiers are obliged to fight in an other-defensive war without giving their consent 
first. This is so because the main job of professional soldiers is to serve in a self-
defensive war. Unless it has been made to clear to them that their duties will also 
include serving in other-defensive wars, their services cannot be used to discharge 
the duty to intervene.         
                                                           
309 (ibid.), pp. 372-373.          
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Arguably, though, these conclusions may change when we take into account the 
Argument from Shared Outcome Responsibility. Intuitively, groups can make higher 
demands on their individual members in situations where they perpetrate wrongs 
against members of another group or stand in a special relationship to another group. 
Still, it is difficult to argue that this is sufficient to make the killing of innocent 
individuals mandatory or that citizens are obliged to acquire highly specialised skills.  
Nevertheless, the status of professional soldiers may become more important here. 
Although professional soldiers usually expect to serve in self-defensive wars, they 
should be aware that the army is one tool through which states can address problems 
arising from their foreign policies. Sometimes the army is needed to rectify a wrong 
that has been committed or to reverse the contemporary effects of a particular 
policy. If this is correct, the Argument from Shared Outcome Responsibility suggests 
that the services of professional soldiers can be used without their consent in order 
to discharge the duty to intervene.   
Admittedly, however, the Argument from Shared Outcome Responsibility does not 
entirely bridge the gap between individualist and collective levels of analysis. For one 
thing, it does not show that states are allowed to draft their citizens into the army in 
order to carry out MHI. Ultimately the success of the Argument from Shared 
Outcome Responsibility depends on the availability of professional soldiers who have 
been trained to very high standards. In practical terms, if we look at some of the 
most powerful states in international politics, this does not seem to be a problem. 
But it is important to acknowledge that the argument rests on the historical 
contingency of professionalised military life.  
To conclude, the above points revealed that neither the Egalitarian Argument nor the 
Argument from Shared Outcome Responsibility entirely bridges the gap between 
individuals and collectives. In this sense, remedial responsibility for Atrocity Crimes 
resembles Feinberg’s train robbery case. Collectives can be criticised for not 
developing institutions that make the halting of Atrocity Crimes possible. But unless 
individuals are highly trained professional soldiers, they cannot be obliged to risk 
their lives to fight in an other-defensive.  
What does this mean for the right to be rescued? The answer is that the right to be 
rescued can sometimes not be fulfilled by states. It is useful to draw an analogy with 
215 
 
the right to food here. The right to food can only be fulfilled if food is available. 
Likewise, the right to be rescued can only be fulfilled if adequately trained 
professional soldiers are available who have been told that they will serve in other-
defensive wars. It is important, though, to acknowledge that sometimes these soldiers 
are available. For instance, since Canadian Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire, 
leader of the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, had asked for the permission to 
halt the Rwandan bloodshed, we can assume that he and his men consented to 
fighting in an other-defensive war.310 The lack of political will to order an 
intervention to halt the Rwandan genocide must count as one of the great moral 
failures of the 20th century.  
VI 
Conclusion 
Utilising the Domestic Analogy, the chapter took Fabre’s argument in defence of 
mandatory rescue killings as a starting point for our defence of the duty to intervene. 
The idea of a mandatory rescue killing rests on the claim that if we accept the 
existence of duties to assist the needy, we must also accept obligations to render 
assistance via lethal means, at least insofar as the target of the use of force is a 
culpable attacker. In this case, V holds a right to be rescued against potential R. 
Likewise, we assumed that victims of Atrocity Crimes are holders of a right to be 
rescued. In order to develop the Domestic Analogy, the chapter first discussed how 
far duties of assistance can and should be assigned to states. We found out that states 
incur duties on behalf of their citizens. Any rescue operation, even if carried out by 
states, originates with the duties of individuals.  
The chapter then presented two arguments, the Egalitarian Argument and the 
Argument from Shared Outcome Responsibility, which specify under what 
circumstances duties to assist can entail duties to declare an other-defensive war. 
Both arguments offer a strong defence of the duty to intervene. However, the real 
problem consists in showing that the collective duty to intervene can be distributed 
amongst citizens of potential intervening states. The chapter argued that individual 
citizens cannot be obliged to take part in an other-defensive war. While we can 
criticise political communities for not developing a sound institutional culture to 
                                                           
310 See, R. Dallaire, Shake hands with the devil: the failure of humanity in Rwanda (London: Arrow Books, 
2005).  
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discharge their responsibilities, we cannot fault individual citizens for not serving in 
MHI. Regrettably, this means that sometimes the right to be rescued cannot be 
fulfilled. If that is the case, though, we can assume that those who failed to intervene 
owe some duties of compensation. Chapter VII examines this issue, amongst others, 
by providing a theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of humanitarian occupations.       
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Chapter VII 
The Ethics of Humanitarian Occupation  
 ‘How do groups who have been killing one another with considerable enthusiasm and 
success come together to form a common government? How can you work together, 
politically and economically, with the people who killed your parents, siblings, children, 
friends, or lovers? On the surface it seems impossible, even grotesque. But in fact we 
know that it happens all the time.’ 
(Roy Licklider)311 
The core beliefs of our time are the creations of these anti-colonial struggles: the idea 
that all human beings are equal, and that each group has a right to rule themselves 
free of foreign interference. It is ironic that liberal believers in these ideas --- someone 
like me, for example --- can end up supporting the creation of a new humanitarian 
empire, a new form of colonial tutelage for the peoples of Kosovo, Bosnia, and 
Afghanistan. The reason simply is that, however right these principles may be, the 
political form in which they are realised – the nationalist nation building project – so 
often fails to deliver them. For every nationalist struggle that succeeds in giving its 
people self-determination and dignity, there are more that only deliver their people up 
to a self-immolating slaughter, terror, enforced partition and failure.  
(Michael Ignatieff)312 
 
 
 
                                                           
311 R. Licklider cited in: F. Cochrane, Ending Wars (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), p. 5.   
312 Ignatieff, Empire Lite, p. 122.  
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I 
Before and after intervention 
As one academic commentator, Robert Keohane, puts it, the question of what 
should happen after MHI will have an effect on what happens before military action is 
actually undertaken.313 To illustrate the point, if MHI led to the creation of a failed 
state, this may raise doubts over its permissibility, not least for reasons of 
proportionality. Indeed, if what we can call post-atrocity societies, i.e. societies in 
which Atrocity Crimes have been successfully halted through military measures, were 
simply left to their own devices, it is to be feared that conflict erupts again. 
Intuitively, some efforts must be undertaken to stabilize post-atrocity societies. This 
intuition is reinforced by R2P’s demand for a ‘responsibility to rebuild’ as well as the 
liberal legalist argument that sovereignty is an enabling condition. Accordingly, the 
other-defensive conception of MHI stresses that interveners must (re-)build 
institutions capable of preserving the peace amongst members of the target state.  
International lawyers and politicians have responded to the challenges arising from 
the reconstruction of post-atrocity societies by introducing the concept of 
humanitarian occupation.314 According to Gregory Fox, humanitarian occupations 
are large-scale ‘social engineering projects’ aimed at the transformation of post-
atrocity societies. The key idea is that an external party temporarily assumes the role 
of local government in order to bring about the desired transition from conflict to 
peace in the target state. In this sense, a humanitarian occupation is ‘government for 
the people’ (of the target state), but it is neither ‘government of the people’ nor 
‘government by the people’, since authority is exercised by an unelected and external 
force. Roughly, the concept of humanitarian occupation contains three main building 
blocks:    
Legitimate External Authority: International lawyers acknowledge that it is often 
(legally) necessary (and proportionate) to occupy the target state. In addition to the 
                                                           
313 R. Keohane, ‘Sovereignty after Intervention’, in: J.L Holzgrefe & R.O. Keohane (eds.), 
Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, pp. 275-298.   
314 G. Fox, Humanitarian Occupation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). The following 
account of the key features of humanitarian occupation is based on Fox’s work. For further useful 
contributions to the subject, see S. Chesterman, You, the People, new ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005); Cochrane, Ending Wars. Ignatieff, Empire Lite.      
219 
 
appeal to necessity, there are four jointly sufficient conditions that constitute what we 
can call Legitimate External Authority.   
1. The Temporal Authority Condition: The rule over the target state’s territory is 
temporarily limited, that is, the exercise of authority must not occur 
indefinitely.  
2. The Insider Interest Condition: Although it is undertaken by an external party, 
a humanitarian occupation is ‘government for the people’ of the target 
state. Unlike earlier colonial administrators who ruled in the interest of 
outsiders, ‘humanitarian occupiers’ rule in the interest of insiders, that is, 
members of post-atrocity societies. Following the interest theory of 
rights, the chapter understands ‘insider interest’ in terms of a list of 
negative and positive claim-rights held individually and collectively by 
members of post-atrocity societies.   
3. The Consent Condition: International lawyers stress that the occupation of 
the target state’s territory is legitimate because it occurs consensually.  
4. The Internationalisation Condition: Although humanitarian occupations can in 
theory be carried out by a single state, international lawyers argue that the 
target state’s territory should be internationalised. That is to say, the 
target state’s territory should be put under international administration.    
Statism: As we already saw during our discussion of the Trojan Horse Objection in 
Chapter III, the practice and theory of humanitarian occupations affirms the 
centrality of the state unit in international law and politics. Consequently 
humanitarian occupations do not entail the dismantlement of the target state. 
1. The Argument from Political Sovereignty: The target state should be 
reconstructed as a politically sovereign entity that can assume its equal moral 
and legal standing under the Principle of Sovereign Equality.  
2. The Argument from Territorial Integrity: The target state should be preserved 
as a territorially unified entity.  
Good Governance: Standards of ‘Good Governance’ and Human Rights Law provide 
the necessary point of orientation for the internal reconstruction of the target state. 
As Fox contends, the target state should be socially re-engineered in such a way that 
it becomes a liberal democracy.  
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Needless to say, these claims contain highly controversial normative assumptions. In 
response, this chapter tries to develop a more theoretical perspective on 
humanitarian occupations. There are two recent developments in just war theory that 
are highly conducive to this end. First, Darrell Moellendorf stresses the importance 
of the jus ex bello (abbreviated as JEB hereinafter), which governs the termination of 
conflict.315 Second, Gary J. Bass and Brian Orend draw attention to the category of 
jus post bellum (abbreviated as JPB hereinafter) in order to develop a normative 
framework for just post-war relations.316 In what follows, we can probe the relevance 
of these two categories for the ethics of humanitarian occupation.  
But before we can engage in a more detailed philosophical discussion of the above 
issues, let us briefly state the following caveat. The chapter assumes the existence of a 
positive duty to assist members of post-atrocity societies with the reconstruction of 
their society.  
First, given that the use of military force will always have unintended as well as 
potentially destabilising consequences, the intervening state incurs obligations to 
support post-conflict reconstruction.317  
Second, taking into account the arguments from the preceding chapters, we can infer 
that if a) duties to assist can sometimes give rise to the duty to intervene and b) 
Atrocity Crimes represent a class of special crimes whose halting is morally 
obligatory, there will also be duties to assists members of post-atrocity societies cope 
with the aftermath of killing.  
Third, since MHI is obligatory and those in the target state have a moral right to be 
rescued, states and political communities that were able to intervene but failed to 
discharge their duties owe duties of compensation to those in the target state. Those 
who failed to intervene are, in other words, obliged to contribute to the 
reconstruction of the target state.  
The chapter falls into three main parts. Part II explores the concept of Legitimate 
External Authority. Part III takes issue with normative commitment to Statism 
                                                           
315 D. Moellendorf, ‘Jus Ex Bello’, Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 16/No. 2  (2008), pp. 123-136   
316 G.J. Bass, ‘Jus Post Bellum’ & B. Orend, War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective 
(Waterloo/Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2000), chapter VII.    
317 A. Gheciu & J. Welsh, ‘The Imperative to Rebuild: assessing the normative case for postconflict 
reconstruction’, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 23/Issue 2 (2009), pp. 121-146, at pp. 124 -126.  
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underlying current theories of humanitarian occupation. Lastly, Part IV analyses the 
normative and practical limits of international law’s appeal to Good Governance and 
Human Rights Law.  
II 
Arguing for occupation 
A. From negative peace to positive peace.  
Intuitively, the termination of any conflict is obligatory once a just cause has been 
realised. As JAB’s Just Cause criterion suggests, the permission to wage war is tied to 
the protection of particular goods that are threatened, either internally or externally, 
by the society in question. Conversely, if they have ceased to pose a threat to 
outsiders or their own members, societies are entitled to a peaceful existence without 
forceful interference from outside, and parties are obliged to terminate hostilities. Let 
us try and find out when it is obligatory to terminate MHI.  
On the one hand, the point of conflict termination, tterminate, is met as soon as 
Atrocity Crimes have been halted. Since the other-defensive conception of MHI 
derives the right to intervene from the individual right to self-defence held by the 
victims of Atrocity Crimes, the permission to use force ceases to exist once the 
conditions that necessitated the exercise of individual rights to self/other-defence 
have been eliminated. In the words of modern conflict theory, tterminate coincides 
with the achievement of a ‘negative peace’ threshold, which is characterised by the 
absence of atrocious violence.318  
But bearing in mind the centrality of the idea of sovereignty as an enabling condition 
for our theory, the mere achievement of the negative peace threshold is a necessary 
but insufficient condition for tterminate to obtain. Rather, according to the liberal 
legalist element of our theory of MHI, tterminate coincides with the achievement of 
what conflict theorists call ‘positive peace’, which is characterized by the removal of 
the structural preconditions that led to the outbreak of violence.  
While this seems to result in two different accounts of tterminate, they are not 
mutually exclusive. The ‘negative peace’ threshold merely specifies the point at which 
                                                           
318 For an account of the distinction between negative and positive peace, see R. Mani, Beyond 
Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War (Cambridge: Polity, 2002).   
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the intervening state must terminate hostilities with the target state, that is, it defines the 
point at which the large-scale use of force in pursuit of the aims of MHI becomes 
impermissible. However, this is not to say that civil and political interventionist 
measures necessary for the creation of sovereign institutions must also be 
abandoned. Strictly speaking, once the negative peace threshold has been crossed, the 
society located in the target state is not yet classifiable as a post-intervention society. 
Instead, conceptually speaking, it is a post-atrocity society. As such, it is still subject 
to ongoing interventionist policies.  
The positive peace threshold specifies the point at which even civil and political 
interventionist measures must be terminated. It reinforces the Temporary Authority 
Condition by providing a ‘cut-off’ point for intervention. Conceptually speaking, 
once the positive peace threshold is met, a post-atrocity society becomes classifiable 
as a post-intervention society.  
Yet there is no unambiguous definition of when the positive peace threshold has 
been reached. Whereas the negative peace threshold depends on an assessment of 
whether atrocious killing has (been) stopped, it remains open what kinds of functions 
post-atrocity societies must be able to perform in order to speak of an ‘enabling’ 
sovereign order. Roughly, we can expect that the community located within the 
target state’s borders must be peaceful, self-sustaining and capable of exercising its 
right to collective self-determination.319 Admittedly, though, the imprecision of these 
values renders the positive peace threshold prone to abuse by powerful actors in 
world politics, thereby threatening the Insider Interest Condition (and reintroducing 
the Trojan Horse Argument). We return to this problem in a short moment. For the 
remainder of this section let us focus on the implications of these two thresholds for 
our understanding of JIB, JEB and JPB.     
Starting with JIB, while it appears that the achievement of the negative peace 
threshold renders any considerations of JIB superfluous, it is certainly too optimistic 
to assume that, despite the endorsement of civil and political interventionist 
measures, no further uses of force are necessary to pacify post-atrocity societies. It is 
questionable, though, whether the use of force during humanitarian occupation is 
assessable via the same normative criteria as the actual halting of Atrocity Crimes. 
                                                           
319 For a similar argument, see S. Reccia, ‘Just and Unjust Post-war Reconstruction: How much 
external interference can be justified?’, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 23/Issue 2 (2009), pp. 165-
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Note that, in a domestic context, the regulatory framework governing the use of 
force is more restrictive than JIB. For instance, although, as the Car Chase Case in 
Chapter V implied, the police may sometimes be permitted to non-intentionally harm 
bystanders, it is not permitted to adopt, say, a policy of strategic bombing. Indeed, 
given that one of the justifications for the use of strategic bombing (and similar 
measures) was to stop Atrocity Crimes, the ethical framework governing the use of 
force becomes more restrictive once the negative peace threshold has been crossed. 
As a result, considerations of JIB have limited relevance for the ethics of 
humanitarian occupation. 
The implications of our thresholds are more complex in the context of JEB and JPB. 
This is so because we can detect two interpretations of their respective scopes. 
According to what we may call the ‘broad interpretation’ of JEB, its principles 
encompass the creation of sovereign institutions. Consequently JEB governs the 
termination of forcible and non-forcible interventionist measures. According to what 
we can call the narrow interpretation of JEB, its principles merely apply to the 
termination of forcible interventionist measures. Obviously, the broad interpretation 
of JEB narrows the scope of JPB to post-intervention societies, while, for the narrow 
interpretation of JEB, the reconstruction of post-atrocity societies falls into the remit 
of JPB. Conversely, a broad interpretation of JPB, which maintains that post-atrocity 
reconstruction is the task of JPB, restricts the scope of JEB. The two categories, 
then, stand in an inverse relationship to each others. If one is restricted, the other 
automatically expands.  
In what follows, let us adopt the broad interpretation of JEB. The point, for the 
other-defensive conception of MHI, is that the conflict that engendered MHI is not 
over until suitable institutions have been created. JEB’s task of formulating principles 
for the termination of conflict captures this better than JPB. The latter becomes 
important once sovereign institutions have been created. Chapter VIII, the 
concluding chapter of this thesis, briefly indicates some prospects for research on 
JPB, but this chapter focuses on JEB.  
Although we have argued that the reconstruction of post-atrocity societies falls into 
the domain of JEB, the question is whether JEB is superfluous. After all, as Alex 
Bellamy argues, JAB’s just cause criterion already defines the goals of an other-
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defensive war.320 But this does not establish the redundancy of JEB. The introduction 
of JEB reflects that different methods are necessary to accomplish the aims of MHI. 
Classic just war theory, via the categories of JAB and JIB, provides us with normative 
principles, however problematic, for the use of forcible interventionist measures. By 
contrast, as the distinction between the negative and positive peace thresholds 
illustrates, JEB’s task is to develop principles for the construction of sovereign 
institutions once Atrocities Crimes have been militarily halted.  
Having established that military hostilities between the target and intervening state 
should be halted once Atrocity Crimes have been stopped, let us now inquire what 
the termination process should look like. To do so, Section B probes the Consent 
Condition inherent in the concept of Legitimate External Authority.            
B. From termination by consent to occupation by consent? 
Although Jeff McMahan and Michael Walzer remind us that the outbreak of war is 
coercive because it is non-consensual, it appears intuitively desirable to end conflict 
consensually. The current legal and political practice of terminating hostilities via 
peace treaties reflects this intuition. Thus, notwithstanding the earlier argument that 
the initiation of MHI does not require the consent of the target state, let us critically 
assess whether the termination of forcible interventionist measures requires a peace 
treaty between the intervening and target states. Generally, peace treaties have a 
tripartite function.  
1. They indicate how conflicts should be terminated, namely by consent. 
2. While the initial act of aggression usually indicates that a conflict has begun, a 
signed peace treaty signals that parties have entered into ‘post-war’ or ‘post-
atrocity’ relations.321  
3. Peace treaties set out principles that govern post-conflict/post-atrocity 
relations. For instance, parties might agree to reparations, the return of 
prisoners of war, or the distribution of territory. 
                                                           
320 A.J. Bellamy, ‘The responsibilities of victory: Jus Post Bellum and the Just War’, Review of 
International Studies, 34 (2008), pp. 601 -625, at p. 624.   
321 International law, of course, treats the signing of a peace treaty as a sufficient condition for the 
establishment of negative peace. But given the dynamics of contemporary asymmetric conflicts where 
fighting continues even after the ‘official’ termination of hostilities, it remains doubtful that a peace 
treaty can be a sufficient criterion for negative peace.        
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Our discussion of the role of peace treaties must pay attention to two separate 
theoretical issues. On the one hand, we must assess whether consent is required to 
terminate hostilities between the target and intervening states. For simplicity’s sake, 
let us call this idea ‘termination by consent’. On the other hand, since we are 
concerned with humanitarian occupations, we must critically analyse how far consent 
is required for the occupation of the target state’s territory. Let us call this idea 
‘occupation by consent’; it is, obviously, closely related to the Consent Condition 
inherent in the concept of Legitimate External Authority. The following four 
arguments show that neither ‘termination by consent’ nor ‘occupation by consent’ 
can withstand critical scrutiny. 
First, from a practical perspective, just as the leadership of the target state is unlikely 
to agree to the initiation of MHI, it is unlikely to consent to a workable peace treaty. 
This is so because the concept and practice of humanitarian occupation challenges 
the authority of the target state’s leadership, for it is hard to see how the rule of law 
could be established if a government guilty of ordering Atrocity Crimes stayed in 
power. Ultimately, then, the governing elites of the target state would have to 
consent to measures running contrary to their own interests. Of course, the problems 
associated with uncooperative elites could be avoided if consent was directly 
obtained from the people of the target state. But in addition to the problem that it 
will be practically difficult to devise a reliable mechanism for securing their consent, 
it is unlikely that those members of the ‘people’ belonging to the perpetrator group 
are going to agree to surrender their power.    
Second, from a more philosophical perspective, the function of contracts is to 
transform liberties into duties and vice versa. Now, if one follows the Orthodox 
View and affirms the moral equality of soldiers, a peace treaty would indeed be 
required in order to transform the equally held liberty to target enemy combatants 
into a (negative) duty not to do so. But since we rejected the Orthodox View in 
Chapter IV, combatantstarget_state are under a negative duty not to use force against 
combatantsintervening_state. Since it merely affirms an already existing duty, a peace 
treaty is as devoid of moral substance as a contractual agreement between the Wells 
Fargo Bank and the James Gang, which obliges the latter not to rob the former. If 
this is correct, ‘termination by consent’ must be rejected.    
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The third argument against peace treaties applies to ‘termination by consent’ and 
‘occupation by consent’ in equal measure. As Thomas Hobbes puts it, the defeated 
party enters into a peace treaty ‘to avoid the stroke of death’.322 But because most 
contractualist theories assume a rough symmetry between the contracting parties, a 
treaty founded on what international lawyers call ‘coerced consent’ cannot be morally 
valid.323 If it refused to sign the peace treaty, the target state’s territory would be 
occupied anyway by a powerful intervening state. After all, we are assuming that the 
intervening state is victorious, which means that it must be more powerful than its 
adversary. Just as a ‘signed confession’ elicited under torture cannot count as 
admissible evidence in court, the target state’s ‘consent’ to the termination of 
hostilities and the subsequent occupation of its territory is not morally valid.     
The fourth argument against peace treaties primarily raises doubts over the 
normative soundness of ‘occupation by consent’. To explain, since humanitarian 
occupations are social engineering projects, the occupying party must be at liberty to 
create the necessary legislation for the creation of new sovereign institutions. The 
normative challenge is to show that the intervening state possesses the required 
moral liberty to govern post-atrocity societies. Following the consent tradition of 
governmental legitimacy, the normatively most acceptable solution to this problem is 
to argue that the moral liberty to administer the target state’s territory results from a 
peace treaty. More precisely, one can argue that Legitimate External Authority comes 
into existence if (and only if) the target state contractually transfers its right to rule, 
which, as we saw in Chapter II, includes a liberty to enforce and design legislation 
in/for its territory, to the intervening state.  
But this argument runs into two problems. First, although it is uncontroversial that 
some rights, such as the right to private property, are contractually transferrable, it is 
by no means obvious that the same applies to the right to rule. Intuitively, there is a 
difference between a contract through which Amy transfers her right over her bike 
by selling it to Ben and a contract in which a sovereign entity transfers its right to 
rule over individuals (no less) to another party.  
                                                           
322 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, editor: R. Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, revised student 
edition, 1996), chapter XX, at pp. 141 -142. For a more extensive treatment of the problem of coerced 
consent, see G. Fox, Humanitarian Occupation, pp. 177-200.  
323 This does not change anything about the problem of duress discussed in Chapter IV. A person 
under duress is not excused for committing an act of murder. However, any contract entered into 
under duress is invalid. 
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Second, just as Amy cannot enter into a morally valid contract to sell something that 
does not belong to her, the target state cannot contractually transfer a right it does 
not hold. As Chapter III pointed out, a state that commits or tolerates Atrocity 
Crimes is illegitimate. This means that the target state’s consent is irrelevant to the 
question how the ‘humanitarian occupier’ acquires Legitimate External Authority 
over post-atrocity societies. For these reasons ‘occupation by consent’ collapses.   
If the above is sound, it becomes apparent that the idea of a peace treaty is of little 
value in the present context. In fact, given that the target state neglected its duties 
towards its citizenry, it is permissible for the intervening state to terminate hostilities 
by unilaterally occupying the target state’s territory. In order to strengthen the moral 
case for non-consensual occupation, the remainder of this section outlines what we 
can call the Teleological Argument.  
The Teleological Argument rests on an analogy between post-atrocity societies and 
the Hobbesian state of nature. Keohane stresses that, just as the absence of trust in 
the Hobbesian state of nature leads to an imaginary war of all against all, the absence 
of ‘civic trust’ in post-atrocity societies not only acts as an impediment to the 
creation of sovereign institutions but challenges the existence of society as such.324 
Just as the possibility of a war of all against all in the Hobbesian state of nature makes 
individuals distrust each other; the mere possibility of the recurrence of Atrocity 
Crimes will undermine the social existence of post-atrocity societies. Further, the 
sheer legacy of Atrocity Crimes will make it difficult for members of post-atrocity 
societies to develop sufficient levels of civic trust to peacefully solve collective action 
problems.  
If the analogy between the Hobbesian state of nature and post-atrocity societies 
holds, it can serve as the foundation of a teleological justification of unilateral 
occupation. The resulting Teleological Argument replaces the Consent Condition 
within the concept of Legitimate External Authority. In addition to the establishment 
of sovereign institutions, the telos of humanitarian occupations is nothing less than 
the preservation of a social and political existence for those in the target state. In 
other words, non-consensual occupation, though representing a radical step, serves 
the interests of ‘insiders’ by enabling them to have a social rather than an ‘atomistic’ 
existence. If this is correct, the Teleological Argument is compatible with the Insider 
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Interest Condition. Admittedly, however, the Teleological Argument has few 
safeguards against abuse by outsiders. In order to deal with this problem, Section C 
explores its relationship with the Internationalisation Condition inherent in the 
concept of Legitimate External Authority.  
C. Insiders & outsiders: some thoughts on the internationalisation of territory  
One defining feature of humanitarian occupations is that it is carried out by outsiders 
in the service of insiders. Although the Teleological Argument (initially) allows 
almost any party capable of preserving the peace to occupy the target state, current 
international legal practice suggests that humanitarian occupations should not be 
carried out by a single state. Instead, the target state’s territory should be 
‘internationalised’. In practice, this means that the intervening state, once it has 
occupied the territory of the target state, applies to the UN Security Council in order 
to transfer authority over the target state’s territory to the international community. 
The Internationalisation Condition holds that Chapter VII of the UN Charter acts as 
a legal justification for foreign rule.325 But the Insider Interest Condition demands a 
more explicit justification of internationalisation that emphasises the interests of 
insiders. To close this gap, the section outlines two insider-based justifications of 
internationalisation.      
Any normative justification of internationalization must show that the international 
administration of the target state is a sound mechanism for ensuring that the rights of 
those in the target state are vindicated. It becomes apparent that the value of 
internationalisation is largely instrumental, depending on the Security Council’s ability 
to protect the rights of members of post-atrocity societies. If it was possible to 
outline an alternative arrangement that accomplishes this task better, there is no 
reason not to abandon internationalisation. Until such an arrangement can be found, 
though, let us inquire in how far internationalisation can aid the cause of rights.           
In regard to negative rights, Bass contends that an occupying power is under a 
negative duty not to impose its own culture and political system on the vanquished.326 
Undoubtedly the creation of sovereign institutions requires ‘social engineering’. But 
there must be certain limits on the social engineering process. Now, although 
negotiation and bargaining processes in current international institutions are far from 
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perfect, they limit the potential for abuse of the social engineering process. The 
necessity for different actors in an international institution to accommodate each 
other’s interest means that no party will have exclusive free reign to reshape the 
target state according to its own conception of the good. In this way, 
internationalisation reinforces negative rights. Note that this also enables us to deal 
with the imprecision of the positive peace threshold. No state is able to indefinitely 
extend its rule over the target state. The international community must decide 
together whether or not post-atrocity societies can be released into independence.     
Yet, while internationalisation may be a sound mechanism for the protection of 
negative rights, its relationship with positive rights is more ambiguous. As critics of 
internationalisation can point out, the fulfilment of positive duties does not usually 
require any specific institutional arrangement. The mere existence of positive ‘duty to 
reconstruct’ does not prove that internationalisation constitutes the best way to fulfil 
it. But there is at least one reason in favour of internationalisation. Let us assume that 
some duties of reconstruction are owed directly to individual members of post-
atrocity societies so they can fulfil their basic rights. It is easier to ensure that 
individuals receive the assistance they are entitled to if an international institution 
allocates resources.327  
Although it is possible to make a theoretical case for internationalisation, the idea 
may encounter two practical difficulties. First, international institutions may be 
unwilling to take responsibility for the occupation. But as the development of R2P as 
well as the legal framework of humanitarian occupation confirm, the international 
community has been more willing to aid the reconstruction of post-atrocity societies. 
than to engage in the actual halting of Atrocity Crimes. Furthermore, for strategic 
reasons it seems unlikely that members of the international community would be 
entirely indifferent to the situation in the target state. If a unilateral occupier is not 
capable of constructing sovereign institutions for the target state, a resulting ‘failed 
target state’ conflicts with the long term security interests of international society. But 
an unchecked increase in power for the intervening state through successful 
unilateral humanitarian occupation would not be in the interest of the international 
community either. Considering these two points, the international community has 
strong reasons to participate in the reconstruction of the target state.      
                                                           
327 This is, roughly, Brock’s position discussed in Chapter II. G. Brock, Global Justice.  
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Second, it is not too farfetched to imagine a situation where the intervening state is 
unwilling to transfer control over the target state’s territory to an international 
institution. However, since the costs resulting from the reengineering of post-atrocity 
societies are likely to be high, it is questionable whether one party on its own is able 
to stem them. It is not unreasonable, then, to suppose that the intervening state 
requires outside support. If it does not, the international community is justified in 
applying diplomatic and economic pressure in order to gain access to the target state. 
For reasons of space, we cannot provide an account of these measures here, though 
they will obviously have to be elaborated. 
Last but not least, it is necessary to assess whether the demand for 
internationalisation undermines the earlier claim, underlying the other-defensive 
conception of MHI, that unilateral MHI is, in principle, permissible. The other-
defensive conception of MHI is compatible with the Internationalisation Condition 
because there are normative differences between the creation of negative peace and 
‘positive’ social engineering.  
To illustrate the point, while Norman the Neighbour is justified in stopping members 
of a criminal gang beating up a rival, he cannot unilaterally formulate and enforce 
policies that remove the underlying causes of gang related crime in his 
neighbourhood. First, because his neighbours, like members of the international 
community, have a stake in the social environment they inhabit, they should be 
allowed to contribute to the solution of social problems affecting them. Second, 
since his neighbours, like members of post-atrocity societies, are holders of rights, 
any policy enacted to tackle gang crime must respect certain ‘side constraints’. The 
multilateral transformation of the neighbourhood, like the multilateral re-engineering 
of post-atrocity societies, is instrumentally desirable if (and only if) it represents the 
best scheme for the vindication of rights. If the analogy holds, the intervening state’s 
permission to unilaterally intervene in order to halt Atrocity Crimes does not 
automatically translate into a unilateral permission to reengineer the social structure 
of post-atrocity societies.  
D. Conclusion 
This part of the chapter began by noting that the other-defensive conception of MHI 
leads to two ‘termination points’, namely the negative and positive peace thresholds. 
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The former obtains once Atrocity Crimes have been halted, while the latter is met 
once sovereign institutions have been reconstructed. It was argued that JEB governs 
the creation of negative peace and positive peace.  
Our subsequent engagement with JEB sheds some light on the constituent elements 
of the concept of Legitimate External Authority. From a normative perspective, the 
difficulty consists in showing that an external party can gain legitimate authority over 
another state’s territory. If our observations on the value of peace treaties are sound, 
the target state’s consent cannot account for how Legitimate External Authority 
comes into being. Due to the failure of the Consent Condition, we face a complex 
interplay between the Temporary Authority Condition, the Teleological Argument, 
the Insider Interests Condition and the Internationalisation Condition. Based on the 
above, we may define the concept of Legitimate External Authority as follows:  
Legitimate External Authority exists if (and only if) members of an international organisation 
multilaterally and not indefinitely exercise authority over the territory of a post-atrocity society in 
order to a) fill the power vacuum created by the removal of a government guilty of committing 
Atrocity Crimes, b) preserve the possibility of a social existence for members of post-atrocity societies, 
c) vindicate the negative rights of members of post-atrocity societies, d) discharge positive duties to 
reconstruct post-atrocities in the most efficient and effective way, and e) establish positive peace via the 
creation of sovereign institutions.328       
Having shown how Legitimate External Authority can be acquired, we must 
investigate how it should be put to use. That is the purpose of Parts III and IV.   
III 
When problems become solutions: a qualified defence of the state 
The enthusiasm for statism amongst theorists of humanitarian occupation appears 
odd. This is so because the perpetration of Atrocity Crimes either occurred at the 
hands of the target state or resulted from the latter’s inability to preserve the peace 
amongst those under its rule, particularly in situations where two or more hostile 
groups are located within its territory. In this light, it seems bizarre that theorists of 
humanitarian occupation recommend the institutions of the territorially unified target 
                                                           
328 Obviously, the concept of Legitimate External Authority resembles Joseph Raz’s theory of state 
legitimacy. See, J. Raz, Morality of Freedom. For a critique, see L. Green, The Authority of the State 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).   
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state as a solution to the problems arising from its very existence. Nevertheless, since 
the other-defensive conception of MHI is statist in orientation, the section outlines 
three instrumentalist defences of the state. As Chapter II emphasised, liberals are 
united in their refusal to accord the state intrinsic value. The reconstruction of the 
target state as a state is only defensible on instrumental grounds. 
However, we will not discuss the issue of territorial integrity here. There are three 
reasons for why this omission is justified. First, in the philosophical literature on 
secession, there is a broad consensus that groups which have been victims of 
Atrocity Crimes are holders of a moral right to secede.329 Second, sometimes it is 
practically impossible to separate hostile groups occupying the same territory. Third, 
especially in cases where killing was not the result of territorial disputes, the question 
of secession is secondary to the issue of post-atrocity reconstruction. In what 
follows, let us assume that victims and perpetrators, if this distinction can be neatly 
cut, must learn to live together.     
Now, the first instrumentalist argument in favour of the reconstruction of state 
institutions stresses that the non-intervention norms attached to state sovereignty are 
useful insofar as they a) offer protection from the global tyranny of a world state and 
b) ensure that communities are capable of pursuing their own conception of the 
common good. The last point is particularly important when considered against the 
background of the concept of Legitimate External Authority. The aim of re-
establishing sovereign state institutions ensures that the humanitarian occupier only 
temporarily exercises authority over the target state’s territory.  
Second, as we saw in Chapter III, for the liberal legalist position, state sovereignty is 
an enabling condition. The function of the state is to preserve the peace amongst 
individuals and groups who pursue different conceptions of the good life. Moreover, 
following Thomas Nagel, state institutions are needed to realise justice. Bearing in 
mind the problems with the post-statist conceptions of MHI identified in Chapter II, 
it is unlikely that we could construct a non-state unit that can accomplish these tasks 
as effectively as the territorially bounded state. In particular, as liberal legalists 
contend, the preservation of peace is only possible via the provision of a number of 
                                                           
329 For two of the most prominent philosophical works on secession, see A. Buchanan, Secession: The 
Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder/Col: Westview Press, 1991) 
& C. Wellman, A Theory of Secession: the case for political self-determination (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). For a critical legal response to secession, see Fox, Humanitarian Occupation.   
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public goods, most importantly a functioning legal system.330 While it is true that 
recent years have witnessed a proliferation of, say, international human rights 
legislation, the successful implementation and enforcement of the law often relies on 
domestic legal systems. The same holds true with regard to the provision of many 
other public goods.   
The third instrumentalist argument in favour of the state has to do with the closely 
related issues of representation and accountability. In regard to the former, let us 
assume that societies have an interest in entering into relations with other societies. 
State institutions provide a useful mechanism, though by no means the only one, 
through which this can be achieved. States, for instance, represent their citizens in 
international bodies, lobby for their interests, negotiate agreements on their behalf 
and maintain diplomatic ties with other states.  
In regard to the question of accountability, in contemporary political practice we 
usually hold state officials accountable through the institutions of the state, most 
notably via national elections and the various subsidiary bodies of the state. In this 
respect, it is also noteworthy that currently existing models of representative 
democracy developed against the background of territorially demarcated state 
institutions. Of course, this argument largely presupposes that the target state should 
be given some form of representative government, but we shall leave this potentially 
divisive point until Part IV.   
Although these three arguments indicate why state institutions may be instrumentally 
valuable, they do not yet constitute a successful defence of the state. Especially the 
invocation of the values of accountability and representation indicate that we cannot 
divorce the legal commitment to statism from its appeal to Good Governance and 
Human Rights Law.  
Ideally, the target state should be internally reconstructed in such a way that it 
becomes legitimate, not least because the right to rule would enable it to carry out the 
above functions. For instance, it would grant the target state (at least) a moral liberty 
to preserve the peace by enforcing the law against those under its jurisdiction. Also, 
as Chapter II showed, the right to rule will grant the target state immunity from 
outside intervention, thereby aiding its task of protecting communal integrity. 
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Furthermore, as Allen Buchanan points out, a legitimate state will guarantee some 
degree of accountability and representativeness.331 Finally, following the liberal view 
of international politics from Kant’s Perpetual Peace to Rawls’ Law of Peoples, a morally 
legitimate regime is less likely to act aggressively towards others. 
Because it is of central importance for humanitarian occupation, let us discuss the 
internal reconstruction of the target state in Part IV.   
IV 
Social engineering and Liberal Democracy 
A. Maximal or minimal transformation?  
The idea of humanitarian occupation is remarkably radical. For one thing, theorists 
of humanitarian occupation deny one of the central claims of Principle of Sovereign 
Equality outlined in Chapter II, namely that states are at liberty to choose their 
internal constitution as they wish. For another, humanitarian occupations also 
challenge the customary understanding of the (legal) powers of an occupying party in 
international law. It denies that an occupier is allowed to create legislation for the 
occupied territory if (and only if) it is militarily necessary to uphold the occupation. 
Instead, as Fox contends, the standard for the reconstruction of post-atrocity 
societies should be nothing less than liberal democratic. Put crudely, the aim of 
humanitarian occupations is democratisation from above where UN officials 
download ready-made constitutions from the internet, fund political parties and 
supervise national elections.  
That said, legal critics of humanitarian occupation argue that ‘externally imposed 
models of national governance should be distrusted [...] because they [are] regarded 
as pre-empting organic national processes of political reform’.332 According to this 
view, the reconstruction of post-atrocity societies as liberal societies represents a 
form of ‘western triumphalism’ that marginalises more ‘indigenous, organic’ forms of 
self-determination. Similarly, some philosophers have doubted the applicability of the 
liberal democratic model to non-liberal societies. For Bhikhu Parekh, 
democratisation from above is a hopeless undertaking because non-liberal societies 
are not necessarily committed to the moral individualism underlying democratic 
                                                           
331 See, Buchanan, ‘Recognitional Legitimacy and the State System’.      
332 Fox, Humanitarian Occupation, pp. 154-155 
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practice.333  For Rawls, ‘democratic engineering’ is a deeply illiberal project, since it 
contravenes the liberal emphasis on toleration. Rawls argues that liberal societies 
should not impose their model of government on their non-liberal counterparts.    
Just war theorists are equally divided on what reconstruction should entail. Some, like 
Brian Orend, seem to be rather optimistic about the applicability of liberal 
democracy to post- atrocity scenarios, whereas others, most notably Gary Bass, take 
a more critical position. To make sense of this debate, Bellamy offers a useful 
distinction between ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ interpretations of reconstruction.334 
According to the former, any changes to the social and political environment of a 
particular post-conflict scenario should be kept to a minimum. Thus, while 
minimalists are likely to agree with the inherent statism of theories of humanitarian 
occupations because it preserves the existing system of states, they reject the appeal 
to Good Governance and Human Rights Law. In particular, as Bellamy points out, 
they fear that Good Governance imports alien elements of liberal political theory 
into the ethics of war. Ideally, according to the minimalist position, a post-conflict 
environment should be returned to the status quo ante bellum once hostilities have been 
terminated.  
Let us begin by responding to the minimalist position. First, the claim that a return to 
the status quo ante bellum is desirable should be approached with some caution. Given 
the development of the concept of humanitarian occupation in international law, it 
seems that our political and legal reality has already overtaken minimalism. It is 
widely accepted that the stabilisation of post-atrocity societies requires reconstruction 
efforts that exceed what minimalists would normally be prepared to permit. 
Furthermore, since the pre-intervention order in the target state gave rise to Atrocity 
Crimes, it is hard to see how a return to it could ever be morally desirable. Finally 
and directly related to the preceding point, the minimalist approach is incompatible 
with the other-defensive conception of MHI. The latter claims that the establishment 
of sovereign institutions is a just cause for MHI. This means that, at the level JAB, 
our theory of MHI is already structured in a way that prepares the later rejection of 
minimalism 
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Second, the charge that the appeal to Good Governance and Human Rights Law 
turns JPB into just another outpost of liberal political theory is a straw man. 
Arguably, just war theory should not be seen as a fixed body of work but open to 
revision. Since some of the assumptions of just war theory are deeply problematic, 
the tools of liberal political theory are useful in trying to develop it further. 
Moreover, since political theory has always been a pluralistic discipline, the 
development of liberal versions of humanitarian occupation does not preclude the 
possibility of developing non-liberal perspectives on it. Finally, because just war 
theory cannot entirely discard of questions relating to the good (political) life, it is, by 
definition, not a minimalistic theory. Even those who are committed to minimalism 
usually rely on certain normative judgments about the value political community, the 
importance of state sovereignty, the virtue of tolerance, or the desirability of 
pluralism. It is a legitimate undertaking to approach these questions from a liberal 
perspective. 
If the above points are correct, we are left with the maximalist approach, which 
appears more hospitable towards the idea of humanitarian occupation than its 
minimalist counterpart.  In a nutshell, maximalists endorse social engineering and 
reject the claim that a return to the status quo ante bellum is possible and desirable.  
However, it is necessary to offer a more fine-grained account of maximalism than 
Bellamy. More precisely, while the insights of liberal political theory usually play an 
important role in the maximalist camp, we should distinguish between what we can 
call Strong Maximalism and Moderate Maximalism. Both positions accept that 
sovereign institutions and the rule of law can only result from considerable social 
engineering efforts, but differ on the extent to which post-atrocity societies should 
be transformed in order to achieve this aim. Strong Maximalism maintains that 
humanitarian occupiers should transform post-atrocity societies into liberal 
democracies. Moderate Maximalism, by contrast, holds that, although significant 
changes to the social structure of post-atrocity societies are necessary in order to 
remove the structural preconditions that led to the outbreak of Atrocity Crimes, 
social engineering should stop short of creating a liberal society. The moderate 
position overlaps with Rawls’ Law of Peoples, whereas the strong position shares 
greater proximity with a universalistic understanding of liberalism.    
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The question we face now is whether Strong Maximalism is normatively preferable to 
Moderate Maximalism. We can answer it by returning to our earlier discussion of 
Walzer’s Millian Argument in Chapter II. To recapitulate, following Mill’s 
observations on non-intervention, Walzer argues that it is impermissible to militarily 
intervene in another society’s internal affairs in order to change its political system. 
As we argued in Chapter II, the Millian Argument gives rise to two interpretations. 
According to what we called the Argument from Excessive Harm, which is closer to 
Mill’s utilitarian background, the forcible creation of a new regime is 
disproportionate because it is likely to be unsuccessful. On the other hand, according 
to what we called the Argument from Undue Interference, the forcible creation of a 
new regime, even though it may be proportionate in very rare circumstances, violates 
the right to collective self-determination of a political community.335 Let us look at 
both of these arguments in Sections B and C, respectively.   
B. Reconstruction and the limits of philosophy    
Although the problem of proportionality is largely consequentialist in orientation, 
one of the perennial issues in the just war debate is whether all harms should be, as 
the utilitarian calculus demands, counted equally. Suppose that the occupying power 
starts to implement policies which are met with resistance from some sections of the 
population of post-atrocity societies. Unfortunately, resistance quickly transforms 
itself into a violent uprising, leading to tensions between different groups in post-
atrocity societies or neighbouring territories. While this raises considerable doubts 
over whether a liberal regime would be able to guarantee the peace, it is possible to 
maintain that, in order to assess the proportionality of Strong Maximalism, one 
should only count the harms for which the occupying power is directly responsible, 
but not those caused by the resistance movement. Intuitively, this appears acceptable 
because members of the resistance movement are engaged in killing, not the 
occupying power.336  
                                                           
335 Of course, there are important differences between Walzer’s use of the Millian Argument and the 
present endeavour. While, for Walzer, the Millian Argument is largely concerned with the 
permissibility of the use of force in order to create a particular type of regime, the current analysis is 
interested in the permissibility of the use of social engineering in order to create a liberal basic 
structure. Nevertheless, as we shall see below, the structure of the Millian Argument can serve as a 
rough analytical template for post-atrocity reconstruction. 
336 This was Prime Minister Tony Blair’s reply to the Iraq Inquiry headed by Sir John Chilcot. When 
pressed on the lack of planning for the stabilization of Iraq after the removal of Saddam Hussein, 
Blair responded that although the lack of planning was lamentable, insurgents were responsible for 
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To reply, it is true that the occupying power is not directly responsible for the killing. 
But it is worthwhile emphasising that it has a duty of care towards those under its 
control, not least because it has effectively assumed the functions of domestic 
government. The duty of care obliges an occupying power to consider all the 
possible harms that may arise from the introduction of a particular policy, even if it is 
not directly responsible for them. Depending on the circumstances, if a specific 
policy has become untenable, it must be revoked or sufficiently reformed. Obviously, 
if the policies necessary to realise Strong Maximalism undermine the peace, the duty 
of care demands that appropriate alternatives be sought to stop the bloodshed. The 
following discussion, then, assumes that the debate between Strong and Moderate 
Maximalism should be assessed in terms of a broad understanding of proportionality 
where all harms are roughly counted on a similar scale.   
With these preliminary observations out of the way, we can now examine four ways 
in which Strong Maximalism may cause disproportionate harms. The first one harks 
back to what Rawls once called the circumstances of justice. In a nutshell, a society 
that is plagued by extreme scarcity will not be able to successfully institutionalise 
liberal democracy. Moreover, for liberal democracy to be possible citizens need to 
possess a sense of justice that motivates them to cooperate with each other under 
political institutions.  
This is not the place to discuss Rawls’ theory in any detail, but the idea of the 
circumstances of justice may hold a clue as to why the reconstruction of post-atrocity 
societies along liberal lines may cause disproportionate harm. Post-atrocity societies 
are likely to be very poor and, given that Atrocity Crimes took place, its members 
lack the required sense of justice. More generally, post-atrocity societies may not have 
the moral, religious and political traditions required for a liberal regime. As a result, 
the creation of a liberal form of government might be resisted by the local 
population, perhaps, in a worst case scenario, leading to regression from a cold 
conflict into a hot one.    
The first aspect of this argument can be tackled relatively easily. Although it is true 
that post-atrocity societies are usually amongst the most disadvantaged societies, the 
duty to reconstruct ensures that its members receive sufficient resources to rebuild 
                                                                                                                                                               
most of the carnage that followed. While this is true, it can hardly constitute a valid excuse. One 
cannot assume the functions of government without a plan of what governing a particular country 
entails.    
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its institutions. The second aspect of this criticism, however, is more difficult to deal 
with; for the imposition of a completely alien political system on a specific culture 
may indeed turn out to be highly problematic. Moreover, if members of post-atrocity 
societies have no desire to cooperate under liberal institutions, an ambitious social 
engineering project is unsustainable.  
However, there are some steps the occupying power may take in order to make 
Strong Maximalism more attractive to insiders. First, the occupying power should 
not adopt a pure ‘top down’ approach to democratisation. Rather, as Michael Walzer 
suggests, since no culture is a monolithic entity, it should try to gain the support of 
those groups in post-atrocity societies supportive of the social engineering project.337 
Furthermore, occupiers need to stress the personal benefits for members of post-
atrocity societies that follow from the introduction of a liberal political system. The 
next section shows in what sense liberal institutions are more beneficial than others. 
If these efforts turn out to be fruitless, it might be necessary to abandon Strong 
Maximalism.  
The second reason for why Strong Maximalism should be rejected on grounds of 
proportionality can be found in Bass’ work. Echoing Rawls, Bass argues that it is not 
permissible to impose one’s own political system on another society. Just as war must 
be conducted with an acceptable measure of restraint, i.e. by discriminating between 
combatants and non-combatants, any reconstruction efforts undertaken as part of a 
humanitarian occupation must be similarly restricted.338  It is not clear, though, why 
Bass thinks the analogy between discrimination and reconstruction is appropriate. It 
is only possible to answer this question if we consider the role of discrimination in 
JIB. Indiscriminate killing, as was pointed out on previous occasions, is not only 
morally deplorable because it violates the rights of defenceless people. In addition, it 
is morally objectionable because it undermines the basis of society by destroying the 
practices and traditions defining social relations between members. It leads, in 
Claudia Card’s words, to the social death of a society. If Bass is correct, 
overambitious social engineering must have a similar effect. 
But Strong Maximalism is not liable to this criticism. In her work on development, 
for instance, Martha Nussbaum argues that a list of universal capabilities should 
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underwrite a democratic constitution.339 But as Nussbaum points out, this does not 
mean that a non-liberal society should be completely reengineered. Far from it, 
democratic constitutions can facilitate a dialogue between members of post-atrocity 
societies through which they can collectively decide on how to solve social problems. 
Rather than relying on the complete transformation of a non-liberal culture by an 
external party, Nussbaum’s point is that liberal democracy enables members to 
challenge oppressive traditions or customs themselves. Taking Nussbaum’s work as a 
guide, then, Strong Maximalism does not need to entail a complete transformation of 
post-atrocity societies where an outside party destroys a traditional culture. Instead, 
Strong Maximalism puts institutions in place through which members of post-
atrocity societies can communicate their social experiences. If sound, Strong 
Maximalism enhances what Card called the social vitality of a community. 
The third proportionality-based objection to Strong Maximalism maintains that it 
causes disproportionate harm because it undermines pluralism in international 
society. But critics who feel inclined to advance this argument need to answer why 
pluralism should be valuable. Presumably pluralism is normatively desirable because 
it enables individuals to undertake ‘experiment of living’. It is possible to argue that, 
in case there is less pluralism, the lives of outsiders, i.e. the members of international 
society, are somehow going to be worse. But even if this was true, it contradicts the 
Insider Interest Condition inherent in the concept of Legitimate External Authority. 
Outsider interests are clearly not irrelevant for humanitarian occupations, but the 
interests of insiders should count more strongly in any assessment of proportionality. 
If the arrangements proposed by Strong Maximalism considerably benefit insiders 
without undermining the prospect of a stable international society, any harms arising 
from a diminution of pluralism become negligible. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that the reconstruction of post-atrocity societies along 
liberal lines will have a negative effect on pluralism. First, there are different models 
of liberal democracy, featuring diverse institutional mechanisms through which 
decisions can be made. Second, bearing Nussbaum’s remarks on democracy in mind, 
the creation of liberal regimes does not presuppose the destruction of indigenous 
forms of life. Finally, as David Miller suggests, the exercise of the right to collective 
self-determination via democratic institutions is likely to lead to different schemes of 
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distributive justice within societies.340 Unless societies are going to make fairly similar 
decisions, Strong Maximalism is compatible with a concern for pluralism, albeit in 
democratic form.  
Let us now turn to the fourth and final proportionality-based argument against 
Strong Maximalism, which is related to Bellamy’s charge that the introduction of 
liberal political theory undermines just war theory. It is possible to use Bellamy’s 
point in order argue that the introduction of Strong Maximalism leads to a slippery 
slope because, if it becomes legitimate to bring about a democratic regime after war, 
states might be tempted to use Strong Maximalism in order to justify the declaration 
of a war aimed at ‘regime change’. But this argument would have to be verified 
empirically. If any increase in the declaration of wars was traceable to the 
introduction of Strong Maximalism, reconstruction policy must indeed be rethought. 
But there is no reason to abandon Strong Maximalism until such data is available.   
The conclusions of this section are rather mixed. On the one hand, Strong 
Maximalism can withstand many of the critical charges levelled against it. On the 
other hand, the violent rejection of Strong Maximalism by those whom it is intended 
to serve may prompt its abandonment in favour of a form of Moderate Maximalism. 
The Argument from Excessive Harm points out the limits of philosophy because any 
assessment of whether Strong Maximalism is likely to fail or succeed in a particular 
context requires analytical tools outside the scope of philosophical discussion. It 
necessitates a closer engagement with the fields of political science and conflict 
studies than is possible here.  
But although Strong Maximalism might sometimes fail, it is questionable whether 
there is a viable non-liberal alternative. Rawls’ idea of Decent Hierarchical Peoples, 
introduced in Chapter II, comes to mind, but for reasons explained in the next 
section, it is unlikely that it can guarantee the necessary stability required for a 
reasonably secure basic structure.  
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C. Always look at the bright side of liberal democracy 
There are two main reasons for why the development of a rights-based perspective 
on social engineering is important. First, as we saw above, critics of humanitarian 
occupation contend that ‘liberal’ social engineering marginalises more ‘organic’ or 
‘indigenous’ processes of self-determination, perhaps even violating the right to 
collective self-determination. Needless to say, if this was the case, Strong Maximalism 
would contradict Legitimate External Authority’s Insider Interest and 
Internationalisation Conditions. Secondly, given the non-consequentialist argument 
that we must place suitable constraints on consequences, any social engineering 
project must be subject to a concern for rights, independently of a mere concern for 
proportionality. In response to these two points, let us scrutinise the relationship 
between the right to collective self-determination and the concept of humanitarian 
occupation in general and Strong Maximalism in particular.  
From a Hohfeldian perspective, the right to collective self-determination consists of 
a) a liberty to make decisions about the social organisation of a community and b) a 
right correlated to a negative duty obliging outside parties not to interfere with the 
decision making process. As such, the right to collective self-determination underlies 
our modern notions of popular sovereignty. Any occupation, even if carried out for 
benign purposes, gives rise to a fundamental tension between popular sovereignty 
and the rule of the occupying power. It must, therefore, be clarified a) how far the 
right to collective self-determination gives a political community a liberty to 
determine the political system through which it subsequently governs itself and b) 
how this liberty can be balanced against the occupier’s liberty to administer the target 
state’s territory. In particular, it must be assessed whether, as a matter of right, 
members of post-atrocity societies may reject the institutions set out by Strong 
Maximalism in favour of a non-liberal framework. To make progress on these issues, 
it is worthwhile pointing out that the case of post-atrocity societies poses two 
practical problems.  
First, in light of the above analogy between the Hobbesian state of nature and post-
atrocity societies, it is questionable whether members of post-atrocity societies 
constitute a political community that could be identified as the holder of a right to 
collective self-determination. On the one hand, following the interest theory of 
rights, while members of post-atrocity societies have certain collective interests in 
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public goods necessary for their security, it is questionable whether they have 
collective interests in those types of public goods, such as a communal identity, that 
can give rise to a claim to self-determination. On the other hand, even if members of 
post-atrocity societies shared an identity, the latter might be ‘obnoxious’ because 
certain aspects of it may have led to mass killing. In both cases, as the term ‘nation 
building’ suggests, social engineering is required to ‘construct’ a collective identity for 
members of post-atrocity societies that can give rise to legitimate, i.e. non-obnoxious, 
interests in self-determination. Until this has been accomplished, post-atrocity 
societies cannot be considered as the actual holder of a right to collective self-
determination. Instead, post-atrocity societies need to be seen as potential right 
holders.   
Second, assuming for the sake of the argument that members of post-atrocity 
societies are actual holders of a right to collective self-determination, there is no 
mechanism through which they can exercise it. Because it is difficult to see how local 
elites could remain in power after Atrocity Crimes have been halted, the unilateral 
occupation of the target state is likely to lead to the removal of its government. What 
is needed, then, is an initial decision procedure through which a new political system 
can be chosen. One possible response to this problem is that communities have 
certain shared traditions and practices that give a clue as to what political system 
would be chosen if the community in question was able to exercise its right to 
collective self-determination. But given what has just been said about the need to 
construct a new civic identity for post-atrocity societies, the appeal to shared 
practices is not a reliable guide. Thus, even if members of post-atrocity societies held 
a right to collective self-determination, they cannot exercise it.  
If this is true, it is hard to see how the ‘organic’ processes of self-determination 
favoured by critics of Strong Maximalism could ever lead to the choice of a political 
system by members of post-atrocity societies. Instead, the occupying power must lay 
down an initial decision procedure through which any subsequent decisions about 
the collective life of a political community can be made. Nevertheless, if the idea of 
‘nation building’ is sound, the occupier must view post-atrocity societies as potential 
holders of a right to collective self-determination. Consequently, the construction of 
an initial decision procedure must not result in institutions that make future exercises 
of rights by members of post-atrocity societies impossible. In addition to a 
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commitment to the protection of individual human rights, this is the best 
interpretation of Legitimate External Authority’s Insider Interest Condition. Of 
course, following the interest theory of rights, the nature of the resulting ‘side-
constraints’ on social engineering depends on how one views the (potential) interests 
underlying the right to collective self-determination. In what follows, let us outline 
two accounts of the right to collective self-determination and explore their 
relationship with Moderate Maximalism and Strong Maximalism, respectively.  
In regard to the former, Rawls’ idea of Decent Hierarchical Peoples is the best 
example of a liberal approach to collective self-determination that leads to highly 
illiberal conclusions. Although Rawls does not treat the right to collective self-
determination in greater detail, it is clear that Decent Hierarchical Peoples, which are 
recognised as equal right holders under Rawls’ Law of Peoples, do not view their 
citizens as free and equal individuals but members of associations.341 It is hardly 
surprising, then, that the right to collective self-determination held by Decent 
Hierarchical Peoples is not analytically reducible to the (collective/aggregate) 
interests of individuals. Decent Hierarchical Peoples hold their right to collective 
self-determination qua group, which indicates some proximity between Rawls’ theory 
and the corporate interpretation of the interest theory of rights.  
Now, for those committed to Moderate Maximalism, this view may be attractive 
because it reflects that humanitarian occupation is often going to take place in 
societies that do not have individualistic moral traditions. If this is sound, in order to 
protect corporate interests in self-determination, the occupier should create institutions 
resembling those of Decent Hierarchical Peoples. This illustrates Moderate 
Maximalim’s assumption that, though social engineering is justified, it should fall 
short of the creation of a liberal regime.  
But it is questionable whether the non-liberal perspective on self-determination is 
conducive to the creation of a reasonably secure basic structure. For instance, Rawls’ 
idea of a decent consultation hierarchy for Decent Hierarchical Peoples does not give 
their members an equal voice in decision-making.342 While the political leadership 
consults its citizens on matters of public policy, it is not bound by their preferences. 
Further, although members of Decent Hierarchical Peoples have human rights to be 
                                                           
341 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 73.   
342 (ibid), pp. 71-72.    
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protected from ethnic cleansing and genocide, they do not have an equal set of civic 
and political rights. But as has been pointed out on previous occasions, the latter 
might be instrumentally necessary in order to guarantee the former. Finally, since 
recent research in political science has shown that equality is an important 
precondition for the existence of civic trust, the profound inequalities resulting from 
an illiberal and non-individualistic approach to self-determination undermine the 
central aim of humanitarian occupation, namely to facilitate the development of civic 
trust amongst members of post-atrocity societies.343  
By contrast, a liberal individualist approach to the right to collective self-
determination avoids these problems. Following the collective rather than corporate 
interpretation of the interest theory of rights, it maintains that group interests are 
analytically reducible to the interests of individuals. Now, if one focuses on the 
interests of members of post-atrocity societies qua individuals, it becomes apparent 
why the right to collective self-determination should be exercised via democratic 
institutions. Put simply, since each member has an equal interest in the existence of 
their political community, everyone should have an equal voice in its decision making 
process. This idea can be strengthened via an appeal to Thomas Christiano’s 
argument for democratic equality.344 Christiano, like Andrea Sangiovanni and other 
liberal legalists, assumes that individuals have interdependent interests in public 
goods that are key features of their society. Drawing on egalitarian theories of justice, 
he argues that justice demands that individuals should be given equal resources, 
understood as equal votes and access to deliberation, to affect political decisions 
about their common life and the distribution of relevant public goods. Accordingly, 
the right to self-determination is a right to democratic self-determination.       
If Christiano is right, it is easy to see why the democratic understanding of political 
self-determination offers a better interpretation of a secure sovereign order than 
Moderate Maximalism. This is so because, in addition to facilitating the 
redevelopment of civic trust, the argument from democratic equality empowers 
individuals to protect themselves against future attacks by giving them a voice in 
political decisions. Crucially, liberal democracy enables individuals to pursue their 
                                                           
343 See, E.M. Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).   
344 T. Christiano, The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory (Boulder/Co: Westview 
Press, 1996).  
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interests in social goods via peaceful means. It gives them equal resources in votes 
rather than guns.  
Indeed, the endorsement of democratic equality is particularly important in the 
context of post-atrocity societies. In his monumental study of the reasons for 
genocide and ethnic cleansing, Michael Mann, the eminent sociologist, argues that 
Atrocity Crimes occur when the demos becomes confused with the ethnos. For Mann, 
this confusion is the (potential) dark side of democracy. The liberal version of 
democracy avoids this danger. It stresses that everyone is allowed to partake in 
decision-making process, regardless of ethnic affiliation. It offers an inclusive version 
of the demos, abstracting from particular identities. This is the bright side of liberal 
democracy.         
From a rights-based perspective, then, there is no tension between the creation of 
liberal institutions by the occupier and future exercises of the right to collective self-
determination by members of post-atrocity societies. Since the right to collective self-
determination should be understood as a right to democratic self-determination, 
humanitarian occupiers are at liberty to bring about a democratic political system in 
the occupied territory through which members of post-atrocity societies can 
subsequently make political decisions.345 The successful implementation of 
democracy will take post-atrocity societies closer to the positive peace threshold 
where all interventionist measures must be abandoned.  
Because Strong Maximalism, unlike Moderate Maximalism, emphasises the interests 
of the weakest and most vulnerable members of post-atrocity societies, it is an 
important step towards the realisation of sovereign institutions. Furthermore, the 
endorsement of Strong Maximalism assists us in solving the problem of legitimacy 
identified in Part III of the chapter; for, as indicated above, democratic states, unlike 
non-democratic ones, are usually thought of possessing a right to rule.  
 
                                                           
345 Critics might reply that the defence of Strong Maximalism renders the Internationalisation 
Condition superfluous, for it seems that democratic interveners should have a permission to 
unilaterally transform the culture of the target state. But this criticism misses the point. First, 
Nussbaum’s work shows that democratisation does not give rise to a permission to completely 
transform all aspects of post-atrocity societies. If Nussbaum is right, democratic regimes may be 
compatible with different indigenous cultures, depending on the social resources available to them. 
Second, the issue of abuse still looms large. Unless they are saints, even democratic states might be 
tempted to extend their reign over post-atrocity societies in inappropriate ways.  
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D. Conclusion: 
One of the most controversial issues in contemporary world politics is the question 
how the political and social institutions of post-atrocity societies should be 
reconstructed. The above showed that there are two main approaches to this 
problem. While minimalism is neither realistic nor normatively desirable, maximalism 
gives rise to two main interpretations. Moderate Maximalism holds that extensive 
social engineering is permissible, but maintains that it should stop short of bringing 
about a liberal democracy. Strong Maximalism, by contrast, assumes that liberal 
democracy can be permissibly created as an institutional framework for post-atrocity 
societies. If the above reflections are correct, Strong Maximalism is a defensible 
position because it represents the best interpretation of how a peaceful society can be 
constructed.  
But although Strong Maximalism is desirable, we have to balance it against the 
Argument from Excessive Harm. Even though the aim of creating democratic 
institutions for post-atrocity societies is a laudable one, it might have to be 
abandoned if its realisation leads to disproportionate harms. The greatest difficulty 
consists in showing when this is the case. Unfortunately, there is little political 
philosophers can do to resolve the inherent tension between rights-based and 
proportionality-based approaches to internal reconstruction, not least because any 
attempt to do so requires complex empirical judgements beyond the scope of 
philosophical inquiry. Nevertheless, philosophical reflection can help us to think 
more clearly about the aims of humanitarian occupations.  
V 
Conclusion 
This chapter tried to provide a normative perspective on the phenomenon of 
humanitarian occupation in contemporary international law and politics. Arguing that 
the ethics of humanitarian occupation falls into the remit of JEB, the chapter began 
inquiring how an external party, i.e. the occupying power, can acquire Legitimate 
External Authority over the target state’s territory. Legitimate External Authority can 
best be understood as involving a Hohfeldian liberty to enforce and create legislation 
for post-atrocity societies in order to remove the structural preconditions that led to 
Atrocity Crimes. Contrary to international law, the chapter argued that Legitimate 
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External Authority can be acquired without the consent of the target state. This 
means that it is permissible for the intervening state to (non-consensually) occupy the 
target state by removing its government from power. Nonetheless, to safeguard 
against abuse, humanitarian occupations should subsequently be conducted by an 
international body rather than a single state.  
The chapter then tried to shed some light on the reconstruction of post-atrocity 
societies. First, following international law and the liberal legalist idea that 
sovereignty is an enabling condition, the chapter affirmed the importance of state 
institutions but denied that the territorial integrity of the target state must be 
preserved at all cost. Second, it was argued that the reconstructed state unit(s) should 
be internally democratic, although it depends on the practical circumstances whether 
this goal is achievable. Lastly, the chapter argued that once the structural 
preconditions for mass murder have been removed by the introduction of a liberal 
democratic regime, interventionist measures must be terminated.  
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Chapter VIII 
Concluding Remarks: in defence of liberal interventionism  
We began this thesis by noting the prevalence of large-scale atrocities in human 
history. Atrocities, as we observed, are a matter of non-ideal theory, as they signal 
large-scale non-compliance with certain fundamental moral principles. Faced with 
the challenge posed by atrocities, we argued that political philosophy must tackle 
three main questions.  
First, political philosophers must identify what is distinctive about mass atrocities. 
Drawing on Claudia Card’s Atrocity Paradigm, Chapter III argued that atrocities 
represent morally distinctive forms of wrongdoing. First and foremost, they must be 
classified as grave moral evils. Evil, on Card’s account, has two dimensions. The 
‘agency component’, which accounts for the non-ideal element within atrocities, 
maintains that an agent culpably violates moral duties not to cause harm. The ‘harm 
component’ indicates that the resulting harm is intolerable. Evil, as Card rightly puts 
it, tends to ruin lives. But even within the category of evils, mass atrocities, including 
genocide, mass murder and ethnic cleansing, occupy a distinctive place. This is so 
because their perpetrators engage in the indiscriminate killing of defenceless 
individuals. Moreover, the indiscriminate killing of victims is often characterised by 
gratuitous levels of violence. While evils make live indecent, they also make death 
undignified. Finally, even if some victims escape the killing, they often suffer a social 
death. Perpetrators of what we called Atrocity Crimes aim to destroy the cultural and 
social preconditions that enable individuals to enter into meaningful social relations 
with others.  
Second, political philosophers must develop principles that govern our responses to 
moral evils. In order to do so, the thesis drew upon two main philosophical 
resources, namely non-consequentialism and just war theory. Non-consequentialists 
contend that, even if an agent tries to prevent highly undesirable consequences, he 
must abide by certain restrictions. In other words, like consequentialists, non-
consequentialists think that consequences matter morally. Yet they deny that 
consequences are the only things that matter. Rights place important side-constraints 
on our actions, while the distinctions between doing and allowing as well as intending 
and foreseeing restrict the way in which consequences enter into our moral 
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reasoning. The justification of these restrictions lies in the view that individuals are 
capable of autonomously choosing a conception of the good life. The purpose of 
non-consequentialist reasoning is to protect the status of individuals as ends-in-
themselves. 
In regard to just war theory, the thesis engaged with the phenomenon of MHI. More 
precisely, it developed the conception of MHI as an other-defensive war. At a 
methodological level, the other-defensive conception of MHI is the outcome of an 
attempt to reconcile our considered judgements about killing and saving in domestic 
society with the ethics of war. To do so, we drew an analogy between so-called 
rescue killings in domestic society and MHI. In a rescue killing, a rescuer defends a 
victim against an attacker. By analogy, the intervening state defends the victims of 
Atrocity Crimes against those who perpetrate them. Like unjust aggression in 
domestic circumstances, Atrocity Crimes are the outcome of culpable wrongdoing. 
In an abstract sense, MHI can be seen as the mass exercise of individual rights to 
defend victims Atrocity Crimes against those threatening their lives.    
But the other-defensive conception of MHI goes further than that. States guilty of 
perpetrating or tolerating Atrocity Crimes fail to preserve a sovereign order for those 
under their rule. Following recent liberal legalist writings on the problem of global 
justice, the other-defensive conception of MHI considers sovereignty as an enabling 
condition necessary to protect our (interdependent) interests in autonomy and 
physical security. The other-defensive conception of MHI assumes that the 
occurrence of Atrocity Crimes signals that a state fails to carry out its sovereign 
functions appropriately. This view of sovereignty has three major implications.  
First, Chapter III argued that, just as culpable attackers forfeit their right not to be 
attacked in domestic society, ‘failed states’ forfeit their right against interference and 
become liable to attack. As a result, the intervening state, provided it meets certain 
criteria, is not an unjust aggressor. Even though the intervening state has not 
suffered an attack by the target state, it does not violate any duties not to aggress the 
target state. The other-defensive conception of MHI, then, urges us to distinguish 
between just and unjust aggression. 
Second, given that the target state is not performing its sovereign functions, Chapter 
III argued that the intervening state is also the holder of a right to intervene. The 
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latter obliges the target state not to engage in a self-defensive war against the 
intervening state. In this respect, the other-defensive conception of MHI closely 
tracks the ethics of domestic rescue killings. Following a justice-based understanding 
of the ethics of self-defence, culpable attackers are not at liberty to defend 
themselves against a rescuer.  
Third, the other-defensive conception of MHI is more demanding than previous 
conceptions. The aims of MHI are not purely negative. They do not merely consist in 
the halting of certain atrocities. Rather, the positive goal is to establish a sovereign 
order and secure the rule of law for residents of the target state. This means that the 
other-defensive conception of MHI aims to accommodate recent legal theories of 
humanitarian occupations. Chapter VII offered a cautious defence of reconstructing 
post-atrocity societies along liberal democratic lines. Liberal democracy pursues a 
politics of inclusion. It considers its members as equal citizens, regardless of their 
more contingent identities. It is doubtful that there is an alternative to the politics of 
inclusion. Of course, the usual suspects, who would, rather predictably, accuse the 
other-defensive conception of MHI of endorsing liberal imperialism, must specify an 
acceptable alternative to liberal democratic politics. There are reasons to be sceptical 
whether ‘organic processes of self-determination’ can provide a normatively desirable 
alternative to contemporary liberalism. 
This takes us to the final of the three main questions identified in Chapter I. We 
argued that political philosophers must specify our obligations towards those 
threatened by Atrocity Crimes. The other-defensive conception of MHI is a 
philosophical interpretation of the responsibility to protect (R2P). It contends that 
MHI is not merely permissible, but also obligatory. In order to defend this claim, 
Chapter VII drew an analogy between mandatory rescue killings in domestic society 
and the duty to intervene. In doing so, it maintained that individuals threatened by 
Atrocity Crimes qua individuals and qua collective have a right to be rescued. The 
problem, however, is that it might not always be possible to fulfil this right. While the 
correlative duty of the right to be rescued is assigned to states, individual citizens 
cannot be morally required to partake in an other-defensive war. That said, the 
argument shows that states must put in place institutions through which they can 
discharge their duties. Certainly we can criticise states for not doing so.                
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This short summary outlines the rough contours of the other-defensive conception 
of MHI. In order to conclude this thesis, let us ask a) why the other-defensive 
conception of MHI is normatively attractive, b) what future issues it gives rise to, and 
c) whether it can meet the challenge, identified in Chapter I, posed by non-
consequentialist anti-interventionism.  
The other-defensive conception of MHI is attractive for a number of reasons. First, 
it is fairly comprehensive. By drawing an analogy with rescue killings, it provides a 
framework in which we can place all the major issues a normative theory of MHI is 
expected to tackle. It is fair to say that the debate about MHI has gone through 
various phases. As Chapter II indicated, the traditional debate about MHI in political 
theory has largely been concerned with the dispute between broad and narrow 
interventionists. But this is slowly changing. For instance, issues relating to the 
conduct of MHI have become more prominent. The same is the case with regard to 
the duty to intervene. Finally, given the renewed interest in jus ex bello and jus post 
bellum, debates about the reconstruction of post-conflict societies are, hopefully, 
bound to become central to just war thinking. The other-defensive conception of 
MHI is able to offer a coherent outlook on all these issues. It unites traditional, 
contemporary and future debates about MHI in a single approach.  
Second, Chapter I observed that, partly because theorists of the just war have 
devoted most of their attention to self-defensive wars, they have not developed a 
suitable analogue to the crime of aggression for MHI. Indeed, as Chapter II 
explained, many theorists of MHI leave the nature of a just cause for MHI rather 
vague. By utilising Card’s Atrocity Paradigm, the other-defensive conception of MHI 
sheds light on the question why certain wrongdoings are morally distinctive. By 
utilising the justice-based perspective on self-defence, it also accounts for why it is 
permissible --- in fact obligatory --- to respond to atrocities via military force. In 
doing so, the other-defensive conception of MHI offers a restrictive reading of jus ad 
bellum’s just cause criterion. Many liberal projects --- the commitment to justice, the 
endorsement of representative democracy, and the emphasis on civic, political and 
socio-economic rights --- are laudable and noble ones. But this does not mean that 
they should be pursued via military force. War can only be an answer to genocide, 
massacre, mass murder, and ethnic cleansing. In this sense, the other-defensive 
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conception of MHI tries to counter the excessively permissive interventionism 
prevalent amongst some liberal theorists.  
Third, the other-defensive conception of MHI sheds critical light on some of the 
assumptions of just war theory. As Chapter IV showed, it is critical of the normative 
separation of jus ad bellum from jus in bello. The two cannot be considered 
independently from each other. As a result, the right to intervene held by the 
intervening state is also held by its combatants. In this context, one of the most 
interesting aspects of the other-defensive conception of MHI is that it explicitly 
engages with the moral status of perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes. This is an issue that 
contemporary theorists of MHI have overlooked. 
Furthermore, as Chapter V illustrated, the other-defensive conception of MHI is also 
critical of some of the assumptions of jus in bello. First, while it upholds the 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants, it argues that the category of 
the former must be extended. This gives us a more realistic (moral) picture of 
contemporary conflict. As was stressed in Chapter I, conflicts often contain ‘grey 
zones’. To respond to these complex circumstances, our treatment of non-combatant 
immunity provides us with a more flexible and, therefore, appropriate set of 
principles for the conduct of MHI. 
Importantly, however, the other-defensive conception of MHI also restricts what can 
be permissibly done to non-combatants during MHI. Chapter V emphasised that the 
Doctrine of Double Effect does not provide a moral blank cheque for the killing of 
non-combatants. Rather, the doctrine must be suitably restricted. For one thing, it 
cannot be separated from the overall goals of a war. The argument that non-
combatants require special protection is reinforced by the treatment of the 
proportionality criterion, especially insofar as dual infrastructure targets are 
concerned. The sociologist Martin Shaw has recently criticised that, in contemporary 
conflict situations, there is a tendency to almost absolutely minimise risks to one’s own 
troops at the expense of non-combatants.346 While the other-defensive conception of 
MHI stresses that intervening states must not expose their combatants to 
unreasonable risks, it also underlines the significance of what Michael Walzer called 
duties of ‘due care’ towards non-combatants.  
                                                           
346 M. Shaw, The New Western Way of War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005).  
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More generally, our treatment of the conduct of MHI identifies some future issues 
for research. First, we argued that neither perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes nor those 
combatants summoned to the defence of the target state are at liberty to target 
intervening combatants. In other words, the use of self-defensive force against 
intervening combatants constitutes a violation of duties of non-aggression. To be 
sure, the violation of these moral duties not to kill fellow combatants in war may not 
mean that unjust combatants (target state) should be liable to punishment. Yet it is 
not unreasonable to suppose that our rejection of the independence of jus ad bellum 
from jus in bello has implications for post-war relations. Should unjust combatants 
repent what they have done? Do they have moral obligations towards those whom 
they killed? Should they work towards reconciliation? Should they appear before 
truth commissions? Should they help construct a new military and political culture in 
their society? These are not only philosophically interesting questions, they are also 
politically relevant. It is to be hoped that theorists of the just post bellum will take them 
up in the future.    
Note, however, that the issue of post-war obligations does not only affect ‘unjust’ 
combatants. It is also relevant for those with a just cause. By developing the Public 
Goods Argument, Chapter V contended that the Doctrine of Double Effect should 
not be used to make negative duties not to harm disappear. Instead, the infliction of 
foreseen harms on non-combatants should be considered as a justified infringement 
of their rights. This suggests that even those with a just cause have post-bellum 
obligations towards non-combatants. In this way, the other-defensive conception of 
MHI challenges the perception that no duties of reparation are owed to non-
combatants or their families. Non-combatants have not been wronged, provided 
interveners abided by standards of proportionality and due care. But nevertheless, 
important negative duties have been overridden, albeit justifiable.  
Last but not least, let us assess whether the other-defensive conception of MHI 
withstands the challenge posed by non-consequentialist anti-interventionism. 
Drawing on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, anti-interventionists can argue that 
it is worse to intervene and kill than not to intervene and let die. The other-defensive 
conception of MHI raises doubts over this claim.  
First, given that Atrocity Crimes are paradigmatic of the gravest evils we know, it is 
hard to uphold the claim that killing is necessarily worse than letting die.  
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Second, the doctrine has relatively little force when it comes to the killing of 
combatantstarget_state because they are liable to attack. This point is particularly 
relevant when it comes to the killing of the actual perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes. As 
Chapter IV showed, perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes are often culpably responsible 
for gratuitous levels of violence. Hence it would be worse not to defend victims of 
Atrocity Crimes against their killers. Non-consequentialist anti-interventionism may 
have greater force when it comes to the killing of non-combatants. But even though 
some non-combatants may be killed during MHI, these killings are constrained via 
Double Effect and a relatively restrictive interpretation of the principle of due care. 
None of this is intended to suggest that the doctrine as such is unsound. But it surely 
matters for our assessment of a situation ‘how’ and ‘with what justification’ 
individuals are killed.  
Third, the idea that sovereignty is an enabling condition is also important for our 
rejection of non-consequentialist anti-interventionism. Anti-interventionists must 
argue that ‘state failure’ is tolerable compared to MHI. But in light of what we know 
about failed states, this claim is rather dubious. It should be rejected for obvious 
strategic, political and moral reasons. It is noteworthy that this argument also 
exposes one of the central dichotomies in the debate about MHI as being overly 
simplistic. It is sometimes argued that MHI reflects a tension between ‘justice’ and 
‘order’ in international affairs. The other-defensive conception of MHI, however, 
rejects this dichotomy. First and foremost, the purpose of MHI is not to make 
societies just but to halt certain grave evils. Furthermore, the other-defensive 
conception of MHI is committed to order. It argues that the target state must be 
reconstructed as a sovereign entity that can take its equal place in the society of 
states. Large-scale humanitarian crises and failed states can potentially undermine 
international peace and security. The other-defensive conception of MHI tries to 
prevent this.         
To conclude, Chapter II observed that almost no contemporary liberal political 
philosopher rejects MHI. Although its practitioners disagree on many technical 
issues, contemporary liberal political theory is, by and large, pro-interventionist. 
While it tries to avoid some of the ‘normative’ excesses found in the liberal 
intervention debate, the other-defensive conception of MHI reaffirms the 
importance and normative soundness of liberal interventionism. 
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